


Urban Issues: Special Edition on Transport Planning

January 1973

The Institute of Urban Studies





THE UNIVERSITY OF
WINNIPEG

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URBAN ISSUES: SPECIAL EDITION ON TRANSPORT PLANNING

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The Institute of Urban Studies is an independent research arm of the University of Winnipeg. Since 1969, the IUS has been both an academic and an applied research centre, committed to examining urban development issues in a broad, non-partisan manner. The Institute examines inner city, environmental, Aboriginal and community development issues. In addition to its ongoing involvement in research, IUS brings in visiting scholars, hosts workshops, seminars and conferences, and acts in partnership with other organizations in the community to effect positive change.

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special edition on

TRANSPORT PLANNING

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Transportation planning and the community

Lloyd Axworthy

Transportation has always been a central factor in the growth and development of Winnipeg. From its earliest days as a meeting ground at the fork of two rivers, through the coming of the CPR to the advent of the automobile, Winnipeg's fortune and future have been wrapped up in the decisions made on transportation.

It is no different today. Winnipeg is presently faced with two major transportation proposals that will have significant impact on the city for the next several

years. Both the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study--detailing the proposed construction of a major freeway system, and the Railway Rationalization Study--detailing the relocation of major rail facilities, encompass expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars, and will yield a major transformation of the geography, economics and social profile of Winnipeg. The decisions made in these proposals will, without any doubt, affect the lives and

livelihood of every Winnipeg resident now and in the future.

It seems necessary, therefore, for citizens of this city to ask the right questions about the present proposals. Too much is at stake to have the present proposal accepted without very thorough public examination, and extensive public debate. We should know exactly what are the objectives, what is the cost, and what is the impact.

This is especially important in light of recent events and developments in urban transportation that call into question many of the conventional planning concepts in urban transit. For example, the value of major freeway systems are now being challenged in cities right across North America. Three years ago, citizens in the City of Toronto mobilized to stop the building of the Spadina expressway. Their argument was that such an expressway would ruin a thriving inner city community and at the same time create added problems of automobile congestion and air pollution. While Toronto City Government did not heed their arguments, the Ontario provincial government did and ordered a stop to the expressway. Now the transportation priorities in Ontario have changed and the Ontario government recently announced a 400 million dollar pro-

gram to build high speed public transit in major Ontario cities.

We are also finding out that existing transportation systems discriminate against minority groups and disadvantaged people. A series of studies produced by Melvin Webber and Donald Appleyard of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at the University of California, show that transportation systems designed for the automobile do not serve young people, old people, the poor and the handicapped.

For example one of the reasons for unemployment among unskilled labour is due to the movement of factories and warehouses to the suburbs. The transportation system is primarily geared to expressways--with limited public transit from the central city outward. Thus, the unemployed and unskilled who do not own cars, can not go where the jobs are. Even in New York which has one

of the most highly developed public transit systems--the inaccessibility of jobs due to transportation handicaps is a severe problem.

For old people, present transportation services are not suitable. According to Appleyard's study, two thirds to three quarters of those over sixty must walk to get their groceries. In an icy winter climate such as we have in Winnipeg this is dangerous and often too much of a deterrent. The same problems are experienced by those with physical handicaps.

For young people, the problem is a different one. They are highly mobile and contrary to common impressions, many do not have access to the automobile. What is provided for them in the way of effective transport and in the way of alternative forms of transportation?

It is worth mentioning here the


interesting proposal put forward by a volunteer group of citizens in Edmonton for a L.R.T. system or Light Rapid Transit. This is a form of electric cars working on rails that is now being introduced into a number of small European cities. In terms of costs, it compares favourably with freeways, yet avoids the noise, pollution and environmental destruction of the automobile transportation system. It also has the advantage of meeting the transit needs of disadvantaged groups and young people, while still servicing the downtown commuter. It also fits well into existing auto-bus systems. One must wonder why such proposals are not considered as a part of Winnipeg's transportation planning?

Another neglected area of overall transportation planning is the restoration and resurrection of neglected systems and facilities. The development of auto-free pathways for cycling or skiing, similar to those in Oslo, Norway, could provide alternative routes for people to use summer and winter. The renovation of existing arterial streets, combining passenger shelter and non-vehicular passageways is another form of renovation which would give added pleasure to city dwellers and the development of a more livable urban environment.

What this suggests is that transportation planning needn't be always on a gargantuan scale, prescribing major freeway systems or the like. There are other premises upon which transportation planning must be based--basically social and environmental in nature which are not included in the WATS or Railway plans.

Winnipeg's transportation plans are in fact piecemeal and incomplete. They do not take into account key ingredients in the overall transportation needs, nor assess how the new proposals affect the number of different interests, groups and kinds of people that inhabit our city. The city is made up of all kinds of different people with different transportation needs and the value or worth of a transportation plan must be measured in terms of how it satisfies those needs.

This points to a major weakness of both WATS and the Railway Study--the lack of good assessment of the total range of social, economic and environmental impact. The criteria used for choosing different alternatives is based on engineering requirements, or costs related directly to the placement of new facilities. A very telling comment in the Introduction of the Railway Report states that the recommen-



ation by the consultants that a full cost-benefit study be undertaken was turned down as being too expensive. The WATS plan doesn't even mention this gap in its data.

Yet, there is good reason to look at questions of cost. Lately the whole issue of user costs for public services has been treated with some seriousness by economists and planners. They suggest that rather than running into huge expenditures for new freeways, that a system for assessing full costs for parking, using downtown streets, be developed and apportioned to those who want to use their cars. The market system can become the means of rationing transportation use.

Similarly new techniques of computer simulation can provide projected impacts and costs of new transportation systems and the results translated into terms understandable to the layman. This would give us the means of determining the best future strategies. Judgement of the impact of these transportation plans is therefore hindered by the lack of proper assessment. It seems strange that one can propose plans of such long range significance without utilizing the best available techniques of assessing cost, and yet this is what has been done. Not only are the present plans incomplete from the point of view of missing ingredients about who is to be served, and in what way, but it is also incomplete in terms of analysis and assessment of the impact of the proposals themselves.

This raises perhaps the most important question--the style and approach of the planning that was used. There was a time when we would put our trust in the experts. But, we have learned since that expert opinion is not enough. There must also be serious attempts to involve people in the discussion and development of plans right from the beginning of the process.

Citizen involvement simply makes good sense. It gives the planners an idea of what the views of different groups in the community are, it brings different perspectives to bear, it means that plans that may be inimical to certain groups are sprung on them by surprise, and it can mean that ultimate opposition can be forestalled.

It is not sufficient to argue that consultation with different groups is not possible. The Regional Planning Commission in Vancouver has held and continues to hold meetings with a multiplicity of community groups during its planning for new transportation. Some American cities provide community groups with advocacy planners, professionals who work with community groups to give them advice on proposed plans.

To the credit of the consultants working on the Railway Study, they recommended that a program of community consultation be initiated, but again this recommendation was not followed by the Technical Committee responsible for the plan.

Now, the railway plan is to be submitted for a quick going-over by the Resident Advisory Groups, with a decision to be taken on proceeding with the second stage by late February. The Resident Advisors, without resources and professional assistance being offered, are expected to make learned comment on the myriad questions raised. It is really too much to expect, and must be considered an act of tokenism to citizen involvement.

What we need, rather than a rush job on the railway study and an implicit acceptance of the

WATS study, is a basic reconsideration of our transportation priorities for Winnipeg. This would involve: 1) a good hard look at what needs are presently not being met, 2) a clearer description and assessment of the impact of proposed studies, 3) a more detailed and lengthy procedure of community consultation, 4) an assessment of the user costs of different transportation modes and a statement of what the real costs are to the taxpayers, 5) the serious examination of "rapid transit" alternatives, especially the L.R.R. system which is limited in cost and suitable for smaller size cities, 6) the establishment of a series of workshops or task force teams recruited from the interested citizens and professional groups in Winnipeg to discuss transportation priorities and begin examining the different alternatives. We will only get a good transportation program when we take the planning out from behind the closed doors.

Simply put, we need a different approach to transportation planning in Winnipeg--one that gives a total picture of needs, that sets out various alternatives, which is more explicit in the cost and benefit of each alternative, and which shares information with the public and involves them in the discussion. The present piecemeal approach is not good enough.

A good deal of valuable information has been gleaned from present studies and appreciation should be given to those in the different levels of government who took the initiative to produce the present plans. But, it should also be recognized that these are only beginnings, and that a more extensive and different planning procedure is required if we are to make the right decisions about what is needed.

The basic advice that should be given to the City Council right now is to go slow--take your time, don't make any commitments and to begin setting up the machinery for an examination and assessment of the full range of transport needs and alternative ways of supplying them.

It may not be very popular to suggest that government not take action, or to slow up so-called progress. But in this case, as in other planning fields, the lack of action may in fact be a more progressive step than rushing into a costly program that has negative results.



THIS EDITION OF URBAN ISSUES IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND OPINION ON THE FUTURE TRANSPORTATION PLANS OF THE GREATER WINNIPEG AREA, AND IS BEING PROVIDED FREE OF CHARGE TO ALL INTERESTED PERSONS AS A PUBLIC SERVICE.

PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITER, UNIVERSITY OF WINNIPEG.

BACKGROUND

Maureen Grant
Jim Cassidy

in the late 1960's the Metropolitan Council of Greater Winnipeg began seriously considering the construction of a highway overpass to span the railway yards between Sherbrooke Street to the south and McGregor Street to the north.

Metro found that with the limited federal funding available at that time for projects of that type,

that the concept would be too costly for them to undertake. During the negotiations with the federal government for more financial support, the federal government suggested the idea of relocating the railway yards and seemed willing to finance this as a pilot project in rail relocation.

Concurrently with these negotiations the CPR railway was talking about expanding their facilities and it did not appear that they would be able to expand in their present location.

The three parties came then together and the federal government agreed to finance a pilot project in rail relocation if a joint produced study showed this to be feasible. Although the CNR had never pushed for relocation of their main operations, they agreed to participate in this study.

On May 1, 1970 the Metro council approved in principle a recommendation that would see the creation of a joint committee that would include representatives of Metro, the federal and provincial governments and CN & CP Rail. This Committee would be charged with evaluating present rail use and future facilities with a view to solving problems that arise from conflicts in rail and road requirements.

October 1970

The study was projected to cost as much as \$5000,000.00 with the federal government paying 75% of the cost. Since it was felt that this study could have a drastic effect on the proposed Sherbrooke-McGregor overpass, the federal government was not willing to make any commitment on the overpass costs until the rail study had been completed.

During these negotiations which did not include the City of Winnipeg, Mayor Juba sent a telegram to N.R. Crump, chairman of the board of the CPR, seeking exploratory talks on a possible relocation of the railway's central Winnipeg freight yards and the purchase of the land by the city.

Mayor Juba's proposal was that if CPR would be agreeable to relocation, the city would discuss buying the railway's land whole or in part, particularly the portion east of McPhillips Street. This land, if bought, could be converted for other uses, eg. installation of light industries.

Mayor Juba said that Metro's planned Sherbrooke overpass might not now be needed and an underpass at reduced cost could be built.

In reply to this action, Councillor Wolfe, Metro's Vice-Chairman, accused Mayor Juba of jeopardizing the rail study by suggesting CPR relocate its central Winnipeg freight yards.

January 8/71

Effects of any decision by CP Rail to move its marshalling yards were now being investigated by the local rail study committee.

After May 15, CP Rail was to make a decision, although a vice-president of the company had already said no move would be practical, even though the yard needed more track. After this date Metro would be in a position either to go ahead with the proposed Sherbrooke-McGregor overpass or to establish new plans for a street to cross the existing yard. This is in interesting contrast to the final acquiescence of the CPR.

Preliminary plans were drawn up by Underwood McLellan and Assoc. Ltd.

January 15/71

Metro council approved giving \$46,000 toward a study of the effect of the CP Railway yard in North Winnipeg. Overall study was expected to cost \$500,000. The Study, already begun by a consortium of consultants, was the first phase of a government industry investigation of rail and road requirements for Winnipeg's future.

August 12/71

The Interim report of rail study found that was unlikely the CP Rail Marshalling yards would be removed from central Winnipeg the move could be worked out between the railway and 3 levels of government. It was felt that this could take as long as 10 years.

On basis of study's preliminary finding, it was concluded construction of Sherbrooke-McGregor overpass would be imprudent before more detailed information became available upon completion of the main study.

To work out a cost-sharing formula, estimates of the social and environmental benefits of moving the yards were required.

At that time it did not appear to be financially advisable for CP Rail to move the yards on its own unless rail traffic was to greatly increase.

The total cost of study (\$500,000.) will be split 5 ways - Federal Department of Transport 75%, Provincial 7 1/2%, Metro 7 1/2%, CP 5%, CN 5%.

September 20/71

Consultants were to be paid \$475,000. The contract was awarded to Damas & Smith Ltd., consulting engineer's and planners'.

June 22/72

Winnipeg Railway Relocation Study recommended that most railway tracks be removed from Winnipeg's downtown area, freeing large amounts of real estate for urban development. Three alternatives being considered actively range in cost from \$50 million to \$92 million. Each of the four proposed schemes would have a major impact on the over-all future planning of the city, of its transportation systems and its industrial economic development.

One scheme recommends common running rights for CNR and CPR through Downtown Winnipeg, plus a combination of both



Rail Study Proposal

George Siamandas

Response to the Study

The quick response of St. Vital and Ft. Garry residents when the plan was first revealed and discussed on the Community Committee level in November and the response by Councillors on November 29th demonstrates the great reservations about the issue. Obviously the Ft. Garry and St. Vital Community Committee do not support the plan because the report proposed relocating the CN line through their communities. Councillors for these two community committees expressed reservations during the council meeting.

Of course, the protest was based less on the real merits of the plan and more on how residential communities of Ft. Garry and St. Vital would be affected by the relocation of the CN main line.

A proper critique of the study begins with some of the following questions:

1. What is the origin of the rail relocation study -- who commissioned it, why and under what circumstances?
2. Is rail relocation a pressing and urgent need compared to other concerns such as providing low income housing, improving deteriorated areas and reducing property taxes?
3. What will the plan cost, and can we afford it at this time?
4. How will the citizens of Winnipeg benefit from the plan, which citizens (low income, middle income)?
5. Does the implementation of the rail study commit us to other plans such as the Downtown Development Plan and WATS -- is it really a way of getting these plans in by the back door as some observers have asked?

CRITIQUE

A careful reading of the Railway Study technical report neither provides satisfactory answers to the above questions nor does it even tackle some of the issues mentioned above.

1. The origin of the study and the issue of rail relocation began in attempts by the Metropolitan Corporation to secure larger federal funding for bridge construction over railway corridors so that they could build the proposed

Sherbrook - McGregor Bridge and in attempts by the CP to expand or move its classification yards further west. The nature of the benefits reported in the plan further suggest that the construction of the freeway program and securing rights of way for it. The motivations do not seem to be the improvement of the Logan, Nairn and Main Street corridor and the building of low income housing as they should be.

2. In terms of priorities the issue of rail relocation seems to be of low priority compared to other expressed concerns by governments and community groups such as housing for low income people, improvement of presently deteriorated areas, improving community and recreational services such as health services, schools, parks and play areas and even the concern to halt rising

railway passenger terminals into one union station. One scheme would bury the railroad tracks in the central core, with high banks for traffic and noise separation, and a further scheme supported tunnelling for much of the downtown track age.

All schemes took into account downtown development and found this to be in line with the ideas presented in the study. The study found major economies and benefits would result for all parties involved from relocation.

The clearing of the CP Rail marshalling yards would presumably obviate the need for a Sherbrook-McGregor overpass on the scale planned, but Councillor

Wolfe said a north-south arterial roadway was still essential to connect north and south Winnipeg

across the area that is now the central yards between King Street and McPhillips.

June 23/72

New estimates for rail relocation put the cost at \$75 million. The plan also estimates that there would be a financial benefit of \$67 million created by savings on other projects - mainly in transportation and in capital gain to the city from increased land values once lands in the area are consolidated. This referred to the WATS plan which was presumed to be going ahead.

June 29/72

The Executive Committee of the Winnipeg Rail Relocation Study endorsed removal of almost all railway tracks from downtown Winnipeg and recommendation now goes to federal, provincial and municipal governments for approval.

The study recommends relocating the CPR tracks on the north perimeter with a new yard in north Winnipeg, and running the CN main line through the Hydro right of way in South East Winnipeg.

CP and CN were concerned over the suggestion that their main lines be linked by retaining tracks behind Archibald Street. The CN also favored locating its tracks nearer Grant Avenue because of lower capital costs.

June 23/72

The relocation of both railways could be accomplished within 4 years and could be done independently or simultaneously. The study suggested that the CP Rail relocation start first.


If the work was staged over 10 years, 1000 jobs would be created on an annual basis of \$12 million a year - \$120 million.

This might mean that some WATS transportation work would be done in conjunction with the relocations.

July 15/72

F.S. Burbridge, president of CP in a letter to Councillor Wolfe stated that "CP Rail accepts the principle of railway relocation

subject to appropriate resolution of its competitive position and operational requirements." It was also agreed that all agencies involved should continue to meet at both the technical and policy levels to identify most satisfactory program and cost sharing arrangements to implement the railway relocation program.



October 11/72.

It was announced by Mr. Ron Basford that over a 5 year period Ottawa will likely start providing \$30 million a year more than the \$20 million available a year now for railway relocation and safety measures. Mr. Basford said that the Winnipeg \$100 million proposal to move rail tracks and facilities could be a prime benefactor of the new plan. The federal contribution for construction of bridges or tunnels to separate railways and highways would be boosted from \$500,000 to \$1 million, or 80% of the cost, which ever would be the lesser. For reconstruction of existing facilities the federal contribution would be raised from a maximum of \$250,000 to a new top \$625,000 or 5% which ever is less. Grants available under the fund would be double the present \$20 million per year.

November 20/72

Fort Garry citizens group was formed to oppose plan--on basis of placing mainline tracks near University Crescent. This was the People First Group.

November 21/72.

200 St. Vital residents vocally refused to support the railway relocation plan--unless the CN Main line was located south of the floodway.

November 29/72.

An informal city council meeting was held to discuss the proposed rail relocation program. The most interesting aspect of the meeting where 400 people voiced their opposition to rail relocation was that the meeting was arranged as an informal meeting of the councillors and therefore no official record of the proceedings was kept. Future study of council proceedings on this subject will find no transcript or mention of this meeting.

The next step is to have the plan commented on by the Resident Advisory Groups, many of whom have not seen the plan and can hardly be expected to make much impact on the discussion in the time given them to do so. If the second stage of the plan is approved in February, the citizen involvement aspect would have been a truly token one.

According to the report, the objectives of the rail study were to "develop alternative plans of railway facilities to that presently in existence which would appear to be technically feasible and desirable from an economic and social point of view in the realization of a superior and more amenable plan for the future development of the urban community and its transportation facilities."

More specifically the plan attempts to:

1. Rationalize railway trackage facilities and operations within the Metropolitan area to permit a reduction in the barrier effect to urban transportation and in the number of future rail - highway grade operations, consistent with maximum efficiency and minimum costs to the railways.
2. Identify blighted areas related to railway facilities and investigate the potential use of these areas and railway rights of way which may become available

through elimination, relocation or consolidation: for urban transportation facilities, other public purposes or appropriate private development.

3. Develop a cost estimate, evaluation and staging of implementation.


The report has proposed four alternative programs for rail relocation:

1. Relocate CN mainline to the present CPR line -and locate classification yards inside the west perimeter. This program was rejected because CN would find interference with its operations and because it does not allow for renewal of the Logan corridor.
2. The CP main line remains but classification yards are located between the airport and west perimeter. The CN main line is relocated along the Grant Avenue extension. Although acceptable to CN it is not expected to be acceptable with the community.
3. Relocate CP main line 2,000 feet south of North Perimeter with classification yards inside north west perimeter. Remove CP yards between Arlington and Main. The CN would relocate main line along Hydro corridor through the residential parts of Ft. Garry and St. Vital.
4. Same for CP as in 1 and 2. CP tracks would be removed from just east of Arlington to floodway (requires underpass under 35 tracks to maintain Arlington.) CN main line would be removed from east of Archibald Street to west of perimeter and joined from west perimeter 1,000 feet south of south perimeter to Symington Yards. High operating costs to CN make this plan unfeasible.

The study says that the proposed program would have the following benefits:

- release 200 acres of CP yards for more appropriate use.
- remove barrier effort of CN main line and allow redevelopment of 50 acres.
- reductions in road-rail conflict and opportunities to extend and connect natural arterial connections.

If simultaneous relocation of both lines is not feasible, then relocation of the CP yards and main line is the main priority with CN relocation being secondary. It is stressed, however, that both should occur simultaneously.



CONT'D

expenditures to keep property taxes at a minimum. In terms of initiative no community group, community committee or public official (other than Bernie Wolfe) has ever identified rail relocation as a priority. No one seems to want it. The reaction of the St. Vital and Ft. Garry community committees, the People's First Citizens Group show indeed that there is considerable opposition to rail relocation. The forthcoming consideration of the proposals by all the community committees and by City Council should show the support for or opposition against the issue of rail relocation.

3. An article found elsewhere in this issue discusses the question of costs. Costs of relocation have ranged from \$75 to \$100 million dollars. The figure in the study is \$75.6 million. Even with the expected benefits in the . . . in WATS and land to be sold for development, the costs remain at \$15-\$20 million. With the additional costs of the WATS freeways, proposed housing and recreation space, the costs surpass \$1 billion. Can we afford this expenditure?

4. When the questions of who will benefit and how are funds raised, we find that the main clients of the proposal will be: the railways with nationalized facilities; urban travellers using cars and living close to the proposed suburban beltway; middle and upper income people; people in the area bordering the railways; shorter travel times; improved quality of life for residents in the area to

be renewed; dwellers of the proposed housing.

5. The terms of reference, criteria, cost benefit analysis and general data base of the report is heavily premised on the implementation of the WATS and the proposals for freeway construction. The rail study would release land and pay for costs of land that would be used for building the freeways proposed in WATS. Approval of the rail relocation proposal is a clear approval of the freeway program in WATS and the beginning of the design phase. A decision which would commit Winnipeg slowly and insidiously to either plans without adequate evaluation of these other plans.

Winnipeg Railway Study

- a citizen's view

How would you like the main line of a major railway moved right up against your back fence? Most residents of Winnipeg would probably respond that such a thing could not happen, not in 1973. Well, let me tell you it can!

Thousands of residents of St. Vital and Fort Garry are faced with just such a situation. Residents of East St. Paul, East Kildonan, West Kildonan and other areas in our City face a similar situation. They thought they were protected by zoning regulations and City planning. The Winnipeg Railway Study destroys that myth. A property owner can be prevented from erecting a duplex in a residential area but zoning regulations will not prevent City planners from trying to relocate the CNR and CPR main lines through such areas.

Concerned residents of Fort Garry have formed an association named "People First" to give voice to their concerns. The association now represents residents of Fort Garry, St. Vital and other areas of the City. While the attention of the Fort Garry residents was, quite naturally, drawn firstly to the threat posed by one of the programs in the Study to a particular area, it was soon realised that the Study had much broader implications. It will affect all areas in the City and all residents - even future generations.

The Winnipeg Railway Study was launched in 1970 as a joint undertaking of the Federal Government, the Provincial Government, the City of Winnipeg, the CNR and the CPR. The objectives of the Study were detailed, comprehensive and lofty. Unfortunately, the price tag for the detailed, comprehensive and lofty Study was estimated in the order of \$1.0 million to \$1.5 million and the budget available for the Study was not to exceed \$500,000.00.

In 1971 the objectives and terms of reference of the Study were severely cut back so that the cost of the Study would not exceed the budget limit of \$500,000.00. The veil of secrecy surrounding the Winnipeg Railway Study is slowly lifting and it is becoming clear that the taxpayers of Winnipeg did not get a bargain for the \$500,000.00 spent on the Study. As the lofty objectives of the Study were being discarded, the Consultant was "directed to abandon the Study Approach of evaluating both immediate programs and long range systems and to generate a limited number of alternative Railway Programs for evaluation. It was also concluded by the Technical Co-ordinating Committee that the and urban transportation networks and the analysis of the Do-Nothing or status quo option, should not be included in the Study."

In the result, the report of the Winnipeg Railway Study, which combines the talents of consulting engineers, sociologists, economists, environmentalists, railway officials and civic politicians and administrators, proposes four programs for rail relocation, none of which relocates the rail lines presently run through our City outside of the City.

While the contributions of the railways to the early development of our City is acknowledged, the existence of rail lines and facilities has for decades blighted

and depressed extensive areas within our City and has created a barrier effect to urban transportation and development. Winnipeg has lived with and suffered these effects for decades. Any program that merely transfers the blighted and depressed areas to other areas within the City and creates new barriers to urban transportation and development is not acceptable in the latter part of the 20th Century.



How then can the Executive Committee of the Winnipeg Railway Study justify its recommendation made to the Council of the City of Winnipeg on November 29, 1972? There is no valid justification but there are two apparent motives. Firstly, the recommendation is a compromise to the railways. A senior City administrator acknowledged this fact in his presentation to City Council. The CNR indicated publicly that it has no desire to relocate but will co-operate, upon conditions, if relocation will be-

nefit the citizens of Winnipeg. The conditions being considered by the railways and our City planners, however, appear to ignore the interests of people.

Secondly, the recommendation of the Executive Committee accomplishes a further commitment, perhaps an irreversible commitment, to the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study (WATS). WATS recommends massive expenditures of taxpayers' monies to construct expressways and beltways and virtually ignores public rapid transportation until the final phase. The WATS recommendations may be seriously challenged as being out of date and contrary to the experience in almost every urban centre in North America. WATS has not been approved by City Council but, nevertheless, the City continues to acquire property for its requirements. Millions of dollars have been expended. Our City planners may have already committed us and our children and our grandchildren to paying the billion dollars plus that is the WATS price tag. If that commitment has not already been made, it certainly will be made if the recommendation of the Executive Committee of the Winnipeg Railway Study is accepted.

Maybe you won't end up with a rail line up against your back fence. However, all residents of Winnipeg, whether they be property owners or tenants, will pay the bills for railway relocation and the WATS recommendations. The cost to every single taxpayer in the City will be thousands of dollars. It is a high price to pay for an out of date transportation study and inadequate railway relocation study.

Freedom of choice is a basic freedom in a democracy. Where is that freedom in Winnipeg today? Did we hand over that basic freedom to bureaucrats at City Hall? Why, then, do they decide behind closed doors the character of our urban living environment? Why do they continue to plan in secret? In a democracy the people have the right to say yes or no. That right is inalienable and it is time that our City administrators and planners opened their closed doors and recognised this fact.



Winnipeg railway relocation

OR, PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE

By Professor Basil M. Rotoff,
P. Eng., M.T.P.I.C.

It seems to be a common belief that many of the problems which beset Winnipeg's urban environment could be solved by the removal of railway installations. This proposition seems to be one of the key justifications of the three-quarter million dollar Winnipeg Railway Study. Statements such as: "Opportunities are created for extensive social and environmental improvements for the people living on both sides of the land occupied by the CP Yard" are typical. The study purports to be a prototype or blueprint for further railway relocation schemes across Canada. But the value of this study as a prototype as well as the validity of its approach is open to very serious questioning if not doubt and skepticism. The fact is that in the past few years, many a railway has been removed, constructed or relocated in urbanized or urbanizing areas without the benefit of a "prototype" study. Some have been successful, others have not. The author of this paper submits that the proposals set forth in the Winnipeg Railway Study should be examined in the light of the successes and failures of railway relocations elsewhere in the country.

The Benefits of Railway Relocation

The Winnipeg Railway Study points to a number of benefits which may accrue to the City as a result of the relocation of railways. These benefits may indeed have a substantial impact upon the urban environment. Let us discuss in general terms some of the most commonly accepted benefits.

Socio-economic integration of isolated parts of the City.

Historically, the centre of most North American settlements developed concentrically from the railway station. Soon a pattern emerged: that part of the settlement which was on the side facing the railway station became the prime development area; conversely, the other side was a less desirable area, which attracted lower income groups and people of lower status. The track acted as a barrier which was so strong and the needs of the two areas were so conflicting and diverse, that what started out as one settlement (i.e., one community) now became in fact separate municipal units. Today, many of the social and economic differences no longer hold true, but the stigma of the "wrong side of the tracks" remains. The removal of the barrier would consequently permit free ecological interaction between component parts of the entire community.

Elimination of level crossings.

The railway which runs through a densely populated area may not necessarily act as an impenetrable barrier, the latter is perhaps more of an attribute of large railway installations or high embankments. The presence of many level crossings may in itself be the proof of an existing interaction between the areas on each side of the track. The situation, however, presents a safety hazard. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult

and expensive to provide integrated municipal services because of restrictions imposed by the track. Improvement of the urban environment in areas adjacent to railway installations.

Many urban areas adjacent to railway installations and especially those which are known as being "on the wrong side of the track", are in various stages of deterioration or even decay. The cause is not so much the proximity of industry which inevitably locates along railways, nor is it the detrimental effect of the railway yard activities, the noise and the interminable rows of boxcars. These areas are the oldest in the community and were originally built by the least affluent segments of the community, by cheaper methods, with materials of lesser quality and often subjected to sub-standard maintenance. The replacement of the railway installation by a higher land use should provide the impetus required for the self-renewal or redevelopment of these areas. Land will be made available for development.

A lack of developable commercial and residential land in the city especially near the core area, will cause land values to rise. This is a great detriment to both the social and economic welfare of the city. The provisions of the necessary central services to the city will be inhibited and development will take place in the suburbs instead, with its accompanying sprawl, proliferation of traffic arteries, ergo more need for individual transportation, etc. Conversely, by encouraging residential development near the core area where the jobs are, much of the burden is removed from the transportation systems.

Removal of a source of pollution.

In the days when people are so conscious of their environment and where the railway is no longer the lifeblood of the city, a great deal is to be gained by removing from the urban area one of the major heavy industrial land uses: the railroads and dependent industries. Not only is the operation a source of pollution in itself, but it also generates traffic which further pollutes in all adjacent areas. Pollution in this instance is to be construed as anything which generates noise, gaseous emissions and solid or liquid wastes, as well as anything which clutters, congests and "visually pollutes" the urban environment.

These are but few of the principal benefits the city may derive from the relocation of railways.

Some Examples of Railway Relocation.

The question is: would these benefits accrue to the City of Winnipeg if the railways were removed? The Winnipeg Railway Study obviously believes so. But rather than speculate on the validity of this belief, let us look at some illustrative examples of railway relocation in the recent past and see if some lesson could be learned from it (a survey

which is conspicuous by its absence in the Winnipeg Railway Study).

Saskatoon has carried out one of the most successful railway relocation schemes. The City was bisected by mainline tracks and had marshalling yards in its very heart. By removing the tracks, all of the benefits discussed above accrued to the City. The marshalling yards were replaced by a Civic Centre and a large Shopping and Business Complex. The mainline was replaced by a Freeway. The layout of the existing railways was such that very little actual relocation was necessary other than that of the marshalling yards which were moved five miles out of town along existing railway lines. The "behind the tracks" area was integrated into the centre of the City; in fact, it became almost part of that centre. However, this relocation had interesting side effects, three of which are of particular interest: First, the foot-loose elements of the community--vagrants, prostitutes, etc.--were no longer confined to a small area of the City but spilled over into the core area thus making law enforcement more difficult. Second, in the opinion of many of the residents, the freeway is harder to live with than was the railway, because of the continuous nature of the noise it generates. Third, many people whose livelihood depends on the railway have chosen to build their homes next door to the new marshalling yards!

In St. John, New Brunswick, the removal of the tracks was part of a partial renewal scheme. Some slums were removed and large and beautiful commercial buildings were constructed. Although this may have proven to be a cosmetic success, it has not solved the slum problems. From police records, it seems that the people who were evicted or removed from these slums spilled into another, older area of the City, thus creating a situation bearing some similarities to that which occurred in Saskatoon.

Sudbury, Ontario presents a good example. Marshalling yards gave way to a good quality, low rental housing development. Although perhaps the aesthetics of the overall projects leave something to be desired, it is a successful handling of the removal of a railway installation and further plans call for a spill-over of the benefits in the form of rehabilitation and renewal for the adjacent areas.

Lachine, Quebec, is a noteworthy case. Great pressure was exerted on all sides to remove the tracks that divided the City through its whole length. These tracks were the cause of many mishaps at numerous level crossings. In addition, land was needed for service industries, for housing and for community facilities. Predictably, no sooner were the tracks removed, that the embankment was cut down, the land developed and, within three years, barely a trace remained of the railway.

The reader may have noticed that the above examples have one thing in common: there were pressures for development and the removal of railways was carried out as a consequence of these pressures. In other words, a plan was devised and the relocation or

removal of the railway was a necessary condition to the execution of the plan, but nevertheless subordinate to it. What happens when there is no plan when a city is faced with the removal of the track without having in mind a definite use for the vacated land?

In Longueuil (near Montreal), several dozen level crossings existed over a two mile stretch. Both the City and the railway were in agreement over the removal, but the railway was particularly interested in developing a very large industrial park east of that City. The track was removed primarily as a consequence of this development. As it were, the railway still holds the title to the right-of-way, the City is satisfied that it has eliminated level crossings and the only other benefit is the increase in assessment on properties immediately adjoining the former track. The right-of-way, however, has gone to weed for the past several years.

In Hull, Quebec, tracks were removed as a consequence of the railway relocation scheme carried out in Ottawa under the terms of the National Capital Plan. The former tracks, the station grounds and other railway holdings have been standing idle for the past five years. A great deal of effort went into finding a use for this land. Imaginative plans have been prepared recently, but no commitment had been made as late as last fall.

The obvious cause for the lack of success of the Longueuil and Hull relocation schemes is that, rather than having a plan and considering the removal of railways as a step in its implementation, a plan had to be devised and a demand for the use of this land created after the fact.

Some significant facts, particularly pertinent to the Winnipeg Railway Study, have emerged from the investigation of Canadian railway relocation case studies:

Railways are not necessarily inimical to residential development.

This was quite apparent in the Saskatoon case, where people sought to build their homes near the site of relocated yards. In the same City the most exclusive residential area is located within a short block of the former railway line. In Longueuil and in Lachine, well-to-do middle class housing was adjacent to the railway line.

Adjacent land uses tend to grow over the scar left by a removed railway.

There is a natural tendency for adjoining land uses to expand into the land vacated by the railway, thus ecologically integrating it into the fabric of the City. Any planned land use other than that of the adjoining areas such as certain types of housing developments, major community and recreational complexes or freeways tend to be just as disruptive as the railway which they replace.

Intrusion of freeways.

Not infrequently, railway relocation schemes are used to bring freeways into the city "through the back door", so to speak, and not necessarily in an optimum location. Adjoining areas may deteriorate after railways are removed.

CONT'D

Paradoxically, there is evidence that, rather than improve, an area may deteriorate as a consequence of the removal of a railway installation. The hypothesis is that people employed by the railways and related or dependent industries would predominantly live in the adjoining areas. As their financial status improves, because of tradition, convenience or plain inertia, they will remain in that area, although in sub-standard housing. The removal of the railway and related employment would no longer tie them down. They then would move to housing which corresponds to their incomes, soon to be replaced by lower income groups. Slum characteristics tend to appear in the area: lowering of maintenance standards, higher incidence of welfare cases, increased crime rates, etc.

Community - wide repercussions.

The relocation of railways may bring about a chain of deep socio-economic changes, some of which may have seemingly no connection with the relocation scheme. These changes may be quite difficult to foresee and may well negate all anticipated benefits, pointing once more to the necessity for most careful planning before any railway relocation is considered.

Conclusion.

It is now possible to venture an answer to our question: will benefits accrue to the City of Winnipeg if railways were relocated as recommended in the Study? In the light of the above, all seems to point to a negative answer. First, the Winnipeg Railway Study is not a PLAN, nor does it propose a plan and we have shown that even when elab-

orate plans were at hand, not every side effect could be foreseen. This fact alone renders the whole Study rather weak as a planning tool. Second, the entire Study seems to hinge on the naive and simplistic premise that the removal of railways will immediately improve the urban environment. We have endeavoured to show that this is not necessarily so, nor is the proximity of railways necessarily detrimental to an urban environment. Third, the Study does not convincingly show that there is a serious demand

for the land other than that needed for the Sherbrook - McGregor traffic artery. For that matter, there is, in the core area of Winnipeg, sufficient land idle, underused or held in speculation, to provide for many years of development. Fourth, the proposed removal of railways will not bring about an integration of the components of the City. To begin with, the Study recommends the creation of transportation corridors which in itself precludes integration. Furthermore, except for a few isolated cases, there does not seem to be much impediment to meaningful interaction between parts of the City directly attributable to the railways; the rivers, if anything, are the major barriers.

It is therefore very doubtful that any of the expected benefits would accrue to the City of Winnipeg, were the recommendations of the Winnipeg Railway Study implemented. In all fairness, a choice of land uses has been examined for each of the so-called "corridors", but this in itself points to the inherent weakness of the Study: there is no plan, no purpose other than the removal of the tracks for their own sake! And this amounts to putting the cart before the horse. The terms of reference of the Study are probably to blame and much of the work is intuitive rather than heuristic in nature. As a consequence, this writer believes that the Winnipeg Railway Study also fails in its endeavours to serve as a prototype for further railway relocations.

Railway relocation and the freeways

Terry Partridge

Relocation of Winnipeg's railways from the central areas seems at first sight an attractive way to create large free areas and remove the existing barrier effect between communities. Current plans, however, are based on the assumption that most of the released lands will be used for freeways proposed in the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study (W.A.T.S.), simply replacing the rail barriers with wide strips of spaghetti-like concrete.

Use of released lands for the road program in fact provides the main economic justification for spending the estimated \$75.6 million required for relocating the railways. The evaluated benefits include savings of \$11.4 million on railway grade separations \$39.8 million on construction and land costs required for planned freeways, and \$8.7 million worth of land released for development. The value of these benefits assumes not only that the freeways will be built, but that they will be built as quickly as proposed in the W.A.T.S. study. If they aren't, the railway program would have to justify considerable interest payments on the costs, while the released lands lay vacant. At the present moment, the road program is already behind schedule, and it is openly admitted that without considerable federal or provincial aid it could never catch up without punishing local taxes.

Even taking the benefits as calculated, however, they come to only \$59.9 million, falling short of the program costs by \$15.7 million. Nonetheless, the Railway Study suggests that further non-qualified benefits will be realized. In particular, mass demolition of 1,700 houses in the central area to make way for the proposed freeways could be avoided. This is a very worthwhile benefit. The value of this benefit is, however, already presumably included in the \$39.8 million savings on the road program, and should not be interpreted as an extra.

The study makes further claims with regard to an actual increased potential for housing and recreation facilities in the core areas. Some of this could no doubt take place on the sections of released development land, and in this respect again, much of the benefit is already included in the estimated \$8.7 million.

A considerable amount of the claimed new housing and recreation facilities is, however, intended to come from demolition and redevelopment of large residential and industrial areas beside the existing railway land. As such, these benefits are largely icing on the cake, bearing no relationship to the relocation proposals except in so far as removal of railways and replacement with freeways can be said to improve the environment, and thereby stimulate development. Aside from this aspect, much of this

development appears to be no more than the result of a standard urban demolition and rede-

velopment program. This approach to urban renewal has fallen into considerable disrepute in recent years, and therefore deserves some careful and critical watching.

The close connection between the Railway Relocation plan and the Freeway plan is not limited to the use of released central area land. In the suburbs, the location of relocated lines is designed to follow routes of proposed freeways, most specifically the suburban beltway. There may be considerable merit in this "transport corridor" approach. Nonetheless, the plan is placing considerable emphasis on a road program that has not yet been approved by council nor even debated for that matter.

Finally, the railway program could tend, either to reduce the demand for roads if it encourages more residential development close to the downtown work areas, or increase the demand by commercial vehicles if the railways seize to serve industrial and warehouse locations as directly.


The general impression is one of a railway relocation proposal almost totally dependent on a road policy that has not been approved, or debated, and is in any case already behind the schedule on which the benefit calculations were based.





Councillor Wolfe has suggested that a decision to remove the railways now, need not be based on any specific re-use proposal, such as the road program. He argues that options for rapid transit lines, parks, recreation, or housing rather than roads would still be open.

At present, however, the Railway Study includes no evaluation


of benefits for such alternatives. It does include an estimate of the market value of all the land that would be released in the event that it was not taken for road purposes. This comes to \$38.6 million, which falls well short of the \$75.6 million cost. In the absence of a plan for some alternate use, there is no assurance that the benefits would equal the costs, and there is a real possibility that the lands might remain derelict for some time pending the development of such a plan. In addition, the precise form of relocation, related as it now is to the road proposals, might not be the most advantageous if some alternate re-use program were decided on. It is not intended to suggest by this that nothing should be decided until everything is decided. The intent is rather to question the sequence of decisions, and in particular the need for such a rush on the railway plan in the absence of a view on the road program.

It is quite possible that relocation of the central railway yards with re-use for public transport, parks, recreation, and housing rather than roads could have a very desirable effect on core area residents and the overall development of the urban area. A review of the freeway proposals, plus the development and evaluation of such alternatives should, however, precede any decision of the railway relocation.





LOGAN CORRIDOR - CURRENT DEVELOPMENT PLAN.



THE WINNIPEG AREA TRANSPORTATION STUDY

A CRITICAL REVIEW BY TERRY PARTRIDGE

The freeway plans on which the railway relocation proposals are based, form part of a long range plan for Winnipeg's future transportation needs. The road plan was recommended in 1968 in the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study (W.A.T.S.) report, and subsequently adopted by the former Metro Council.

The W.A.T.S. program calls for the construction of five radial freeways converging on a tight ring around the downtown area, a suburban beltway located at the edge of development about three miles inside the perimeter highway, plus 63 miles of major street and bridgeworks throughout the area.

The program based on 1967 prices, was estimated to cost \$429 million for the freeways, and \$180 million for major roads spread over the period from 1968 to 1991. A further expenditure of \$158 million was recommended for upgrading the bus system, and constructing a rapid transit line along Portage and Main in the latter part of the plan period.

Although the W.A.T.S. program has not yet been approved by the new unicity council, city administrators are still following the former Metro policy, and will likely continue to do so unless instructed otherwise.

City planners may be involved in an ongoing planning process, continuously updating and revising plans to account for changing conditions, and new proposals, such as the Downtown Development Plan. The general approach of the W.A.T.S. study nonetheless remains the guiding thrust of policy. Land acquisitions along proposed freeway routes are continuing at a steady rate. Most importantly, city council are now in the process of considering for approval in the current capital estimates two freeway construction design studies at a cost of \$5000,000.00 Before allowing such an expensive foot in the door, council should decide whether the taxpayers can afford these roads

and whether they are really value for the money.

The estimated total cost for the proposed transport investments, based on 1967 prices, was \$767 million spread over a period of 24 years. Assuming annual inflation at 3%, this would now cost about \$900 million in today's prices. The average annual cost over the next 24 years would then be 37 million. With an average population over the period of 650,000, this amounts to an annual tax of at least \$57 per person, or \$200 per household.

This represents a substantial increase over today's rates of transport expenditure, that would have to be met by increased grants from senior governments, which we all pay for anyway; increased local taxation; or a reduction in other priorities. Consider for instance the total cost of \$22 million estimated for completing the entire riverbank park acquisition program. Although \$22 million is less than 8 months worth of transport expenditure, it is nonetheless planned to stretch the phasing over a 25 year period.

The W.A.T.S. study began with surveys of travel habits and travelling conditions that existed in the Metro area in 1962. Based on this information, a computer model was developed. The purpose was to simulate future travel conditions resulting from an expected 50 percent increase in population by 1991.

The model was tested on five different road and public transport plans described in Table 1. The least expensive scheme 1, was expected to result in heavy congestion on approaches to the downtown and elsewhere. Scheme 2 with addition of the suburban beltway would speed up traffic elsewhere but have little effect on downtown congestion. Scheme 4, with the addition of an extensive 49 mile rapid transit system would encourage more public transport use, but at too high a cost, and again with little effect

on downtown congestion. Scheme 3, with the further addition of a radial freeway system was expected to relieve congestion but at too high a cost, and with substantial excess capacity.

The recommended scheme 5 retained most of the road components of scheme 3, but with a considerably scaled down rapid

transit system of 5 miles along Portage and Main. This plan was expected to relieve most of the downtown congestion at a far lower cost than scheme 4.

The arguments in favour of the selected plan are, however, based almost entirely on blind faith in the raw computer output. There appears to be no attempt to interpret the computer results from an understanding of its limitations. There is no effort at economic analysis, which no doubt accounts for the emphasis on relief of downtown congestion at any cost. And finally, the list of alternatives fails to include a number of practical low cost options.

In particular, the model fails to simulate the natural tendency of people to respond to changing travel conditions resulting from congestion. Therefore, the model predicts almost identical numbers of car trips into the downtown in the rush hour period for schemes 1 and 5. It assumes that employment in the downtown will be the same, that the trip pattern will be similar, and the choice of mode, time of travel, and persons per car will all be the same, congestion or not.

In fact it goes somewhat farther than this. The downtown congestion is largely based on an assumed 75% increase over 1962 in rush hour work trips to the downtown. Less than one-third of the increase is due to a forecast increase in downtown employment. The rest is based on an assumption that more of the future employment will be in offices, and that office workers tend to travel more in the peak. This is an incredible assumption to base a massive freeway plan on, particu-

larly since it contradicts the observed trend in other larger cities for less travel to occur in the peak when congestion gets heavy.

A number of other assumptions such as too low parking charges, failure to account for the increased central area population proposed in the downtown plan, and lower than present car occupancy rates, contribute to an overestimate of car vehicle travel for schemes 1, 2 and 4, and a possible underestimate for schemes 3 and 5. Some of these factors may of course be compensated by other assumptions used, such as too low transit fares. The balance of the bias, nonetheless, appears to strongly favour the building of more roads.

The W.A.T.S. study includes a short discussion about economic considerations, but fails to attempt any form of analysis. On the basis of traffic flows, time savings, and cost figures given in the report, it is, however, possible to make some rough estimates of what an economic analysis might reveal.

For instance, the addition of the suburban beltway in scheme 2, to the major road system of scheme 1, would save 2.97 million hours of rush hour travelling time in the year 1991. This assumes 500 rush hours per year.

The cost of adding the beltway was estimated at \$17 million. Dividing this total cost by 8 gives a figure of \$15.8 million which is the approximate annual cost in the year 1991 for comparison with the annual time savings of 2.97 million person hours.

For this to be justified, it would be necessary for Winnipeggers to value their travel time savings at \$5.30 per hour. This is probably at least three times as much as people would be willing to pay given the choice, and therefore suggests that the additional cost would be a bad investment.

Adding the radial freeways and rapid transit line of scheme 5 to the system of scheme 2, would save a further 5.04 million hours of rush hour travelling time in 1991. At an extra cost of \$351 million total, or \$44 million of 1991 annual expenditure, these time savings would cost \$8.70 an hour. In terms of value for money, the radial freeways are clearly much worse than the suburban beltway, which itself appears bad. To top it all off, the beltway is scheduled as a lower priority

LOGAN CORRIDOR RAILWAY RELOCATION PROGRAM: #4.




TABLE 1

Transport Alternatives Tested in W.A.T.S.

Scheme Components	Scheme 1	Scheme 2	Scheme 3	Scheme 4	Scheme 5
Major Street Extension	X	X	X	X	X
Suburban Circular Freeway		X	X	X	X
Radial Freeway System			X		X
Expansion of Present Bus System	X	X			
49 Miles of Radial Rapid Transportation			X	X	
5 Miles of Radial Rapid Transportation					X
(\$mill) Cost roads	\$206	334	773	298	609
Cost transit	82	82	643	643	158
Cost total	\$288	416	1416	941	767

than the radial freeways in the W.A.T.S. implementation plan.

There are of course other benefits not considered above such as, offpeak time savings, vehicle operating cost savings, and time savings for commercial vehicles. The figures necessary to perform such calculations are not included in the W.A.T.S. study.

On balance, however, it is quite likely that overestimates of benefit due to the rigid assumptions of the computer model, plus understatement of social and environmental costs will offset benefit categories that are not included. The overall impression is one of a very low return on the proposed investments.

This does not mean that nothing need be done about Winnipeg's future transport requirements. It would be a useful first step to improve the transit model to more sensibly account for the effects of road congestion on public transport use. This would likely indicate a far greater potential for the rapid transit schemes. In addition, a closer look should be


taken at the assumption that a greater proportion of travel will take place in the peak. In general, what is needed is a better understanding of the model, and a more informed interpretation of the output.

Finally, some less costly alternatives should be considered. For instance, a modest rapid transit line, like that proposed for scheme 5, should be tested as a package with the road proposals of schemes 1 and 2. Consideration should also be given to management schemes involving parking restraint, reserved lane busways, staggered office hours, and building constraints on the most congested arteries, so as to spread the load around a bit more.

The WATS study singles out Portage and Main as a problem area, for bus operations. Because of the density of development on these roads in the centre, it might be necessary for reasons of proximity to run more buses down them, than they could handle. In this respect, encouragement of further high rise buildings, such as the Trizec development at Portage and Main seems very ill advised indeed. Subsidized parking as proposed in The Downtown Plan would also seem to be counter productive.

A realistic search for economically efficient alternatives would, however, be far more likely if the provincial and federal governments were to stop contributing towards the costs of municipal road investment programs. If local governments were given instead equivalent sums in general tax support grants, they would have more freedom to trade off roads for other priorities such as public transport, homes, parks, and recreation. Shared cost pro-

grams should only be retained for the promotion of national social objectives such as environmental improvements, and the elimination of poverty. There is no reason whatever why senior governments should artificially encourage the building of roads.



RECOMMENDED STREET AND HIGHWAY SYSTEM 1991.

Transit in trouble

By Pete Hudson
On behalf of the Winnipeg
citizens Transit Committee
(WCTC)

WCTC was formed a short time ago to attempt to reverse the trend away from public transit to the private automobile. It will assist local groups who are wanting improvements in the transit service in their area, it wants to educate the citizens of Winnipeg about the need for improved transit and will be making direct representation to City Hall in the future. Arguments to support its stand include the following:

1. Economics

The Winnipeg Area Transportation Study (WATS) which is being examined here, is estimated to cost nearly 800 million dollars over a twenty year period. If you take out the proposed expenditures on the public transit part of the scheme, the estimated cost is about 610 million dollars on a beltway - freeway - major streets system. This is an annual expenditure of over 30 million dollars per year. The figures will increase greatly through inflation. There will be no revenues to offset the costs and expenditures are capital expenditures only. They do not take into account maintenance costs.

2. Freedom of choice

Planners agree on the need for a well balanced transportation system, by which they mean that any person should have several choices

of how to get from A to B. Right now there are 2 choices: stand around at 30 Below zero waiting for a bus which never seems to come or drive your car. For those who can't, or don't want to, afford the crippling expense of owning a private car, there is another choice-- stay at home.

3. The Environment

The nearly 100 percent reliance on the automobile as the only form of transportation can make a city unfit to live in, in a very short time. In some cities 60% of air pollution is caused by automobile exhausts.

The car is a considerably greater user of energy than any form of public transit. A 200 horsepower bus can carry 60 people; a 350 horsepower car will carry 6 at the most.

Cars consume gigantic amounts of space to move, to park or to be serviced. European cities with the same population as Winnipeg which rely mostly on public transit cover about 1/20th of the land space.

Nothing destroys a neighbourhood faster than even just a rumour that a freeway is going by. Just look at the area around the proposed Sherbrook - McGregor Overpass as an example. On the other hand, the experience of other cities has been that a good public transportation system in an area can give it new life.

Finally green space suffers-- green space is not just good to look at. It offers shade, shelter from wind, prevents soil erosion and above all produces life-giving oxygen. Do we need more Kildonan Parks or more black top deserts like Polo Park?

4. Equality

Governments which use the rhetoric of equality of opportunity and social justice in fact encourage a transportation system which has the reverse effect in several ways. One way is that poorer people pay for most of the "hidden costs" of the automobile such as the bad air and the ugly and dangerous environment of the central part of the city, while the more affluent are able to use their offending automobiles to escape to the suburbs.

From these arguments emerge some basic questions which should be considered by all the people of Winnipeg before further progress is made on the WATS report.

1. The automobile has become beloved by all of us because of its obvious advantages of comfort, convenience etc. What has not been realized until recently is the escalating cost of this luxury - not just in terms of money, but also in terms of the environment, pollution, loss of freedom for the pedestrian, the cyclist, and the transit rider, and equality. The question for Winnipeggers is do we still want to continue to bear these costs?

2. Is there a direct connection between a failing public transit system and the promotion of all the facilities required for unrestricted use of cars? The more easily and conveniently people can use their private cars, the fewer people use the public transit system. As this trend continues transit service is cut and fares increase, so that fewer people are paying more for a poorer quality product. As public service deteriorates so more and more people use private cars and so on in a vicious cycle.

3. There are at least two basic flaws in the logic of the arguments of the freeway builders. One is that now people are virtually forced into their cars because other choices are so limited. From this, freeway builders conclude that there is some innate or inherent preference of people for private as opposed to public transportation. They then say that we have to give people what they want. The other is the assumption that present trends are inevitable and that nobody has any power to change them. Thus the WATS report assumes that automobile use will rapidly increase and projects a freeway and a beltway system accordingly. But surely the people of Winnipeg and its government have the power to say "Stop"? We have the power to demand and plan for an entirely different transportation system if we have the will to exercise that power.

4. Even if we are firmly wedded to our beloved automobile, is more and more blacktop the answer? Evidence from other North American cities suggests that new freeways, street widening projects etc. are at best a very temporary answer to traffic



bottlenecks. Freeways particularly often turn out to be a fast way from one traffic jam to the next.

5. Do we require a different philosophy towards public transit? At the moment it is regarded as a business with long debates about "deficit". Should it not more appropriately be regarded as a public utility, like the parks system - a public amenity which recognizes people's basic right to move around the city without having to rely on General Motors and the friendly finance company to provide them with the means?

All these arguments and questions sound reasonable and logical, but something more is needed - some glimmering of the insanity of our present course - a recapturing of something we all have, called common sense. Who was at Polo Park during the Xmas rush and saw the hundreds of frustrated and angry drivers at a dead stop blaring their horns at one another, and assailing each others nostrils and lungs with the fumes from their impotent oversized engines? And when they finally did park they still had further to walk in the freezing cold to the store than did their European grandparents who walked from their houses. Is this progress? Is this sane? Is it the shape of things to come all over in the near future?

The basic proposition of the WCTC is that vigorous measures towards a high quality public transit system with concurrent measures to regulate automobile use is the only policy which makes sense for Winnipeg at this time. Public transit costs considerably less, is far less destructive of the environment, is more equitable, and if properly and flexibly organized can come close to providing the advantages of the automobile. The philosophy behind the WATS study and many of its recommendations are contrary to this proposition and we urge the people and government of Winnipeg to re-examine it.

An alternative to the freeways

Jim Cassidy

A class study group from the Department of Extension at the University of Alberta has recently come out with a 50 page report entitled, Light Rapid Transit: The Immediate answer for Edmonton.

This group, a totally voluntary one, has developed an alternative to a \$750 million freeway plan proposed for Edmonton.

The alternative, which is a L.R.T. system consisting of a

two-car train which operates both over and underground, is capable of carrying 500 passengers and, if, as suggested, a six - branch system is used, 500 passengers could be carried every five minutes on each branch. This gives a capacity of 6,000 passengers per hour per direction on each branch and 18,000 people per hour each way in the central subway.

The entire system would cost \$120 million and could be build over a period of ten to fifteen years.

The Light Rapid Transit System as differentiated from an underground rapid transit subway system has been developed, tried and proven in post war Germany, Belgium, Holland and Sweden and is now operating in more than 20 cities.

Construction of several well-phased L.R.T. lines in Edmonton would greatly magnify the transit system's ability to serve a growing city. L.R.T. is affordable by Edmonton with the normal current annual Provincial assistance. L.R.T. complements the primary automobile system in the area where it does not work well in the central city. L.R.T. allows continued reliance on the primary automobile arterial roadway system without the construction of costly, destructive downtown freeways. L.R.T. enhances Edmonton's main resource--the North Saskatchewan River Valley and its system of ravines. L.R.T. is not environmentally destructive. L.R.T. does not destroy neighbourhoods. L.R.T. is pollution free. In addition, L.R.T. provides the nucleus for a much greater emphasis upon public transportation in the future should events dictate less emphasis upon the automobile. In summary L.R.T. is the obvious choice for transportation development in Edmonton and might be a concept worth consideration for Winnipeg.

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
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Beware of senior governments bearing gifts

by Lloyd Axworthy

Who determines the transportation priorities of cities? Often it is the senior levels of government.

This is not done in an overt way. Federal and provincial planners are very correct in constantly stating that they do not wish to interfere in the cities and will simply respond to the wishes of the city decision-makers. But this is a polite fiction.

The truth is that the senior governments set priorities through power of the purse. There are certain things they will pay for, and certain things they won't pay for--cities, needing federal and provincial funds will, therefore, choose the projects or proposals for which funds are available.

The railway relocation study is a classic example. The original in Winnipeg was how to build a new bridge across the CPR tracks. The federal government was not prepared to share the cost of such a bridge. They were interested, however, in railway relocation and therefore were prepared to offer funds for a study. The City of Winnipeg, which started out simply to build a new bridge, is now undertaking a much larger and perhaps more perilous enterprise of moving the railways; all because of the power of the federal purse.

The Minister of State for Urban Affairs has recently announced that his Ministry is preparing legislation to offer financial assistance, not just for studies, but for the actual removal of the railways. So very soon Winnipeggers will be tempted by the availability of federal funds to move their railway. Whether Winnipeggers believe that relocating the railways is good or not, someone in the Urban Ministry in Ottawa believes it is, so we will dance to their tune.

A preferred strategy for the federal government would be legislation offering assistance to the cities for a full range of urban environmental programs. Thus, if Winnipeggers decide they would rather have an improved public transit system, or even a system of urban parkland, and leave the CPR where it is, they could receive federal assistance.

It would seem also that the provincial government of Manitoba should be concerned about the influence of federal grants for railway relocation. As other papers in this issue point out, railway relocation in Winnipeg is tied in with the proposed freeway system. Yet, over a year ago, the provincial Minister of Transportation indicated that his government was opposed to the proposals in the WATS study. Therefore, it appears that in effect a provincial transportation priority is be-

ing contradicted, through the power of federal grants for special kinds of projects.

In Ontario, the provincial government has taken the lead in developing progressive new approaches to urban transportation. They are not allowing their priorities to be set by the federal government. We should expect the same in Manitoba.

No one wished to turn away the bearer of gifts, and the new interest by the federal government in matters of urban transportation should be appreciated. But, there is also a danger, repeated many times in the constitutional history of Canada, that the federal government can set local priorities through the provision of special grants or "gifts".

Transportation is too important to Winnipeg to have our priorities set from outside. Therefore we should not only be asking our own City Council to re-think and go slow on the Railway program and on WATS, but we should also be asking federal Members of Parliament and the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs to change their approach. If Ottawa was willing to supply support to this city in developing a comprehensive approach to better transportation, rather than offering single shot

assistance for railway removal, then the choice of initiatives in transportation would be easier to make.


At the same time the provincial government could be taking the lead in developing new directions in city transportation and offering assistance for the development of experimental programs. They might also begin discussion with the federal government for new fund sharing agreements on urban transit for the Province that would encompass the full range of transportation needs.

The assistance of senior levels of government is essential for developing better cities--but not when it comes in packages that compel what the priorities should be.

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