The Future City, Report No. 2:
The Politics of Innovation

_____

By Tom Axworthy
1972

_____

The Institute of Urban Studies

INSTITUTE OF
URBAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF WINNIPEG

THE FUTURE CITY, REPORT NO. 2:
THE POLITICS OF INNOVATION
Published 1972 by the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg
© THE INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES

Note: The cover page and this information page are new replacements, 2015.

The Institute of Urban Studies is an independent research arm of the University of Winnipeg. Since 1969, the IUS has been both an academic and an applied research centre, committed to examining urban development issues in a broad, non-partisan manner. The Institute examines inner city, environmental, Aboriginal and community development issues. In addition to its ongoing involvement in research, IUS brings in visiting scholars, hosts workshops, seminars and conferences, and acts in partnership with other organizations in the community to effect positive change.

E

FUTURE

CITY

THE FUTURE CITY

Report No. 2

'The Politics of Innovation'

by Tom Axworthy

FOREWORD

This is the second report published by the Institute of Urban Studies on the new city government scheme in Winnipeg.

The first report, called The Future City, published in the spring of 1971, was a selection of views on the potential workings of the new local government re-organization. This second report in The Future City series, is an anlysis of how and why the new scheme came about and how it relates to the central question of implementing change in the institutions of government. The Institute plans to issue further research reports and studies on the Winnipeg system of local government, as we believe it to be an important experiment in developing more effective and democratic means of managing our urban areas, and one that should be continuously monitored and analyzed.

Our thanks are owing to the Federal Government's 1971 Opportunities for Youth Program that enabled students to study the new system of government as it began last summer. The author is presently a doctoral candidate at Queen's University and because of the grant, he and the other students were able to pursue a research project of important value.

Our thanks also to Professor Andrew Quarry, who edited the report and to Mr. C. N. Kushner of the Provincial Government who reviewed the report before publication.

April 1972

Lloyd Axworthy,
Director,
Institute of Urban Studies.

INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, July 24, 1971, the Legislature of the Province of Manitoba gave third and final reading to Bill 36, "The City of Greater Winnipeg Act". The passage of the Unicity Bill ended one of the most bitter conflicts of modern Manitoba politics and ushered in a unique experiment in North American metropolitan government.

Bill 36 is important both for its substance and the process which led to its creation and adoption. It is a genuine innovation in the area of metropolitan reform; for years there has been argument between the proponents of government decentralization, who believe in increased citizen participation, and the supporters of area-wide amalgamations who opt for efficiency and better service. Bill 36 tries to fulfill both expectations by incorporating the philosophy and many of the concepts recommended by the famous Redcliffe Maud Royal Commission on Local Government in England.[1] In fact, it may well be that Winnipeg's experiment in local government is the most important urban development in Canada since the formation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953.

It is, of course, too early to assess the success or failure of the new structure. The Unicity Council was not incorporated until January 1, 1972. But what can be examined now, is the process which led to the adoption of the reform. This is the goal of the paper. The case study itself is organized around the theoretical concept of innovation. Innovation is a vague word which is often used but little understood. It is hoped that this study will not only increase our knowledge about urban politics in Canada but will also clarify the meaning of this important concept.

1. Premier Schreyer is thus implementing what Prime Minister Heath refused.

Theories of Metropolitan Reform

One of the basic problems facing our society today is whether the system

of local government which originated in the 18th and 19th centuries is capable of

coping with the many pressures associated with mushrooming urbanization. Urban

growth makes a mockery of political boundaries and results in two main problems:

1. The existence of many local government units makes it difficult to cope with

area-wide problems such as pollution, planning, and transportation. The problems

are area-wide; the authority is fragmented.

2. Fragmented local government results in financial inequality. The city is, in

effect, one economic and social unit but people pay their taxes only to the area

municipality in which they live. Thus suburbs have a great deal of the taxes while

the central city has most of the problems.

To deal with the above problems, local government planners have developed a

variety of institutional structures ranging from amalgamation, to two-tier

authorities, to area-wide special purpose bodies.[2] The problem has not been the

creation of plans but rather how to get them adopted, and here, the existing liter-

ature on metropolitan reform is of little help to Canadian students. Much of

the material is drawn from American sources; we have excellent accounts of

the battles to get metropolitan government in Miami, partial consolidation in

Baton Rouge or city-county consolidation in Nashville.[3] But as Scott Greer has

---

2. For a good description of the various types of metropolitan plans see
    J.C. Bollens and N.J. Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

3. See, for example, D.A. Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville Consolidation
    (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1963); William Harvard and Floyd Corry,
    "The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rough Area," in J. Zimmerman, ed.,
    Government of the Metropolis (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc.,
    1968), p. 177; E. Sofen, The Miami Metropolitan Experiment (Bloomington: Indiana
    University Press, 1963); and R. Wolff, Miami Metro (Coral Gabler: University of
    Miami Press, 1960).

written in Governing the Metropolis the whole American experience in metropolitan

reform has been conditioned by the precepts of Jacksonian democracy.[4] The idea

of "home rule" and local ratification has become embedded in most state constitutions

and as a result voters in every municipality have the right to decide whether or

not they wish to be annexed, consolidated or federated (in most cases they have

not desired a change). This hurdle of local referendum is alien to the Canadian

experience.

The importance of the local political culture is also emphasized in two

books which are relevant to Canadian urban politics. In Harold Kaplan's study of

Metro Toronto, Urban Political Systems, the low pressure environment and the large

degree of social consensus are partial explanations for Toronto's executive-centered

system.[5] In Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform Frank Smallwood

clearly shows that the parliamentary system has a major effect on the type of

strategy that various groups adopt in supporting or opposing reform.[6]

Smallwood has also adopted the game-contestants approach of Sayre and Kaufman to

a parliamentary system and has demonstrated the importance of actor motivations.[7]

From the study of the theoretical literature, then, it appears that three basic

questions must be asked about any attempt to gain reform:

1. What is the political culture and distribution of power in the local system?

2. What are the conditions which lead to the initiation of the reform?

3. What are the types of power and important motivations held by the partici-

    pants in the contest?

---

4. Scott Greer, Governing the Metropolis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 54.

5. Harold Kaplan. Urban Political Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 157.

6. Frank Smallwood, Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 368-313.

7. See Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960).

The Concept of Innovation

The term innovation not only describes the substance of Bill 36 but the elements involved in the process of innovation offer a useful way in which to approach the empirical data of the Winnipeg case study.

The concept of innovation has received a great deal of attention from sociologists, psychologists, anthropoligists, and organization theorists.[8] Each discipline has defined innovation differently, but the one element central to all these definitions is novelty. The quality of newness separates innovation from other types of social change. Newness does not imply uniqueness: some other system or organization may have originated the idea, but, for a change to be innovative, it must differ from existing practices or immediate past traditions. As vital to the meaning of innovation as the concept of novelty, is the quality of planning. Innovation is a form of planned change, a new response to social or system pressures. For the purposes of this study then, innovation within the political system is defined as any new policy, structure, technique or behaviour qualitatively different from existing practice or predominant traditions proposed as a response to a particular problem or change in the environment.

Innovation thus invokes the detection of a need for a new policy and the initiation of the process for obtaining acceptance of that policy. The basic elements of the process which apply to our case study are:

1. Perception

2. Idea-configuration or creation

3. Adoption

---

8. See Everett Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovation (New York: Free Press, 1962); Everett Hagen, A Theory of Social Change (New York: McGraw Hill and Co., 1953); Victor Thompson Bureaucracy of Innovation (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969); Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961); and James Q. Wilson in his article "Innovation in organization: Notes Towards a Theory", in James D. Thompson, ed., Approaches to Organizational Design, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1966) pp. 193-216.

The need for perception must be the starting point. Before innovation can take place someone has to realize that a problem needs attending to, or that there has been a change in the environment which necessitates a change in the operation of the system. The first section of the case study deals with the history of local government in Winnipeg and, in particular, the dispute between Metro and the city of Winnipeg. The clash of these two bodies so stalemated urban policy in Winnipeg that the senior government clearly perceived the need for change.

Once perception of the problem has occurred the new approach itself has to be developed or borrowed from someone else. Part II of the case study explains why Bill 36 was innovative and tries to describe the process by which it was created. The only method available to describe the process was personal interview since cabinet secrecy shrouded the issue. Part II, then, is less reliable than the other sections and relies in part upon our subjective evaluation of conflicting rumours and statements.

Part III of the case study is perhaps the most important section in the paper. Here we describe the process which led to the adoption of Bill 36. There are many factors which influence the acceptance or rejection of innovation: the innovative resources of the change agent, the strength of the obstacles opposing the reform and the motivations of the actors. In a study of innovation in public health programs Lawrence Mohr has developed a hypothesis which includes these three factors: the adoption of innovation is directly related to the recipient's motivations, inversely related to the strength of the obstacles in the way of innovation, and directly related to the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles.[9]

---

9. Lawrence Mohr "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations", American Political Science Review,LX III.

In the literature on Innovation, however, most theorists are concerned with the voluntary acceptance of innovation -- such as people accepting new health programs and Indians changing their agricultural techniques. But in analyzing government innovation the ultimate factor is coercion -- governments can force the acceptance of change if they deem it a high enough priority. The factor of coercion necessitates a somewhat different approach than that employed in the innovation leterature.

The fruitful frameworks have been developed by Frank Smallwood in his work Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform, cited previously and Amitai Etzioni in his book Political Unification.[10] Smallwood's game-contestants approach has been described above and is helpful in analyzing the tactics and techniques used by the participants in the contest. Etzioni's book describes how different units come to form one integrated political community and the unification of thirteen governments to form one Greater Winnipeg council certainly fits his definition of community.[11] In particular, Etzioni points out the importance of the distribution of elite power groups and the different kinds of power that can be employed as the integrating authority.[12]

---

10. Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Ltd., 1965).

11. Etzioni defines a political community as possessing three kinds of integration: "a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence . . . b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community, and c) it is the dominant force of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens". Op. cit., p. 4.

12. Etzioni calls his change inducing unit the integrating authority; innovation theorists call theirs the innovating power; an equally useful description is our old standby the decision-making power -- a more general description which I employ.

A more specific description of the elements involved in urban policy
making is contained in Robert Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky's Urban Politics and
Public Policy.[13] Using a systems approach, the two authors usefully outline the
different factors, variables and concepts which must be discussed before the
urban policy process can be fully explained.

Using concepts developed in the different literatures of innovation,
integration and policy-valuing, the following framework has been formulated to
help classify the different factors which affect the politics of achieving urban
change. Due to limitations of the empirical data, not all these factors have
been discussed in the Winnipeg case example, although the framework has been
followed as closely as possible.

A Framework for the Analysis of the Politics of Urban Change

    A. THE ENVIRONMENT OF URBAN POLICY

        I The Socio-Economic Context

            1. Physical factors
            2. Resources

        II The Political Setting

            1. Local Political Culture
            2. Structures of Government
                i - formal
                ii - electoral
                iii - intergovernmental
            3. Scope of Participation
                i - Public
                ii - Elites

        III The Urban Community

            1. Sources of Integration
                i - social
                ii - economic
                iii - political
            2. Sources of Stress

13. Robert R. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics and Public Policy
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971.)

B. THE PARTICIPANTS

    I   The Initiators

          1. Composition
          2. Motivation
          3. Resources
          4. Techniques

    II The Decision-Making Power

          1. Level composition
          2. Motivation
          3. Resources

    III Opponents and Supporters

          1. Composition
          2. Motivation
          3. Resources

C. STRATEGIES / RESULTS

    I The Arena

          1. The locus of conflict

    II Stages of the Campaign

          1. Preliminary Manoeuvers
          2. Consolidation of Forces
          3. Final outcome

    III Strategies

          1. Nature of the appeals
          2. Tactics
          3. Scope and Intensity

    IV Results

The Environment of Urban Policy

    The environment in which any urban policy takes place is of course,

fundamental to understanding the nature of the political powers. David Easton has

suggested that it is possible to separate political life from the rest of social

activity with politics being concerned with the authoritative allocation of
values.[14] The environment influences political activity and is, in turn, influenced
by it. Urban policy, which refers to authoritative decisions on a local level, is
affected by the economic, social, religious, and cultural factors present within
its boundaries. The local environment produces both resources, which can be
employed by the local decision-makers, and constraints, which limit the behaviour
of the local voters.

The socio-economic context refers to the physical factors of size,
density, and heterogeneity, which affect political life, and to the economic
resources of the area. In his famous article "Urbanism as a Way of Life",
Louis Wirth defined Urbanism as being the result of number, density of settlement
and heterogeneity of the urban population.[15] These three factors combine to
generate both resources (energy, diversity, economic strength) and conflict
(fights over living space, ethnic disputes, etc). The wealth or economic resources
of the cities are also an essential variable. Lineberry and Sharkansky suggest
that the wealth of cities can be measured by the indices of population growth,
income, and education[16], and the irony of urban wealth is that the huge resources
contained in the cities are usually just beyond the reach of the local policy-makers.

The political setting is composed of a variety of variables which
influence the course of urban policy. The classification of local political
culture is rarely defined but always referred to. James Wilson has suggested that
"a political culture might be thought of as a widely shared, patterned view of
the proper scope and behaviour of public institutions and specifically, what ways

14. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965) pp. 23-59.
15. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life", American Journal of Sociology, XLIV,
(July, 1938), p.18.
16. Lineberry and Sharkansky, op. cit., pp. 20-25.

of behaviour on public matters . . . would be thought legitimate."[17] Aspects

of the local political culture or climate which may affect urban policies are

the traditions of government, the ideal of reformism, the existence of the

business ethic and the tolerance of corruption. The structure of government,

that is whether there is a strong mayor, council, manager and so on, the type

of electoral organization (ward system or city-wide election), and the inter-

governmental relations between local units within the metropolitan area

(horizontal) or between the Province and Federal Governments (vertical) all

affect the climate in which urban policy is made. The scope of participation

has been employed by many authors as an important variable. Lineberry and Sharkansl

believe that voting is an important resource which is not employed properly in

those communities which have low voting turnouts.[18] Kaplan has discussed the

comparative lack of elite participation in Toronto and believes that the low

pressure environment is a partial explanation for Toronto's executive-centered

system.[19] Although difficult to assess, it is important to try to discover the

"temperature" of the local political system -- are the local political leaders

subjected to many kinds of pressure or are they largely autonomous?

The classification of <u>urban community</u> is a concept borrowed from the

integration literature. "Community" refers to the state of affairs where

the inhabitants of a given area "show some minimal readinessor ability to

continue working together to solve their political problems".[20] Hans uses

the term to describe a situation in which "specific groups and individuals

show more loyalty to their central political institution than to any other

17. James Wilson, <u>City Politics and Public Policy</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 12.
18. Lineberry and Sharkansky, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 52.
19. Kaplan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 157.
20. David Easton, <u>A Systems Analysis of Political Life</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 172.

political authority."[21] What these definitions have in common is that they empha-size a degree of co-operation, tolerance, and a feeling of "togetherness" which makes an area feel distinct.

In any city, as Banfield and Wilson have written, there are forces which increase this sense of community and others which cause conflict and disintegration. The life of a city is a constant balancing between conflict and co-operation. In describing a process of unicifcation like the Winnipeg case example, it is, of course, important to know the level of integration among the various units. Joseph Nye, in an article in International Organization, has written that there can be integration in three broad areas: the economic, social, and political. Nye has suggested various indices to measure the level in each of the areas.[23] If there is a great deal of integration in the community it can be an important resource for the policy maker. On the other hand, if conflict is intensive, this is a major constraint.

The Participants

The participants in the urban policy valuing process may range from the Mayor of the city, to the Premier of the Province, to the average voter. Although every urban decision may have a different set of participants, one can group the major classifications of actors relatively easily. These are

1. the formal decision-makers
2. business interests
3. labour unions
4. city newspapers
5. reform groups
6. municipal bureaucracies
7. neighbourhood groups
8. the public.

---

21. E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 5.
22. Edward C. Banfield, James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).
23. Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration Concept and Measurement", International Organization, Autumn 1968.

The formal decision-makers, whether they be the mayor and his council or the Premier and his cabinet, are always involved in urban decisions if only as a ratifying body. Business interests (downtown merchants, suburban shopping centres, etc.) often participate in local decisions, and it has been suggested by some authors that business interests are often the predominant interest. Labour unions may be involved (municipal employee unions often are) and city newspapers are almost always a factor in urban decisions. Reform groups, like the League of Women Voters, professional associations, or academics influence many issues in the local area. The municipal bureaucracies are involved not only in the administration of urban policy but, as Banfield demonstrated in Political Influence, often initiate issues.[24] With the new cry of participation, neighbourhood groups are steadily gaining a more important voice in city politics. And, of course, the public is an entity which is never ignored.

The initiators refers to that group of actors who succeed in placing their issue or problem on the public agenda. This is an important action, for, as Bachrach and Baratz have pointed out in their article, "Two Faces of Power", often what is not discussed is as significant as what is.[25] The term decision-making power refers to the individuals, formal bodies, or behind-the-scenes groups who took the effective decision to develop and implement the given urban policy. This classification usually describes government but following C. Wright Will, Floyd Hunter and others there may be an informal power elite which really "calls the shots". Opponents and Supporters simply refers to the actors who were involved in the political battle to get the policy adopted.

24. Edward Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961).

25. Peter Bachrach and Morton D. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" in Willis S. Hawley and Frederick M. Wirt, eds., The Search for Community Power (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1968), pp. 239-250.

The motivations and resources of the participants are two of the most important variables. Sayre and Kaufman write that there are four main levels of "stakes and prizes" in city politics:[26]

1. public office or employment
2. money
3. governmental service
4. ideological and intangible rewards.

In his study of Greater London, Smallwood found that the participants were motivated by four drives: power, professional concern, fears, ideological rationalizations.[27] The exact motivation of the actors will differ from issue to issue, but it is important to determine why they act as they do.

The term political resource is often equated with the hoary concept of power. In Political Unification, Etzioni describes three basic types of power which can be employed to achieve unification: identitive (symbols or propaganda), utilitarian (economic) and coercive (law or military).[28] In the Winnipeg case example, the Provincial Government used coercive power by legally forcing the municipalities to unite but they also appealed to symbols and offered economic or utilitarian benefits. Unlike Etzioni who was referring to power on a state basis, Robert Dahl is interested in individual resources. A political resource for Dahl is anything which can be utilized to sway the specific choice or strategies of another individual and this includes time, money, status, control over jobs or information, legality, the right to vote or even energy.[29] In analyzing any conflict, one must examine the resources available to both sides and how these resources are employed.

---

26. Sayre and Kaufman, op. cit., Chapter II
27. Smallwood, op. cit., p. 291.
28. Etzioni, op. cit., p. 37.
29. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 225.

Strategies / Results

The techniques employed during a political conflict are also of interest. The <u>arena</u> is the different theatres in which the conflict unfolds -- battles in the press, public meetings, investigating committees and the legislature. The nature of the arena, that is whether the fight is taking place in the press or in Parliament, may well affect the type of strategy which is followed.

The classification of <u>stages of the campaign</u> has been well developed by Frank Smallwood.[30] The time variable is always a crucial one: the period before the government is completely committed to a certain course of action offers more opportunities for different types of strategies, than when the battle is simply whether or not the government will back down. In analyzing the stages of the campaign, there is invariably a time of preliminary manoeuvers in which potential opponents survey the battleground, try to enlist allies, and prepare for the conflict to come. Eventually, there is a consolidation of forces where the lines are clearly drawn and the resources of both sides are committed to the battle.

Finally the actual strategies must be described. The studies of Karl Deutsch and his associates in <u>Political Community and the North Atlantic Area</u>[31] are helpful in delineating the categories which must be studied. The <u>nature of the appeals</u> are important because the type of issues raised have symbolic importance and help to reveal the motivations of the participants. Deutsch found that the same type of appeals have been used over and over again by those who are in favour of integration. The <u>scope and intensity</u> of the campaign is also crucial: how committed are the participants, did they employ all the resources at their command, and did the issue become a major one and thus attract other causes? If

---

30. Smallwood, op. cit., pp. 169-285.

31. Darl Deutsch et al., <u>Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

one side is deeply committed to the cause and the other is only lukewarm, the "intensity" factor might become a key variable.

The above framework, then, offers a guide on how to organize empirical data in the field of urban political conflict.

A Summary

The Winnipeg case study will be organized around the concept of innovation. Innovation is one type of change -- a change characterized by the quality of novelty. The need for change arises because of stress in the environment. The three primary stages of innovation are perception, creation, and adoption, and each corresponds to one section of the case study. Part I records the recent history and problems of the Winnipeg metropolitan area -- a history of stress and conflict of sufficient magnitude to force many individuals and in particular the provincial government to perceive the desirability for change. Part II describes the process which led to the creation of the Unicity plan and an analysis is made of the various sections of Bill 36. In Part III the political battle which led to the final adoption of the bill is outlined and the framework of analysis described above is then applied to the whole case study.

PART I

THE HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WINNIPEG

Like any political environment, the urban system of metropolitan Winnipeg has been shaped by historical, economic, and demographic forces. Beginning as a western boom town in the 1880's, the city has been transformed by successive waves of European immigration until it is now one of the most cosmopolitan areas in Canada -- and one of a few in which Anglo-Saxons are in a minority. Governed throughout its history by representatives of the Anglo-Saxon

business elite, within the last two decades, the ethnic majority has been making

its political power felt. Still clearly the dominant unit in Manitoba,

Winnipeg is not however, a dynamic economic area and its boom days are gone. In

short, it is a fascinating mixture of old and the new, the dynamic and the traditional.

The history of the city of Winnipeg still has to be written and this

paper does not even begin to analyze the important factors. We are interested only

in the variables which have affected the urban politics of the area, and even here

the treatment is cursory. But for purposes of analysis, there are four major

factors which have influenced Winnipeg's local politics:

1. the paramount position of Winnipeg

2. the economic and social integration

3. the underlying social consensus

4. the ethnic transformation.

Winnipeg is the dominant unit in Manitoba. With a population of 534,675 in

1970,[32] over half of Manitoba's citizens live in the area. The Provincial Govern-

ment's "Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area" hereafter

referred to as the "White Paper" recognized that "Greater Winnipeg is a prime

generator of economic life in the province. The greater part of all the goods

and services produced in the province are produced or generated in this area. It

provides the most jobs and produces most of the tax revenues needed to run the

province."[33] Despite the smallness of its population compared to Toronto or

Montreal, Winnipegers are conscious of being the major city not only in Manitoba

but in the Prairies as a whole. Winnipeg supports a symphony orchestra, one of the

best ballet troupes in North America and a professional theatre company -- cultural

32. Statistics Canada's figures reported in The Globe and Mail, November 9, 1971.

33. Government of Manitoba, "Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater
     Winnipeg Area", December, 1970, p. 2.

resources far out of proportion to the size of the city. The cultural, economic, and demographic dominance of Winnipeg has been reflected in provincial politics. Urban/rural cleavage has been one of the dominant themes of Manitoba politics[34] and Winnipeg has been as much a whipping boy for rural legislators as New York or Toronto.

Despite the dominance of Winnipeg in the province, the city has been small enough to become economically and socially integrated. George Rich, the former Director of Planning for the Metropolitan Corporation has written "Metropolitan Winnipeg, like other metropolitan areas, was a social and economic whole fragmented into a number of municipalities for the purposes of local government."[35] Because of the dictates of weather, the citizens of the Assiniboine and Red Rivers have had to cooperate ever since the Selkirk Settlers arrived in the early 1800's. Different communities such as St. Boniface, largely populated by Franco-Manitobans, the "North End" 'Winnipeg's ethnic center' or St. James, the WASP suburb, did develop but Winnipeg was still primarily the center for identification. There is only one real entertainment center, shopping area, and downtown. The voting results of October 6 show this Winnipeg identification -- the man identified with the idea of Winnipeg amalgamation, Stephen Juba, received as many votes in the suburbs as he did in his home baliwick of Winnipeg proper.[36] Mr. Juba may have been elected for a variety of reasons, but plainly the appeal to the local "identity" of the various municipalities by his opponents carried little impact.

34. For a discussion of this theme see W. L. Morton, Manitoba: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).

35. George Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years" in Ralph Krueger and Charles Bryfogle, eds., Urban Problems, (Toronto: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 359.

36. See the Winnipeg Free Press, October 7, 1970.

In a city associated with the Winnipeg General Strike, the description
of an underlying social consensus at the local level may strike some observers
as peculiar. But by and large, Winnipegers have seemed to be agreed upon the
main principles and directions of urban politics. Until 1956, the city of Winnipeg
was ruled by a series of business oriented Anglo-Saxons. George Sharpe, John
Queen, et alii all came from the same mold. In Who Governs?, Robert Dahl has
described the first mayors of New Haven as patricians or entrepreneurs and the
same description would fit their Winnipeg counterparts.[37] Believers in "good
government", "efficiency" and "business principles", these men have left an
important legacy. The principles of non-partisanship, efficiency and what Banfield
and Wilson call "public regardingness",[38] have been firmly established in Winnipeg.
Mayor Juba and other representatives of the smaller ethnic groups have taken over
the political posts, but, if anything, they believe even more strongly in this re-
formism ethnic. Stephen Juba has made a career of being non-partisan and the direct-
ion of his administration has been basically conservative. There was intensive
conflict in Winnipeg in the 1960's but it was over what level of government could
best do the job, not the direction of policy. Part of Juba's success lies in the
fact that he constitutes no threat to established business or financial patterns.
The one party to threaten even slightly the status quo was the N.D.P. municipal
group and it was crushed in the 1971 election (in part because it brought party
politics to the local level).

Winnipeg's lack of growth may also contribute to the maintenance of a
consensus. The population increase of Winnipeg from 1966-1970 was only 5%
compared to 16% for Toronto, 15% for Vancouver, 16% for Edmonton and 21% for

---

37. Robert Dahl, op. cit., p. 11-32.
38. Banfield and Wilson, op. cit.

Calgary.[39] (These population figures are also an indication of the economic dynamism of the respective areas.) This lack of growth lessens the stresses caused by urban sprawl, lack of housing and the other problems associated with growth. As the President of the Downtown Business Association said, "we don't want faster growth. Now we have time to plan and think things over." Another indication of consensus (or the success of the elite in preventing potential conflict) has been the lack of neighbourhood groups, poor people's associations, and similar 'grass-roots' organization. Only in the late '60's did such groups appear to challenge the prevailing philosophy. Finally, lack of participation or a low "temperature" of local politics may indicate a general satisfaction with the way things are going and as our case study of Bill 36 will show, there was little interest group activity.

The ethnic transformation of Metro Winnipeg, while not drastically changing the basic consensus, certainly affected the local politics of the city. As the Dominion Bureau of Statistics reported in 1961, Winnipeg was one of the most ethnically heterogeneous metropolitan areas in Canada. In 1961, out of a total metro population of 475,989, approximately 45% or 213,964 were of British origin while Canada's other charter group, the French, had 39,777 or about 8%. Under the census designation of "other" ethnic origin were about 47% of the total metropolitan population and in the city of Winnipeg itself, the citizens of the non-charter groups constituted 52% of the total of 265,429. The largest ethnic groups in 1961 were the Ukrainians 53,918, German 50,206, Polish 24,904, and Jewish 18,250. Almost all of these immigrants (and in 1961 23% of Winnipeg's population had been born outside Canada) settled first in the old North End between the Canadian Pacific tracks and old St. John's. And although these people have spread throughout Metro Winnipeg most still live north of Portage Avenue.[40]

---

39. The Globe and Mail (Toronto) November 9, 1971.

40. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census.

The ethnic patterns of settlement have played a major role in local politics in the last two decades. M. S. Donnelly has shown in the article, "Ethnic Participants in Municipal Government," that aldermanic elections follow ethnic majorities: "not one alderman has been elected in a Ward where he did not have a community of his ethnic origin to support him."[41] In Ward 1, 90% of the Jewish vote, for example, in 1960 went to M. A. Danzker a candidate of Jewish origin, and for the first time a non-Anglo-Saxon alderman was returned.

The year which really marked the ethnic transformation of power was 1956 when Stephen Juba, a third-generation Canadian of Ukrainian origin, defeated G. E. Sharpe, the incumbent. Only two non-Anglo-Saxon candidates had run for mayor prior to World War I, and Juba himself had been unsuccessful in 1952 and 1954 when he lost by 15,000 votes. In 1956, however, Juba was presented with an issue concerning alleged misuse of public money and this gave him enough "good-government" votes, combined with his ethnic support to defeat Sharpe. The major issue in the campaign was Juba's ethnic origin with the Winnipeg Free Press believing that "Juba would be a larger risk than the citizens of Winnipeg should wisely take"[42] and the ethnic papers all behind him. In Ward 1, which had a majority of Anglo-Saxons, 64.5% turned out and Sharpe received twice as many votes as Juba but in Ward 3 where Slavic groups predominate Juba won by nearly 11,000 votes. Since 1956, Juba has become almost a folk hero to many ethnic citizens and this combined with his political skill and conservative outlook (thus insuring that the business community did not mass against him) has made him unbeatable. Juba has expanded his political appeal beyond his ethnic base but it is his strength in the North End which has made him the most powerful politician in Metro Winnipeg.[43]

---

41. M.S. Donnelly, "Ethnic Participation in Municipal Government" in Lionel Feldman and Michael Goldrich, eds., Politics and Government of Urban Canada, (Toronto: Methuen Ltd., 1969), pp. 64.

42. Winnipeg Free Press, October 19, 1956.

43. Ethnicity may also affect turnout. In 1956 about 58% of the electorate went to the polls, the largest turnout since 1938 when an ethnic candidate had also run. In 1960 when Juba was elected by acclamation the turnout fell to 38% but rose in 1962 when another candidate appeared (even though Juba was in no trouble). In 1971, when a real contest appeared to be threatening Juba's position, the turnout rose to a record 60%.

These four factors then, have influenced the direction and content of urban politics in Winnipeg. From this general discussion of trends and character- istics we will now focus on the single issue of development of regional government in the metropolitan area.

The Early Years

Municipal government began in Manitoba in 1836 when the Lord Selkirk Grant was re-transferred and the District of Assiniboia was established. However, it is not until Manitoba entered confederation in 1870 that modern municipal structures begin to appear. In 1873, Winnipeg was incorporated into a city and Portage La Prairie and St. James became municipalities.[44] The two main trends evident in this early period were the growth, largely by annexation of Winnipeg and the rural/**urban split.** In 1882 Winnipeg annexed large portions of Assiniboia and Kildonan and in 1906 Elmwood and parts of Kildonan voted by referendum to join the city. Municipalities such as Transcona were incorporated in 1912 to facilitate a railway center and it became apparent that the river system was a barrier to municipal unity; thus West St. **Vital** split to become the Municipality of Fort Garry, Assiniboia became Charleswood in 1913 and Kildonan and St. Paul split into East and West portions. The 1920's saw **dispersion** spread between rural and urban areas and in 1919 Brooklands parted from rural Rosser, the urbanized area of Assiniboia became St. James, rural West Kildonan split to become Old Kildonan and rural East Kildonan became the separate municipality of North Kildonan. By 1924, then, the municipal organization was set and did not change for thirty-six years.

44. See K. Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), pp. 67-77, for a description of the different processes of incorporation.

The structure of municipal administration was determined by the Municipal Act of 1962 which stipulated that cities and towns were to have one mayor, and two aldermen per ward. The council-committee system became the prevalent form of organization. Thus the Mayor is the executive officer and the ex-officio member of all council-controlled committees. The councils are usually divided into standing committees and the various civic departments are responsible to their respective standing committees.[45] This tradition of strong committee power greatly influenced the organization of the Metropolitan Council and the central council of the new Unicity. In 1920, the city of Winnipeg introduced proportional representation. The previous seven wards were reduced to three with six aldermen each. The Winnipeg Free Press (then in the zenith of its power) and the Grain Growers Guide strongly championed the cause as a device to control the political machines of the two major parties who, it was felt, influenced local politics too strongly. This suspicion of political parties at the local level, then, is a major tradition of Winnipeg urban politics.

The early years of local government in Winnipeg also reveal a surprising amount of inter-municipal cooperation. In fact in 1960 when Metro was created many of the local functions were already integrated. In the field of engineering there was cooperation in the use of specialized equipment and in dyking. The suburbs could make use of the city of Winnipeg's police training facilities and for major fires, the city of Winnipeg lent equipment and men. Formal cooperation was instituted through the use of special bodies:

1. Greater Winnipeg Water District 1913
2. Mosquito Abatement Authority 1927
3. Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District 1935
4. St. James-Winnipeg Airport Commission 1937
5. Metropolitan Planning Commission 1948
6. Metropolitan Civil Defence Board 1951
7. Greater Winnipeg Transit Commission 1953

45. For a fuller discussion of the Winnipeg Council-Committee system see Thomas Plunkett, Urban Canada and its Government (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 119-125.

There were complaints from the municipalities that Winnipeg dominated these boards for her benefit and in some cases, such as the Greater Winnipeg Water District, there were wide variations of service. The planning board was only an advisory board and as Rich has pointed out most of its plans went unheeded.[46] But despite the difficulties, the impressive degree of inter-municipal cooperation undoubtedly aided the eventual emergence of Metro.

The pre-war period also saw the creation of the Manitoba Municipal Board Up to the depression of the 1930's the municipalities had fairly small debts, most as a result of public works projects. However, the huge sums of money borrowed during the depression were so excessive that many of the municipalities could not afford to pay even the interest on the loans. In 1935 the Provincial Government created the Municipal Board which regulated the amounts that municipalities could borrow: the continuing control of the Municipal Board over borrowing has been a source of friction ever since.

The Coming of Metro

Following World War II, the expansion of the urban population of the Winnipeg Metropolitan area created a series of problems familiar to any student of urban politics. Expenditures soared: for example the school debt of the City of Winnipeg rose from $1,419,952 in 1945 to $10, 575,450 in 1956. The revenues available to the municipalities were distributed unequally; many of the businesses settled in St. James but most of the population lived in Winnipeg. The assessment picture was a **mess: assessment differed as much as 75% from municipality to municipality.**[47] The cities of Winnipeg, St. Boniface, St. James, East Kildonan, West Kildonan and Fort Garry employed their own assessment personnel but St. Vital, Transcona, Tuxedo, North Kildonan, West St. Paul and East St. Paul engaged private firms while Old Kildonan, Brooklands, Assiniboia and Charleswood made use of the Provincial assessors.

46. George Rich, op. cit., p. 360.
47. Ibid.

Planning on an area-wide basis was about non-existent and because of the river system there was a particular problem with bridges. Streets, bridges and recreational facilities were paid for solely by the municipalities in which they were located despite the fact that they were freely used by all residents of Greater Winnipeg and were often a necessity. Many municipalities complained of inequality of service from the Winnipeg-controlled joint boards and all municipalities were dumping raw sewage into the Red and Assiniboine Rivers.

As early as 1951 the seriousness of the above conditions had let the Provincial-Municipal Relations Committee to recommend a single Metropolitan Board for all the special purpose bodies. In 1952, the Winnipeg city council demanded reform and other municipalities also wanted change. In 1953 the report of the Provincial-Municipal Committee called for "immediate action towards a reallocation of duties, functions, and responsibilities between the three levels of government".[48] Virtually all the local government units of the Greater Winnipeg area were united on the desirability of change -- although there was little agreement over the exact solutions to the problems.

Finally in 1955, the Provincial Government appointed the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, composed of the mayors of Winnipeg, St. Boniface, St. James, East and West Kildonan.

C.N. Kushner of West Kildonan and a Winnipeg expert on Local Government who was one of the commissioners also acted as secretary to the Commission, and eventually wrote the report. The reason given for this dual responsibility was the concern of the Commission to avoid any possible 'leaks' before the report was presented to the government - incidentally, there were no 'leaks' prior to such presentation.

The appointment of the G.W.I.C. was the catalyst which led to the formation of the Metropolitan Corporation. The G.W.I.C. was a high level commission

48. Report of the Manitoba Provincial-Municipal Committee, February 1953, p. 18.

its report would almost inevitably lead to change of some kind. The briefs presented to the C.W.I.C. are also interesting: the opinions of both the city of Winnipeg and the municipalities **were** about the same in 1971 as they were in 1956. In July of 1956 and May of 1957 the City of Winnipeg made a strong bid for amalgamation, although it was stated that a Metropolitan solution would be accepted under certain conditions.[50] A joint brief on behalf of a majority of the municipalities (Assiniboia, East Kildonan, West Kildonan, St. Vital, North Kildonan, Fort Garry, St. James, Transcona and Tuxedo) was firmly opposed to the idea of total amalgamation and advocated a weak metropolitan government with the members of the central council composed of the mayors and aldermen of the participating municipal councils.[51]

In 1959, the G.W.I.C. published its Report and advocated a Metropolitan government. Before completing the Report frequent consultations were held with officials of Metro Toronto, particularly Fredrick Gardiner. The Commission conceded that long term planning was an impossibility under the existing set up. The Commission recommended that adjustment be made so that the 19 area municipalities would be incorporated into eight cities: Winnipeg, St. Boniface, St. James, St. Vital, Fort Garry, East Kildonan, West Kildonan, Transcona. The central council would consist of the mayors of the eight cities plus six other elected members. There was to be amalgamation of the fire and police departments and the metropolitan corporation would assume responsibility for water, public transportation, sewage and drainage, airports, metropolitan highways and assessment. The Metro Corporation was to assume all of the duties of the special bodies and

---

50. City of Winnipeg Council, "Brief to the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission", Winnipeg, May 1957.

51. Majority of the Municipal Corporations in the Greater Winnipeg area, "Submission to the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission", Winnipeg, 1957.

have the authority to determine what percentage in taxes each city would pay. The Metropolitan Corporation was also to establish a Metropolitan School Board: this board was to select all school sites and would control local board expenditures while the local boards would have the right to appeal any action.[52]

The reaction to the G.W.I.C. report was mixed: in October of 1959, the City of Winnipeg in a brief to the Provincial Government declared that it was unalterably opposed to the creation of a metropolitan corporation.[53] Many of the municipalities were also opposed to the wide powers of the Metro corporation and the transfer of boundaries. It was now in the lap of the new Conservative administration of Premier Duff Roblin.

Metropolitan Government

In the spring of 1959, Duff Roblin won a majority of 36 of the 52 Provincial seats. The Conservative majority was equally composed of new found strength in the North, traditional Tory strength in the rural areas, and strong support from the suburbs of Winnipeg. The Liberals represented the rural opposition, the C.C.F. was strong in Winnipeg and dominant in North Winnipeg. The government was progressive but cautious -- a welcome change from the Campbell Liberals who were cautious and reactionary.

The government realized that the report of the G.W.I.C. had to be implemented -- the problems were too serious -- but the municipalities had to be placated. Much of the Conservative party's urban strength came from the suburbs and the local aldermen, mayors, **were often active members of the party**

52. Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations, Winnipeg, 1959.

53. City of Winnipeg Council, "Submission to the Government of Manitoba", October, 1959.

apparatus. As stated by a senior official of the Roblin ministry the problem was
how to get "a new form of government in a way least likely to disrupt the
situation."[54] The Government believed that in the interests of efficiency the
new corporation should only have a few members, but it did not want to consolidate
boundaries. The solution found was to create ten special districts and leave the
municipal boundaries alone.

The Government's plan differed further from **that of the G.W.I.C. because it**
proposed that all ten metro members be elected with no representatives from the
local municipalities. This decision was taken largely because of the experience
of Metropolitan Toronto. It was felt by the Premier and his associates that one
of the problems with Metropolitan Toronto was that the representatives felt
more loyalty to their home areas than to the new body. A totally new form of
government would solve the problem of internal dissention. The boundaries of the
ten districts were drawn in a pie-shaped formation to include different areas so
that the councillors would have to adopt an area-wide approach. To allay the
fears of the municipalities, the duties recommended by the Commission for Metro,
such as the Metro School Board and the amalgamated police force, were forgotten.
There was never any question of having a total amalgamation.[55]

Bill 62, the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act was introduced into the Legislature
on February 12, and assented to six weeks later on March 26, 1960. It was, in the
words of a highly placed observer, "Roblin's baby".[56] The Premier had taken the
largest part in creating the bill and he was its most active defender in the House.
The main provisions of the Bill included the ten member boundaries described above,
a preferential voting system, a chairman appointed by the cabinet with succeeding

54. Interviews
55. Interviews
56. Interviews

chairmen to be appointed by the council, and an Executive Director responsible for administration. The Corporation was given sole and full authority over all planning, zoning, and issuing of building permits; charged with the responsibility of preparing a master plan that would include long term planning for major roads (Metro only had authority for Metro streets, the City of Winnipeg retained its traffic authority), bridges, transit, sewer, water, garbage and major parks. In addition the council was given many operational functions such as assessment, civil defence, mosquito abatement, flood protection, **sewage** disposal (but not collection) and water (excluding local distribution).

Metro was to obtain its revenues from four major sources: direct levies on each municipality proportionate to the relation of the assessment of that municipality to the total assessment; direct fees; tax revenues secured from levies made on industry and the local municipalities who were required to remit a portion to Metro and the issuing of debentures, subject to the approval of the Municipal Board, if the amount exceeded $500,000.

The success of the Government's campaign can be measured by the lack of conflict Bill 62 engendered. The basic principles of the bill, said Roblin, were the need for central planning and centralization of services. The only group to oppose the bill rigorously was the city of St. Boniface and the local M.L.A. Larry Desjardians who feared for the French identity of his area. The Liberals under D. L. Campbell wanted a referendum on the issue. Most of the area municipalities agreed in principle with the establishment of a two-tier system (a situation at least partially due to Winnipeg's insistence on total amalgamation), although many felt that Metro's planning powers were too broad and all wanted direct representation The City of Winnipeg attacked Metro's powers of zoning and land use and again stated that amalgamation would be more efficient. Few interest groups submitted briefs

and those that did appear before the Law Amendments Committee were in favour. In the end only six members of the House (most of them rural Liberals) voted against Bill 62 and it was assented to on March 26. **Initially** at least the Government had achieved its goal of little "disruption".

A Decade of Conflict

The history of the years 1960-70 is one of unending dispute, disagreement and disharmony between the mayor of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan Corporation. One can pick up a newspaper for any month in this span, and the odds will be that the two governments will be in conflict. For example, the Winnipeg Tribune on September 11, 1969 quotes Juba as saying "Super governments like Metro lead to duplication, inefficiency and waste" to which a Metro councillor replied in the Tribune on the 22nd: "If the Mayor has a policy, it seems to be one of continual opposition, harrassment, obstructionism, irresponsibility and lack of co-operation to any working proposal or method of dealing with metropolitan problems."

This battle was not merely verbal; the two governments often found it impossible to coordinate traffic policy, and each attacked the other's pet projects. In the case of the Winnipeg Downtown Development project, for example, each government produced its own plans, its own set of entrepreneurs, and its own supporters (the intra-government battle over Downtown development almost ruined the 30 million dollar deal when the private developers involved in the project came close to washing their hands of the whole mess). The intensity of the conflict had virtually deadlocked urban policy and the Provincial Government was again forced to intervene. As a senior Metro official has commented on the dismal record, "if we thought of it, Winnipeg thought it was bad, and vice versa."[57]

---

57. Interviews

Figure I

Metropolitan Winnipeg – 1960

METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG—MUNICIPALITIES AND POPULATION—1960

IN METRO AREA			PART IN METRO AREA AND PART IN ADDIT___ ZONE*		
B	BROOKLANDS	4288	A	ASSINIBOIA	609
EK	EAST KILDONAN	26869	C	CHARLESWOOD	6034
NK	NORTH KILDONAN	8649	ESP	EAST ST. PAUL	1982
OK	OLD KILDONAN	1312	FG	FORT GARRY	16962
SB	ST. BONIFACE	36361	MD	MACDONALD	180
SJ	ST. JAMES	33817	RO	ROSSER	350
TR	TRANSCONA	14096	SP	SPRINGFIELD	220
TU	TUXEDO	1624	SV	ST. VITAL	26765
WK	WEST KILDONAN	19675	WSP	WEST ST. PAUL	2032
W	WINNIPEG	256733			60622
		403424			

TOTAL METRO POPULATION 46406

*The additional zone also included parts of RICHOT (RI), TACHE (TA), ST. ANDREWS (SA) and ST. CLEMENTS (SC).

The man responsible for the conflict was Stephen Juba, Mayor of
Winnipeg. Juba had always believed in amalgamation as a more efficient way of
administering services but his opposition was based on more than an abstract belief
in the superiority of one type of structure over another. He seemed to dislike
Metro and its first Chairman, Richard Bonnycastle, with a personal fervor difficult
to explain. One explanation given by many observers is that Juba is an egomaniac
who hated seeing the powers of Winnipeg reduced and took the slight personally.
A second reason may be that Juba simply wanted to go down in history as the
first super-mayor of Greater Winnipeg. A Ukrainian becoming Unicity's first
mayor, would signify to everyone the political power of Canada's new Canadians.
Finally, and perhaps more plausibly, Juba may have attacked Metro to cover up his
own lack of achievements: Metro was a convenient whipping boy to blame for higher
taxes, lack of public housing, and other deficiencies of the Juba administration.
Perhaps we will never know Mayor Juba's real motivations. But what is fact, is
that for ten years Stephen Juba, with extravagant rhetoric and meaningful action,
tried to discredit Metro and block its activities. Secure in his electoral base
Juba was an immovable obstacle and eventually the mountain had to come to Mohammed.

In its battle with the Mayor, Metro had few political resources. Richard
Bonnycastle, the first chairman of Metro appointed by Roblin in 1960, was a decent
hardworking man with close associations to the Conservative Party. Bonnycastle's
first job was to find high-calibre staff to get Metro started. Elswood Bole, a
former official of the Municipal Assessment and Appeal Board, was appointed
Executive Director and he put together a competent staff which moved in the opinion
of some observers, too quickly into Metro's various fields. Bonnycastle tried to
co-operate with Juba and in a gentlemanly way opposed many of the mayor's statements.
But he was no match for Juba in the field of politics or public relations and the

fact that he was an appointed official put him at a tremendous disadvantage vis-a-vis the mayor. The real power of the chairman of Metro lay in his support by the Provincial Government and unlike the Toronto experience where Frost backed up Gardiner, Roblin dropped Metro almost as soon as he created it. George Rich, the former planning director of Metro has written, "During its initial period of strong political conflict, the Provincial Government served only to encourage the critics to look for further real and imagined causes for complaint. Metro had to rely on the Provincial Government because it had few political resources itself: the special electoral districts were an artifice with no correspondence to local feeling and the Metro level of government was the least viable political unit in Greater Winnipeg.

Premier Roblin backed away from Metro because it soon became an unpopular body with everyone. Metro had to pay hugh outlays for roads, bridges and sewage and assessment in the metropolitan area rose sharply, particularly in Charleswood, Winnipeg and West Kildonan. The public, guided by the Mayor of Winnipeg, blamed Metro for the increase in taxes. The municipalities were extremely unhappy about the planning function: under Bill 62, Metro had the final say in planning and officially the other local governments had no legal planning powers, although, in fact, they had to implement Metro's plans. Even supporters of the Metropolitan concept, like C.N. Kushner, the mayor of West Kildonan claimed that the municipalities were paying much and receiving little. In January 1961, the Mayors and Reeves Association of Greater Winnipeg was formed to present a common front in opposition to Metro. The traffic authorities of Metro and Winnipeg argued over parking and major road construction. To add to Metro's woes the public transit system in the first year showed a large deficit of $850,000.

---

58. George Rich, op. cit., p. 368.

The Provincial Government saw its creation disliked by the public, hated by the Mayor of Winnipeg and opposed by the municipalities. Rather than expend its political capital in a defence of Metro, the Government skillfully retreated. Section 210 of the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act called for a review of Metro in 1965 but the Government moved this date up and established the Greater Winnipeg Review Commission on October 2, 1962. Criticism of Metro lessened after the Commission began its work and the Government temporarily was "off the hook". It was to resort to a similar strategy four years later.

The three man commission chaired by the late Lorne Cumming who had written the famous Cumming Report advocating Toronto Metro, reported in February, 1964 and made numerous recommendations which they described as "relating to technical matters". In their briefs to the Commission the area municipalities were united on three basic points:

1. no direct representation on the metro council;
2. confusion about planning and inequality of assessment;
3. lack of local funds: payments to education and metro often took up to 75% of a municipal budget leaving little room for local initiative.

The Commission ignored many of the complaints of the municipalities and only in the areas of planning and assessment did the Commission recommend important changes. As Thomas Plunkett has written about the Commission: "the fact that an inquiry of this nature had to be instituted only two years after the initiation of metropolitan government in Winnipeg leaves considerable doubt as to the validity of the Review Commission's statement 'we have no hesitation in finding that on the whole, the basic advantages of the local government system established by the Act have been demonstrated beyond question. We feel justified in stating, also, that we have found no justifiable ground for criticism and no real defects in the interim administrative organization.'"[59]

59. Thomas Plunkett, op. cit., p. 107.

The three main recommendations of the Commission were that business assessment would be subject to the same mill rate as real property. This recommendation had the effect of removing from the municipalities the option of choosing between the assessment of personal property or the levy of a business tax. The Commission helped clear up some of the confusion about planning by giving municipalities the right to appeal to the Municipal Board. These recommendations were amended to the original act in 1964. The Commission also changed the boundaries of the municipalities. At the time of incorporation nine municipalities were wholly within the metropolitan area boundaries and ten were partly within. (see Figure 1) Following the Review Commission's recommendations, five rural municipalities (Rosser, Macdonald, East St. Paul, West St. Paul and Springfield) were withdrawn from the metropolitan area and two that had been partly within the boundaries were now totally included (Fort Garry and St. Vital). After the town of Brooklands merged with the city of St. James in January 1, 1967 there were ten municipalities wholly and three partially within metropolitan Winnipeg for an area of 170 square miles.

The Commission had not come to grips with many of the complaints about Metro and the implementation of the Commission's recommendations did not defuse the political situation. In 1964 Mayor Juba held a referendum on Metro. The results were not binding in any way but the outcome was embarrassing for Metro. Twenty-five percent of the Winnipeg electorate voted and of these 28,389 voted against Metro and only 12,053 were in favour. The referendum also asked "Do you want total amalgamation?"; 25,049 supported total amalgamation and 15,179 were opposed.

In 1966, Premier Roblin again tried to get rid of his Metro problems by giving it to a Commission to study. On August 18, 1966, the Local Government Boundaries Commission was created. The Commission was chaired by Robert Smellie,

Figure 2

Metropolitan Winnipeg 1964

METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG—MUNICIPALITIES AND POPULATION—1964

N METRO AREA			PART IN METRO AREA AND PART IN ADDITIONAL ZONE*		
B	BROOKLANDS	4405	A	ASSINIBOIA	13489
EK	EAST KILDONAN	28112	C	CHARLESWOOD	7121
FG	FORT GARRY	19197	SV	ST. VITAL	29375
NK	NORTH KILDONAN	10541			49985
OK	OLD KILDONAN	1363			
SB	ST BONIFACE	41516			
SJ	ST JAMES	34459			
TR	TRANSCONA	17920			
TU	TUXEDO	1942			
WK	WEST KILDONAN	20902			
W	WINNIPEG	255796			
		436153		TOTAL METRO POPULATION 486138	

* The additional zone also included parts of EAST ST. PAUL (ESP), WEST ST. PAUL (WSP), MACDONALD (MD), RICHOT (RI), ROSSER (RO), SPRINGFIELD (SP), ST. ANDREWS (SA), ST. CLEMENTS (SC) and TACHE (TA).

the former Conservative Minister of Municipal Affairs and contained such local

government notables as Stephen Juba and Elswood Bole. C. N. Kushner resumed

his familiar role as secretary to a Local Government Commission. The Commission

was to study the territory and boundaries of existing local government units and

other matters considered relevant to the establishment of viable local govern-

ment units.

From 1966 - 1968 the Commission spent most of its time studying education

boundaries in Manitoba, outside of the Metro area, but in that year it began an

extensive program of research on Metropolitan Winnipeg. It studied the costs of

total amalgamation, different types of local government structures, and the

factors which make up a community. During the time of the Commission's research

Metro and Winnipeg embarked on their bitter fight over the convention centre

for downtown development and the N.D.P. defeated the Conservatives in the June 1969

election. The change of government, of course, radically affected the possibility

of reform of Winnipeg local government structures. By September, 1970, the

Commission had completed its report (which Mayor Juba refused to sign), although

the Schreyer administration had by now formulated its own plan.

In the main, the Commission's recommendations were similar to those of

the 1959 Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission. The G.W.I.C. had wanted eight

cities, the Local Boundaries Commission wanted nine: Winnipeg, Fort Garry, St.

Vital, St. Boniface, Transcona, St. James-Assiniboia, Tuxedo-Charleswood, Old

Kildonan-West Kildonan and North Kildonan-East Kildonan-Elmwood. The Metro council

would be composed of the mayors and aldermen of the nine cities plus ten directly

elected representatives. Amalgamation of the police and fire forces was rejected

but again like the G.W.I.C., a Metro School Board was proposed. The Local

Government Boundaries Commission then, favoured the constant demand of the area

municipalities that there be direct representation on the Metro Council but events had already passed the Commission by. In summary, apart from being a useful device to defuse criticism, the record of the three local government commissions is not overwhelmingly impressive.

An Evaluation of Metro

Metro, clearly, was not a political success. Faced with a powerful opponent who took advantage of every opportunity to belittle it, possessing few political resources on its own, and with little backing from the Provincial Government which had invented it, Metropolitan Government became a misunderstood and disliked structure. However its many concrete achievements are surprising and in fact, Metro proved that regional government was workable. As the Boundaries Commission wrote "the crisis situation which existed in 1960 in connection with many of the area-wide or inter-municipal services no longer exists" and this was largely due to Metro,[60] Some of its areas of achievement, for example, **follow.**

1. Planning

In 1960, Bill 62 legislated that Metro was to prepare a Master Development Plan. A first draft was completed in 1963-64 but was changed after the Cummings Commission. In 1966 after a second series of public meetings a plan was formulated and several outside consultants were invited to have a second opinion. Again after changes, the plan was approved by the Minister of Municipal Affairs in 1968. In 1971, Bill 36 stated that the Metropolitan Development Plan was to be the approved Greater Winnipeg Development Plan.

---

60. Local Government Boundaries Commission, "Provisional Plan for Local Government Units in the Greater Winnipeg Area", 1970, p. 66.

2. Transportation

Metro acquired rights of way for many new thoroughfares, built several bridges and paid for public transit by area-wide taxes.

3. Sewage and Water

Metro built additional reservoirs and improved the distribution system. The pre-1960 summer water rationing is a thing of the past. Metro also built several sewage plants so that by 1971 all Winnipeg sewage will be treated.

4. Assessment

In 1960 the difference in assessments was sometimes as much as 75%. By 1965 Metro had completed a total area-wide reassessment, and the differences became insignificant.

5. Parks

In 1960 Metro took over responsibility for parks over 15 acres in size; by 1970 Metro had parks of 2,040 acres. Also by that year Metro had planted over 2,000 trees and landscaped 219 miles of streets.

Metro also made a contribution in another way. In 1960, total amalgamation seemed incomprehensible as a solution to Winnipeg's problems and the creation of a two-tier system seemed to be a large step. By 1970, the climate was different; people were used to area-wide government and the political integration of Winnipeg was increased. The Metropolitan council itself favoured amalgamation and pointed to Metro's experience to show that amalgamation was at least technically feasible. Indeed, it is somewhat ironical that Mayor Juba will undoubtedly have to use the Metro administration to run his Unicity. In its own way Metro has done as much to promote the unification of Greater Winnipeg as Mayor Juba.

But if Metro promoted unification by showing that it was feasible, Mayor Juba certainly forced the issue. The Provincial Government in 1960 thought that

Metro would be a workable solution to Winnipeg's urban problems -- Juba proved

otherwise. By his power, skill and obstinacy, he kept the amalgamation issue

before the public and the senior government. In terms of the innovation framework,

Mayor Juba was the agent which kept the urban environment sufficiently disturbed

to impell the Provincial Government to continually reassess the sitation. And

finally, a provincial adminstration adopted the change that he had been advocating

for over a decade.

PART II

THE UNICITY CONCEPT

The single most important factor in the long process which led to the

unification of Winnipeg's local governments was the surprise election of the New

Democratic Party in June of 1969. The N.D.P. had been third in seats prior to

1969 with all their members coming from urban areas, many of them from North

Winnipeg. The N.D.P. is a party devoted to change (though not change of a radical

hue) and this coupled with the switch from a suburban-based party to a central-

city party ultimately led to Bill 36.

The citizens of Winnipeg wanted amalgamation for two basic reasons:

a) most of the social ills associated with urban life (welfare and rural migration,

for example, accumulated in the downtown core, and

b) much of the richest revenue was located in the suburbs. Amalgamation would

result in fairer distribution of the costs and resources.

The party of the central city, the N.D.P. had always favoured amalgamation and as

Bernie Wolfe, vice-chairman of the metropolitan corporation wrote in a brief "no

surprise should be registered at the determination of the present government's

decision to proceed with restructuring regional government in the Metropolitan

Winnipeg area".[61]

---

61. B. R. Wolfe, "A Review on Restructuring For Regional Government".

Metropolitan reform was not a major issue in the provincial election campaign of 1969 but on June 24, prior to election day, the leader of the N.D.P., Ed Schreyer, held a news conference at Union Centre to announce his urban policy. Schreyer stated that if elected, he would set up a new regional government with wider powers than the existing Metro structure. Such a new regional council might unify such services as fire, police, **and sanitation.** But, he said, such a new council would not necessarily mean that there would be total amalgamation. Mr. Schreyer acknowledged that this represented a change in the party's policy of favouring a single unit of municipal government but that this was his position. Although little noted at the time, the Premier's statement was an important one; at one and the same time, he announced a policy of major reform while opposing total amalgamation and supporting the idea of community units. It may be that the Premier was thinking of Ontario's scheme of regional governments and particularly the Ottawa-Carleton arrangement -- a scheme he may have been familiar with while living in Ottawa as a Member of Parliament. In any case Bill 36 certainly follows the general outline of the June 24th statement which suggests that the Premier may have had a more important role in developing the Unicity concept than many observers thought.

At the time of the upset victory, Robert Smellie and the other members of the Local Boundaries Commission offered their resignations to the newly formed Provincial Government. Premier Schreyer, who initially appeared eager to hear the Commission's recommendations, refused to accept the resignations. During the next year, while the Government was involved in the titanic battle over publicly owned auto insurance, the Commission established good rapport with the new administration. A former member of the Commission remembers that "for a year our relations were as cordial as they had been with **former Premier Wier".**[62]

62. Interviews.

It is difficult to judge when the Government decided to opt for its own scheme but sometime during the year Finance Minister Saul Cherniack began to set up a research team separate from the Boundaries Commission. Mr. Cherniack, one of the strongest members of the Government, had served on the first Metro council and was a known supporter of amalgamation. Mr. Sidney Green, the runner-up to Mr. Schreyer as leader of the N.D.P. and one of the most powerful men in the Manitoba N.D.P. had also served on the first Metro council. The "Cherniack-Green axis" was a powerful combination which pushed for urban change and particularly for unification.

The goal of the research was pre-determined -- Greater Winnipeg was to be united into one city. The job of the research team was to come up with a workable plan. To direct the research Mr. Cherniack employed one of Canada's foremost urban experts, Meyer Brownstone. Mr. Brownstone, a well-known supporter of the N.D.P. had worked for the C.C.F. government in Saskatchewan from 1947-1964 as a research economist. There he had made the acquaintance of Earl Levin, the Metro Planning Director who had also worked for the C.C.F. and who joined him on the research team. Other members of the team included Lionel Feldman, an urban specialist from Toronto and C.N. Kushner. In the summer of 1970 the Government asked the Local Boundaries Commission to make their files and research totally accessible to Mr. Brownstone and his associates. Mr. Brownstone's research was undoubtedly influenced by many sources: both he and Mr. Feldman would be aware of the large literature on citizen participation and the desire for participation is an important part of the White Paper. The possible influence of the example set by the Ottawa-Carleton regional government scheme has already been noted. Another research source was the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission on Local Government in England which is quoted approvingly in the White Paper. It is likely that the

Government got its idea of community councils from Redcliffe-Maud. Mr. Brownstone consulted with various individuals in Winnipeg but he did not go through the usual motions such as meetings with the Metro Council and the City of Winnipeg.[6]

Sometime during the fall or early winter of 1970 the Brownstone recommendation went to Cabinet. There was definitely controversy within the cabinet over the Brownstone proposals and many were eventually changed. One highly placed source has said "what was left out of the White Paper is more important than what remains".[64] The main issue of contention apparently was over the continued identity of the local municipalities. The main proponents of amalgamation were Cherniack and Green while Al Mackling, the Attorney-General and a former alderman for St. James, and Saul Miller, Education Minister and former mayor of West Kildonan, opposed them and sought to preserve the separate identities of the suburban municipalities. The impasse was resolved with the compromise of the community councils. With his known talent for conciliation, it may well have been the Premier who engineered the compromise (a final policy which followed his statement of June 24th). In fact, Bill 36, is almost a perfect example of compromise; it allows a suburban member to emphasize the community council and a central city representative to praise unification. In the debate on Bill 36, for example, Frank Johnstone the Conservative member for Sturgeon Creek attacked the "hypocrisy" shown by Mr. Mackling in preaching the "evils of total amalgamation for six years as St. James alderman" and then supporting the bill. The Attorney-General replied to the attack by arguing that Bill 36 was not amalgamation but rather "regional government and a series of community committees."[65]

---

63. Interviews
64. Interviews
65. Winnipeg Free Press, June 10, 1971.

Although the report of the Local Boundaries Commission had been submitted September 10, the Government held up its publication until the cabinet had decided on an alternative plan. Finally in late December the Local Boundaries Report was released and a week later on December 23, 1970 the White Paper was unveiled at a news conference. Mr. Cherniack who had been designated Minister of Urban Affairs, said the report was a "wholly new approach" which would continue the efficiency of centralization with more citizen participation. The Premier, for his part emphasized that the White Paper meant one city but "with provision for reorganizing existing communities".[66]

The Concept Examined

The December 23rd White Paper analyzed Greater Winnipeg's urban problems and came to the conclusion that "almost all of the urban area's difficulties stem in whole or in part, from three main roots -- fragmented authority, segmented financial capacity and lack of citizen involvement".[67] The solution proposed was a bold combination of unification of the municipalities and de-centralization of the political   process.

Innovation was defined in an earlier section as any new policy, structure, technique or behaviour qualitatively different from existing practice or predominant traditions. The essential quality is novelty. Novelty does not mean uniqueness -- all the innovations advocated in the White Paper had appeared somewhere else -- but as a total package and compared to what had been tried in the past many of the suggestions were new. The unification of the twelve municipalities, the 48 member ward system, the Board of Commissioners administration system, and of course, the concept of community councils, had not been tried in Winnipeg before.

66. Winnipeg Free Press, December 23, 1970.
67. Government of Manitoba "Proposals for Urban Re-Organization" (White Paper, December 1970, p. 11.

The White Paper attempted at one and the same time to promote greater
effectiveness and efficiency in local government through unification of the
municipalities and a strong bureaucratic structure and greater citizen partici-
pation via the ward system and community committees. The White Paper can be
conveniently sub-divided into the sections dealing with:

1. Unification
2. Political structure
3. Municipal administration
4. Participation.

The government proposed to create one city. The twelve municipalities would cease
to exist and there would be one central council. The unified council would be
the exclusive law-making body responsible for all programs, budgets and for
relationships with other governments. The government hoped that a unified council
would end citizen confusion over what authority was responsible for what function,
prevent the inequitable exploitation of the tax base, distribute services more
fairly and plan more effectively. As a first step in creating one city, the
White Paper proposed that the mill rates of the municipalities be equalized.
Under this formula most of the area municipalities and the city of Winipeg would
experience a decrease but the richer suburbs of Charleswood, North Kildonan,
St. James-Assiniboia and Tuxedo would pay more. One of the major issues connected
with the unification proposal was the question of how much the new structure would
cost. Robert Smellie, Elswood Bole and many others argued that unification
costs would climb dramatically (and it makes sense that the policemen in
Brooklands would now demand the same as their Winnipeg counterparts, that is, costs
would level up to the highest dominator). Mr. Bole, in fact, estimated that most
citizens would pay a hundred dollars more in taxes a few years after the amalgamation.[6]
Government supporters argued that unification would result in savings through the

68. Winnipeg Free Press, July 3, 1971.

elimination of duplication. Earl Levin, and Ellen Gallagher (Mr. Cherniack's executive assistant) also made the point in a series of speeches and articles that the Government had not amalgamated to save money but rather to increase the effectiveness of area-wide planning and **distribution of services.**

To govern Unicity, the White Paper proposed a 48 member central council with the mayor chairman of the council. In essence the White Paper proposed to recreate **a** parliamentary system of **g**overnment. The Government was opposed to direct election of the mayor for "area-wide election of the mayor would in our view not merely dilute the supremacy of the popularly elected council but leave ambiguous the question of who is really responsible, the Council or the Mayor" (p.27) Through the pressure of Stephen Juba, the Government was forced to retreat from this proposal and many observers are now asking the same question posed in the White Paper about the new Winnipeg council. The Government adopted the traditional committee system of government, but here too it made changes. Following many studies, including the Maud Committee on Management, the Government proposed to create a central executive committee composed of the mayor and the other committee chairmen. The Executive Committee would be the overall policy arm of the council and there would be three administrative committees: Planning and Development, Finance, and Works and Operations. Each of the administrative committees would have six or more councillors and the administrative departments would report to the Council through these committees.

The municipal administration selected was the Board of Commissioners system, found in Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. The Board of Commissioners would be chaired by a chief Commissioner and have as its members the various commissioners of the executive departments. The Board of Commissioners would supervise the city administration and make policy recommendations to the council through the policy committees. The unification of the bureaucracy frightened some observers. James Lorimer wrote about the White Paper:

"The government's plans for community committees do not implement their
preferred desire to generate citizen involvement but the other aspects of
the policy proposal do very effectively centralize power, increase the effective-
ness of the bureaucracy and in general will make the work of citizens trying to
make their views heard at City Hall that much more difficult."[69]

The Community Committees were to be the link between the citizen and
the new councils. The committees would be composed of councillors selected from
the ranks in the municipal areas for which the committees are established.
The Community Committees were to correspond to existing municipal boundaries, with
merger occurring between East Kildonan and North Kildonan, Charleswood, Tuxedo,
and Fort Garry, and Old Kildonan and West Kildonan, to form a total of eight.
Each councillor elected from a local ward would become a member of the Community
Committee corresponding to the old municipality and the Greater Winnipeg Council.
The Community Committee was to provide ready access to the people in the areas
and supervise local administrative functions such as the running of community
centers, local parks, playgrounds and libraries. The Community Committees
were to spur citizens to discuss policy. The Winnipeg Community Committee
was to be divided into North, Central, and South Winnipeg sub-committees.
The Community Committees were to advise the central council as to the needs and
wants of the local area. But the obvious question is, if people felt distant
and out of touch with the Winnipeg City Council, why should they necessarily
feel more involved with the Winnipeg Community Committee? Because of the great
increase in wards, people may well have more access to their councillor but
why should this access take place through the structure of the Community Committee?
The concept of "community" is vague but one could ask, moreover, whether the bonds
of community conform to the municipal boundaries. Many observers believe the
committees were intended merely as a transitional device designed to let Winnipeggers
adapt to amalgamation. Each municipal area would have at least three members.

69. James Lorimer, quoted by Gail Cook and Lionel Feldman "Approach to Local
    Government Reform" Canadian Tax Journal, June, 197.

Figure 3

GOVERNMENT OF GREATER WINNIPEG *

```
                    ┌──────────────────┐
                    │     Council      │
                    │   Mayor and      │
                    │   Councillors    │
                    └──────────────────┘

              ┌──────────────────────────────┐
              │  Executive Committee         │
              │  Mayor                       │
              │  Chairmen of three Admin-    │
              │    istrative Committees      │
              │  Councillors selected by     │
              │    Council                   │
              └──────────────────────────────┘

              ┌──────────────────────────────┐
              │  Board of Commissioners      │
              │  Chief Commissioner          │
              │  3 City Commission           │
              │  Mayor                       │
              └──────────────────────────────┘
```

Committee on Planning and Development	Committee on Finance	Committee on Works and Operations
Commissioner on Planning and Development	Commissioner of Finance	Commissioner of Works and Operations

*From Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area -
Manitoba Provincial Government, 1970.

Figure 4

Administration of Greater Winnipeg *

*From <u>Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area</u> –
Manitoba Provincial Government, 1970.

Figure 5

The Committee System

If the Community Committees are an experiment in providing citizen participation, there can be little doubt that the 48 member ward system will provide greater access. There will be one councillor for every 10-12,000 people. The wards in fact, may be more of a community than the community councils. They are smaller in scale and tend to group people who fall in similar economic and social calibers. (See Figure 6)

The large number of wards, however, clearly makes it imperative that there be some informal means of organizing the council. Implicit in the White Paper proposals is the hope that party politics **will** come to the Greater Winnipeg area. The cabinet-type of government envisioned in the White Paper merely gives formal expression to this hope. One of the major issues of the fight over Bill 36 was the charge that the N.D.P. hoped to win a majority of N.D.P.

*From **Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area —**
Manitoba Provincial Government, 1970.

members on the regional council and had structured the wards to bring about this situation. It is not known what influenee these party considerations had on the formulation of the White Paper proposals. Some elements in the N.D.P. were certainly enthusiastic about the prospect of party politics at the municipal level. The identification of the party with the central city would, it was hoped, give them a clear shot at controlling the regional government. If the N.D.P. could become established at the local level it would give them an important government they could control even if the party were defeated in the Province. In the subsequent council election in the fall of 1971, the N.D.P. was the only partisan party which was really organized, although prominent Liberals and Conservatives were involved in the Independent Election group.

However, several members of the cabinet were less sanguine about the party prospects at the local level. After the election of October 6 in which the N.D.P. only won seven out of the 39 seats it contested, Premier Schreyer said he was "surprised" at the result but that he had never felt that the party would do well.[70] In an examination of the issue of party politics at the local level, Bill Burdeyny, the suburban affairs editor of the Winnipeg Tribune found that the N.D.P. held only twelve of the 112 local representatives in Metro Winnipeg prior to the passage of Bill 36.[71] The party, thus, had much to gain and little to lose but the outlook could not be considered as a "sure thing". It is likely that party considerations had little to do with the proposal to create 48 wards -- the main input being the desire to achieve greater participation -- but once the decision was taken, the N.D.P. hoped to exploit the situation. It is also evident that the cabinet was not overly enthusiastic about the decision to run locally but many members of the party organization saw it as an opportunity to entrench the party and give it a permanent base.

70. Winnipeg Free Press, October 7, 1971.

71. Bill Burdeyny "Party Politics and Regional Government", in Lloyd Axworthy, ed.,
    The Future City (Winnipeg: The Institute of Urban Studies, 1971) p. 34.

MAP I — PROPOSED WARDS

GARDEN CITY 8,192
KILDONAN PARK 8,009
SHAUGHNESSY HEIGHTS 11,505
McPHILLIPS 11,217
JEFFERSON 8,606
GROVE PARK 10,098
SPRINGFIELD HEIGHTS 11,284
CATHEDRAL 11,432
LUXTON 10,894
WATT 10,300
WESTON 11,138
ARLINGTON 10,120
ROSS 10,032
RIVERTON 9,562
MUNROE 10,989
TALBOT 9,196
KILDARE 7,692
HERITAGE PARK
CENTENNIAL 11,786
KING EDWARD — BROOKLANDS 11,661
POLO PARK 11,385
SARGENT PARK 11,799
MARYLAND 11,731
BALMORAL 11,900
TACHE 11,063
REGENT PARK 7,000
KERN PARK 6,443
SILVER HEIGHTS 11,108
DEER LODGE 11,035
ST. CHARLES 10,263
11,992
MEMORIAL 11,683
WEST-MINSTER 11,775
ROSYLN 11,676
NORWOOD 11,097
LANGEVIN 11,384
KIRKFIELD 10,651
ACADEMY 13,233
KELVIN 11,317
QUEENSTON 12,735
GRANT PARK 11,124
RIVERVIEW 12,646
11,130
GLENLAWN 10,092
ASSINIBOINE PARK 11,983
WILDWOOD 11,504
FERNWOOD
WINAKWA 11,826
UNIVERSITY 11,430
DAKOTA 9,879

NOTE: WARD NAMES ARE PROVISIONAL; SUGGESTIONS FOR NAMES WILL BE WELCOMED AND ENCOURAGED FROM WARD RESIDENTS

——— WARD BOUNDARIES
▬▬▬ COMMUNITY COMMITTEE BOUNDARIES

DECEMBER 1970

Figure 6

Boundaries of Wards and Community Committees,

White Paper, December, 1970.

In response to the problems of Metro Winnipeg and the years of conflict and deadlock, then, the Government proposed a bold and innovative solution which in part was frankly experimental. At one stroke the Provincial Government planned to unify the city and introduce party politics at the local level -- two issues which had divided the city for years. The White Paper was the opening shot in a battle which dominated provincial politics for the next six months.

PART III

THE ADOPTION OF BILL 36

The political battle over Bill 36 can be divided into two phases: in the first or White Paper stage the Government maintained that it was <u>not</u> irrevocably wedded to the White Paper proposals and it gingerly explored public reaction through a series of town hall meetings. It knew that the area munici-palities would be opposed but the basic question was how the public would respond. Would the White Paper develop into a major political issue (as the automobile insurance dispute did) or were the municipalities really representing themselves **and no one else?**

The opponents of the White Paper tried to broaden the dispute sufficiently to force the Government to retreat. This attempt failed. The second phase of Bill 36 occurred after the Government had presented the bill to the legislature. At this point, the arena of conflict was transferred from public meetings to the legislature. The opposition to the Bill now attempted to change particular parts of the bill and build up points to be used against the N.D.P. in the October council election. **"War"** over Bill 36 had been lost, but, several tactical "battles" remained to be fought.

The Preliminary Maneuvers

The technique of issuing a White Paper was a wise move by the Government. It allowed them to present several controversial ideas without becoming completely committed to the program. In essence, it gave them an opportunity to test public opinion and see the resources of their opponents before they actually drafted the bill. Many times during the next few months various cabinet officials said that the Government would change some aspects of the White Paper. For example, on February 25, Mr. Cherniack said that the Government was not "married" to the planned reorganization.[72] This approach of the Government gave the impression that it was open-minded and receptive to the demands of the public. There is some doubt about how far the Government would have retreated, and the bill which was eventually presented to the legislature differed little from the White Paper. But the Government did change some non-essential aspects which belied the opposition charges of "dictatorial". The use of the WhitePaper and the series of public meetings also extended the Unicity issue over a long period of time which helped defuse the emotional aspects of the debate.

The initial reaction to the White Paper varied. Most representatives stated, that they had not had time to read the document yet. But both Stephen Juba and Jack Willis, the Chairman of Metro, welcomed the plan while Charleswood Mayor Arthur T. Moug's only reaction was "it's lousy".[73] However, within a few weeks the opposition began to form and by February the different camps could be clearly delineated. On January 4, 1971, D.A. Yanofsky, mayor of West Kildonan wrote in the Winnipeg Free Press the first of a series of articles examining the Government's plan. In these articles Mayor Yanofsky questioned the need for a large central council and said it would bring party politics to the Greater Winnipeg area.

---

72. Winnipeg Tribune, February 25, 1971.
73. Winnipeg Free Press, December 24, 1970.

He also questioned the need to disrupt all of Greater Winnipeg in order to solve the financial problems of the City of Winnipeg. Soon the various area municipalities began to publicly oppose the plan. On January 13, Fort Garry municipal council leveled an "all out fight" against the White Paper and the next day the council of St. Vital followed suit. Suburban N.D.P. members like Attorney-General Al Mackling were attacked. The local St. James paper said Mackling was the "Pall bearer at the death of St. James-Assiniboia".[74]

On January 21, the area municipalities grouped together to form a common front against the Government. Mayor R. A. Wankling of Fort Garry called the meeting and ten of the area's twelve municipalities were opposed to the urban reorganization policy. Mayor Stephen Juba was not invited to the meeting because of his known support for amalgamation and only Mayor Stanley Dowhen of East Kildonan favoured the central city concept. The mayors agreed to meet jointly to propose alternatives to the plan and co-ordinate their attacks. In the legislature, the Conservative Party was the strongest opponent of Unicity. Prominent spokesmen like Elswood Bole, former executive director of Metro, and Robert Smellie, Chairman of the Local Boundaries Commission, kept up a steady attack on the White Paper.

The government while receiving few outright endorsations of its proposals, received general support from the City of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan corporation. Each of these governments, while asking for specific changes (Mayor Juba in particular wanted a directly elected mayor) gave the government their support "in principle". The Winnipeg newspapers were strangely mute on the Government's plan. The Winnipeg Free Press had long supported amalgamation and Saul Cherniack was one of the few ministers who had not been criticized by the newspaper.

---

74. Winnipeg Free Press, January 22, 1971.

Since the paper supported the idea but opposed the government it remained silent. The <u>Winnipeg Tribune</u> raised several questions about Unicity but said "on balance it appears that the concept of amalgamation of the present twelve municipalities into one city has rallied support".[75] The White Paper also received support from the few associations or interests concerned with municipal politics. The Downtown Business Association and the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce raised queries about certain aspects of unification but basically believed that amalgamation would be good for business. On January 26, 1971 the <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u> reported that C. J. Rogers, president of the Downtown Business group said that the White Paper was "reasonably compatible with what we have in mind". Other supporters of the government included Lloyd Axworthy, director of the Institute of Urban Studies who said that the opposition to one-city was nonsense,[76] and the Manitoba Association of Architects who also favoured a single-authority government.

The most significant source of support for the Government came from the municipal employees union. Apart from the elected members of the local councils, the municipal employees were the group most concerned with the proposed re-organization. The 5,000 municipal employees were a group with real power, not only for their numbers, but because their cooperation would be essential in making the new structure work. In an important move Mr. Cherniack announced that all existing employees would be guaranteed their jobs, although there might be some changes in position. He also stated that the pay of the employees would remain at their present level and that "no employees would suffer a loss of rights because of the change". Representatives of the Canadian Union of Public Employees responded with a brief in support of the government. R. A. Henderson, Prairie

---

75. <u>Winnipeg Tribune</u>, July 29, 1971.
76. <u>Winnipeg Tribune</u>, February 13, 1971.

Director of C.U.P.E., said that the union was "not impressed by the local politician's internal politics of self-preservation."[77]   By guaranteeing the jobs of the municipal employees, Mr. Cherniack prevented the future Winnipeg Council from making any significant savings through job rationalization and he left himself vulnerable to attacks about costs.   But he secured the support of one of the few groups powerful enough to offer significant opposition to the White Paper.

Within a month, then, of the presentation of the White Paper the opposing groups could clearly be outlined.   In January, Mr. Cherniack announced that the government would hold eleven public meetings from January 27 to February 24, to explain in detail the Unicity concept and listen to the public's views.   With the January 21 meeting formalizing the suburban opposition to Unicity, the real forum of conflict shifted to these public meetings.

The Public Debate

The opponents of Unicity attempted to use the public meetings as a demonstration to the government of the unpopularity of the White Paper.   The various municipal councils urged their citizens to attend and sent propaganda to the voters.   The council of Fort Garry, for example, prepared a sheet which stated on its title page in bold, black type

YOU WILL LOSE:

YOUR MUNICIPAL IDENTITY
YOUR TAX RESERVES
YOUR LOCAL REPRESENTATION
YOUR COMMUNITY CONTROL

Other councils openly aided citizens groups who had formed to oppose the plan. The St. Boniface council sponsored a public meeting on behalf of a group of

---

77.   Winnipeg Free Press, March 26, 1971.

citizens who were worried about the loss of St. Boniface's identity. Mr. Prince, the leader of the St. Boniface group told the council to "help us prove to them (the Government) that they are railroading us".[78]

The opposition to the White Paper presented three main avenues of attack:

1. the cost of one big city
2. the loss of local identity
3. the introduction of party politics to Greater Winnipeg.

Elswood Bole and Robert Smellie led the attack against unification because of its cost. On January 14, Mr. Bole said centralization, amalgamation of police and fire services, and consolidation of services provided at different levels of the municipality would cost an additional $18 to $20 million or an increase of 17 mills.[79] Later he put this into dollar terms by stating that the taxes of most residents would increase by $100. Robert Smellie called the proposals in the White Paper "a Frankenstein's Monster that will come to haunt you when you get your tax bill".[80] The concentration of attention on the issue of cost led Ellen Gallagher, the executive assistant to Mr. Cherniack, to write that "the main theme of the public debate so far has been the cost of unifying services, and while this is perhaps not an entirely irrelevant issue, it certainly is a long way off the central point of the proposals."[81] The main point for Mrs. Gallagher and the government was the quality of service provided.

The issue of local identity was an emotional one: all the area munici-palities discussed the issue but it was in St. Boniface, with its tradition as the home of the French fact in Manitoba, where it made the most impact. Many citizens felt that St. Boniface, which in fact preceded the founding of Winnipeg by half a century, would cease to be autonomous. A St. Boniface citizens group circulated a petition and planned a march to Ottawa (what good this would do, no

78. St. Boniface Courier, May 12, 1971.
79. Winnipeg Free Press, January 14, 1971.
80. Winnipeg Tribune, January 27, 1971.
81. Winnipeg Free Press, March 13, 1971.

one bothered to explain). However the intensity of the issue prompted the French

Canadian Health Minister, Mr. Rene Toupin to promise that the Government would

recognize the cultural identity of St. Boniface.[82]

The White Paper was also criticized for prompting party politics at the

local level. Many of the local mayors concentrated on this point and Robert

Smellie put their position most succinctly when he said the White Paper was "the

N.D.P. manifesto for provincial control . . . it will require party discipline

to make it work, and which of the three political parties is ready to fight an

election at this time? Only the N.D.P. They have designed the entire system in

their favour."[83] Many opposition members such as L. R. Sherman, Conservative

member for Fort Garry charged the government with "callous political gerrymandering"

in the arrangement of wards under the proposed central city plan.[84] This charge

of gerrymandering was one of the most common complaints in the early period of

the conflict.

The alternative plan proposed by the ten area mayors -- again only Stephen

Juba and the municipality of East Kildonan were opposed -- in many respects

clearly followed the report of the Local Boundaries Commission. The mayors

proposed that

1. the present municipalities be kept;

2. the present metro council be eliminated and a new regional council formed
   composed of the mayors and aldermen of the municipalities;

3. services administered by the new council would roughly be comparable to those
   now performed by metro;

4. a Greater Winnipeg Education Region be established as recommended by
   the Local Government Boundaries Commission.[85]

82. Winnipeg Free Press, February 4, 1971.
83. Winnipeg Free Press, March 2, 1971.
84. Winnipeg Free Press, February 18, 1971.
85. Winnipeg Tribune, April 2, 1971.

The alternative proposed by the mayors revealed the basic motivation of the group:
they wished to remain in existence and were concerned about little else.

Government Strategy

In response to the attacks on the White Paper, the strategy of the Government appeared to be to try and defuse the issue as much as possible. Mr. Cherniack refused to enter into a debate over the cost of unification and said "we are not forcing the unification of any services . . . The council itself will be able to decide."[86] The one positive feature of the White Paper extolled at all the public meetings was the benefit of equalization: "what we are saying is that if this equalization was in effect in 1970, then 80 per cent would have paid less taxes."[87]

But what the government tried hardest to do was to project an image of reasonableness and concern (compared to many of the extreme statements of the opposition). A sampling of headlines for the period in question contains the following "Changes possible: Mackling . . . City Plan can be changed" . . . Changes likely in Urban Plan, Cherniack . . . City Plan Changes possible".

In the debate over public auto insurance the government had been accused of being dictatorial, rigid and unbending. Obviously the strategy of Mr. Cherniack was to change this image and have his opponents appear committed to the **status quo**.

In one masterful move, the Government took away one of the most potent charges of the opposition and reinforced this image of reasonableness. On Monday, February 22, Premier Schreyer, announced that in response to the charges of gerrymandering, the Government would set up an independent commission to review boundaries: "we just want to make clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that charges

---

86. Winnipeg Tribune, January 22, 1971.
87. Winnipeg Free Press, January 21, 1971.

of rigging the boundaries is just a bunch of childish nonsense."[88] The head of

the Commission was Judge Peter Taraska and he was joined by Dr. Hugh Saunderson,

the retired president of the University of Manitoba and Charland Prudhomme the

former clerk of the legislature. On April 21, the Commission recommended that

the number of wards be increased to 50, the number of community committees to

thirteen from ten, that the boundaries of several wards be changed and the names

of about a third of the wards changed. The Commission retained the government's

criterion of about 10,000 people per ward but it felt that familiar polling

divisions used in the past should be retained "as much as possible within the

new ward boundaries".[89] On May 14th, Mr. Cherniack accepted the Taraska Report

in its entirety and said the government was "most favourably impressed."[90]

The Taraska Report, of course, did not deal in any important way with the central

aspects of the White Paper (the terms of reference were tightly drawn) it merely

changed details. But it seemed to give the approval of an independent board to

the White Paper and it took a potent issue away from the opposition. (See

Figure 7)

The success of the government's attempts to "cool" the political tem-

perature on Unicity can be seen by the response to the public meetings. On

January 27, 1971 about two hundred citizens of South Winnipeg met to discuss the

plan and in the first few gatherings hundreds of people turned out. However,

despite the efforts of the local councils, it was apparent that there was as much

support for the central city concept as opposition. Indeed, as the public meetings

continued it became obvious that Unicity was not a "hot" political issue in the

minds of most voters. The attendance at the meetings began to fade out and in

the end only 50 or 60 people were turning up. Sidney Green, who was as active as

---

88. Winnipeg Tribune, February 23, 1971.
89. Winnipeg Free Press, April 21, 1971.
90. Winnipeg Free Press, May 14, 1971.

Figure 7

Boundaries of Wards and Community Councils,

Taraska Report, April, 1971.

WARDS

GARDEN CITY

KILDONAN PARK

SISLER

KILNORTH

JEFFERSON

MYNARSKI

LEIGHTON

SPRINGFIELD HEIGHTS

ARLINGTON

CATHEDRAL

MILES

MacDONELL

WESTON

STRATHCONA

RIVERTON

JOHN GUNN

KERN PARK

NORQUAY

TALBOT

SARGENT PARK

BANNATYNE

ROSS HOUSE

BOOTH

SILVER HEIGHTS

KING EDWARD

POLO PARK

BALMORAL

TACHE

ST CHARLES

DEER LODGE

WESTMINSTER

MEMORIAL

ROSLYN

LANGEVIN

REGENT PARK

KIRKFIELD

KELVIN

COCKBURN

NORWOOD

QUEENSTON

RIVERVIEW

GRANT PARK

GLENLAWN

TUXEDO

HEIGHTS

WILDWOOD

FERNWOOD

WINAKWA

CHARLESWOOD PARK

MAYBANK

DAKOTA

UNIVERSITY

N

Mr. Cherniack in defending the plan, stated publicly that the poor attendance revealed the lack of success of the area municipalities in whipping up opposition to the White Paper.[91]

A telephone poll conducted by the Institute of Urban Studies of the University of Winnipeg confirmed this analysis: about half the respondents thought that some change in the structure of local government was desirable, but many were ignorant of the government's proposals and most said their stand would not affect their vote. The only clear image to come from the survey was that 87% of the respondents favoured the direct election of the central city mayor.[92]

A final indication of the real lack of public interest may be the St. Vital by-election held April 5th. The St. Vital council had taken a strong stand against Unicity and the seat had formerly been held by a Conservative. However, the N.D.P. candidate Jim Walding was successful. The by-election had occurred in the middle of the White Paper conflict and Mr. Walding said his election proved that voters supported the central city concept. However most observers thought that the central city plan had not been much of an issue one way or another, and that most voters were not affected by it. But if "local identity" was as important to the suburb as the council felt, it is likely Unicity would have been accorded a more essential role in the campaign.

The opponents of the White Paper then, clearly failed in making the issue as decisive, far-reaching and emotional as they had hoped. Their strategy had been to create so much public furor that the government would be forced to back down. A recent example of a nearly successful campaign was the auto-insurance dispute and if the municipalities had been able to wage a similar campaign they might have succeeded (the Government was less committed to Unicity than it was to

91. *Winnipeg Tribune*, March 2, 1971.
92. *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 18, 1971.

auto insurance). By the time the Legislature began to debate the bill, the municipalities knew they had lost. As the Winnipeg Tribune wrote about the brief of the city of St. James, "Mayor Hanks, who up to now has been one of the chief opponents of the Unicity plan, offered little criticism, indicating his suburb and municipality has more or less given up the fight and resigned itself to the idea that the scheme will go ahead."[93]

The government waged a skillful strategy and outmanoeuvered the municipality but the failure of the suburbs lies deeper than mere tactics. In essence, the basic assumption of the suburban politicians -- that local identity was an important factor -- was no longer valid. Winnipeg had become an integrated unit and it was the local boundaries that were regarded as artificial, not the Unicity boundaries. In a revealing quote, William Greenfield, a strong opponent of the White Paper, was asked if he favoured a referendum on the government proposals. "I certainly would not", he shot back. "Mayor Juba has done such a good job of selling the White Paper that people in West Kildonan as well as in East Kildonan and even Charleswood believe him."[94] In their attacks upon the White Paper the mayors of the suburbs only represented themselves and as soon as the Government realized this fact, Bill 36 became a certainty.

Bill 36

On April 28, 1971, the Government released the draft of Bill 36. The draft legislation still called for a 48 member council but Mr. Cherniack had already announced that the Taraska report would be accepted. The Minister said that there were no major changes from the Government's White Paper but rather it was "more of an elaboration" of that paper.[95] In response to the demands of

93. Winnipeg Tribune, July 15, 1971.
94. Winnipeg Free Press, January 13, 1971.
95. Winnipeg Free Press, April 29, 1971.

St. Boniface, the bill clearly contained a Part III, a declaration that the new city "shall make available at its central office persons who could communicate in French and English" and that all notices, bills or statements made to the residents of St. Boniface would be in French and English. The leading defender of the cause of Franco-Manitobans, St. Boniface M.L.A. Larry Desjardins, soon announced that he would support the bill and was satisfied with the protection given the French language.

On May 10, Mr. Cherniack introduced the bill for first reading and on June 3, the debate on second reading began. Debate lasted a month and on July 9, 1971 the bill was passed with a vote of 31-15. Liberal Gordon Johnson defected from his party to support the government and independent Gordon Beard followed suit. From July 14-16, the law amendments committee heard public presentations, largely from the mayors in the Metropolitan area and on July 21, with only one significant change -- an amendment allowing the direct election of the mayor -- the committee completed clause-by-clause analysis. July 24, the bill passed third reading 22-14 with Conservative Inez Trueman supporting the government.

The debate in the legislature adds little to our discussion. The three parties simply rehashed the debate which had followed the publication of the White Paper. Led by Mr. Cherniack, the N.D.P. put forward the position that Winnipeg is one socio-economic community which should be unified while permitting participation through the ward system and the community committees. The Liberal and Conservative parties both favoured schemes of reorganization based on the Local Boundaries Commission. Suburban members like Conservatives Frank Johnson, Bud Sherman or Liberal Steve Patrick attacked the government on the old themes of cost of unification, preservation of local identity, gerrymandering, and introducing party politics at the local level. Conservative rural members such as Harry Enns were fearful that rural Manitoba would be called upon to contribute

financially to the city of Winnipeg and that the city of Winnipeg would have too much power. One of the few opposition members to offer a sophisticated critique of the bill was Sidney Spivak, the leader of the Conservative opposition. Mr. Spivak asked a long series of questions about the new power of the city bureaucracy and the lack of power of the community councils in a major speech on June 22. Mr. Spivak echoed the comments of James Lorimer when he said the bill in reality centralized power but only hoped for participation.

Despite isolated examples of useful criticism, the impression one gets from the legislative debate is that the members were only going through the motions. The government had a majority and was now firmly committed to the plan. All the arguments had been heard before. In fact, with the exception of Mr. Cherniack's opening address, no N.D.P. member rose to debate the bill until following Mr. Spivak's speech of June 22. The Premier spoke briefly and vaguely. By and large it was a disappointing debate.

The suburbs, in fact, had turned from trying to defeat the bill which they knew was impossible, to organizing for the October civic elections which preceded the January 1, 1972 date for the new council. Organizations called The Independent Citizens' Election Associations began to spring up first in the suburbs and then in the city itself. As the Winnipeg Tribune described the activity "formations are taking place that look like a gang-up against the New Democrats in the anticipated battle for seats on the proposed one-city council." The raison d'être of the new civic party was independence from the organized national parties but partisan politics undoubtedly entered into the calculations of its leaders. Prominent individuals in the Conservative and Liberal parties were active in the movement and while these men were genuine about their desire

for independence, an equal fear was that "the new city council could become a
lop-sided block of N.D.P. representatives."[96]

The locus of conflict had shifted by the summer from the area munici-
palities to that very whirlwind of controversy, Stephen Juba. During the winter
controversy over Unicity the mayor of Winnipeg had been rather silent. He
endorsed the government's plan but offered little real support. It was well
known that he favoured the direct election of the mayor and it was suspected
that he wanted to be that first mayor. At times he hinted to reporters that he
had secret studies showing how easily unification could be achieved but "he
says he's saving his ammunition for when it counts".[97] Some observers felt that
the mayor was biding his time waiting to see if the government got into trouble so
that he could intervene and collect some political debts. The government
never appeared to be in trouble over the issue but it was careful to keep Juba
on its side. Early in February, Premier Schreyer said that "we could very easily
go for an elected mayor",[98] despite the points raised against the idea in the
White Paper. Mr. Cherniack kept the option open when he introduced Bill 36
and said he was "still open to discussion" on the question of a directly elected
mayor.[99] Groups associated with the central core like the Institute of Urban
Studies or the Downtown Business Association favoured direct election while Metro
and many area mayors were adamantly opposed.

The whole issue was overshadowed by the personality of Mr. Juba. Frances
Russell, a political columnist for the Tribune explained that "it's a fairly safe
assumption to make that no one on the current municipal scene except Mr. Juba could
win in a direct election. And it is also a fairly safe assumption that Mr. Juba
would not be a likely choice in a council vote".[100] On July 7, Mayor Juba made a

96. Winnipeg Tribune, June 19, 1971.
97. Winnipeg Tribune, June 26, 1971.
98. Winnipeg Free Press, February 11, 1971.
99. Winnipeg Free Press, April 2, 1971.
100. Winnipeg Tribune, July 15, 1971.

strong statement about the subject. If the mayor were elected by the council he
would be "a little puppydog to the majority of the council" and "the public have
indicated they want to elect the Mayor."[101] A week later on July 13 the Mayor
got the Winnipeg city council by a vote of 7 to 6 to favour the direct election.
Mr. Juba himself, had to cast the tie-breaking vote. This episode shows his
unpopularity among his own council -- if he was going to be mayor he would have to
be elected. At approximately this time Mr. Juba began to make statements about
running as the head of a slate of candidates to contest the fall election. He
would run as an independent and oppose party politics at the local level. In
veiled terms, the Mayor let it be known that he would oppose partisan parties at
the local level (which meant the N.D.P.) and if Juba had run a slate it would
probably have been most effective in North Winnipeg -- the center of N.D.P.
strength. For the first time the government had a potential opponent with real
political clout.

As Bill 36 moved to the law amendments committee the only real question
was the mayoralty. Twenty-seven presentations were made to the committee but
the groups represented reveal the lack of significant interest group activity in
Winnipeg local politics. Thirteen of the briefs came from local mayors, aldermen,
or metro councillors. There were only two representatives of ethnic groups (the
St. Boniface citizens' group mentioned above and a Ukranian organization opposed
to official languages; two professional bodies (the Institute of Urban Studies
and the Manitoba Association of Architects) and one each from business   (the
Chamber of Commerce)and political parties   (the Liberals); **seven** individuals
made personal appeals. There were no briefs from rate-payers associations, real
estate interests, planning groups, companies, labour unions, welfare agencies,

101. Winnipeg Tribune, July 7, 1971.

or community associations. Apparently only the local politicians were interested in what was going on.

The event everyone was waiting for was the address of the Mayor. On the evening of Thursday, July 15, he gave a vintage performance. He was all milk and honey, ("I take my hat off to the N.D.P."), except when he strongly criticized the Local Boundaries Commission "that was the farce of all Royal Commissions ever held ", but he made it clear that he wanted to be mayor and that only through direct election could he achieve his dream: "I have a good imagination", he said, "but I can't stretch it that far as to see the council electing me mayor. Can you imagine Wankling (Mayor of Fort Garry) or Yanofsky (Mayor of West Kildonan) voting for me?"[102]

The government gave in. On July 21, Mr. Cherniack announced that the Mayor would be directly elected. The influence of Mr. Juba can be seen in the provision that only the first mayor of Winnipeg would be elected; in subsequent years the council would decide. Mr. Juba had wanted to be the first super-mayor of Winnipeg -- he was going to achieve his wish. Mr. Cherniack also decided that the new super city would be called "City of Winnipeg". Mr. Juba had succeeded where all the area municipalities had failed -- the Government had finally changed an important part of the White Paper. But unlike the suburban mayors he had power, and more to the point, he had power in the N.D.P.'s backyard.

The Framework Applied.

In the previous section, the long process which led to the adoption of Bill 36 was described. Many individuals, forces, and factors were involved and the framework for the analysis of urban change is a means of organizing this data.

102. Winnipeg Tribune, July 16, 1971.

Not all the possible factors discussed in the framework apply to the Winnipeg case example but enough of them are present to be summarized.

The Environment of Urban Policy

The environment of urban policy in Winnipeg was a curious blend of tradition and change. Socio-economic factors like Metropolitan Winnipeg's size compared to the rest of the province was an important reason why Winnipeg problems could not be ignored. It is too important to the life of the province and too many voters live there for any senior government to leave its problems unattended for too long. The ethnic heterogenity of Winnipeg was perhaps the main reason why Stephen Juba was so powerful. The political setting of Winnipeg affected the levels of participation which in turn was one of the most significant findings of the case example. In the battle over Bill 36, the political temperature was low. The public did not seem to get aroused in any significant way and perhaps more surprisingly the level of interest group activity was almost minimal. Few pressure groups appeared to enter the conflict over Bill 36 (in contrast to Smallwood's case example of London where several professional groups were important actors) and almost none seem to have influenced the actual creation of the White Paper. Unlike some issues in Manitoba -- notably the dispute over auto insurance--actors such as the newspapers, labour unions and business groups did not appear to be overly concerned. The only bodies with active roles were the formal decision-makers -- the local governments, the Government, the legislature and the parties. As in Harold Kaplan's case study of Metropolitan government in Toronto, Winnipeg's local government appears to be an executive-dominant system with a fair amount of consensus and low levels of public or interest group participation. Executive-centered local government may in fact be a characteristic of Canadian urban politics.

Winnipeg also appears to be a well integrated community. The comparatively small size of the population has produced a high level of social and economic interaction. From the lack of success the opponents of Bill 36 had in appealing to the issue of local identity and the eventual vote for Mayor Juba in the suburbs as well as the center, it is apparent that most Winnipegers feel a sense of political community. The creation of a Metropolitan government in 1960 aided this process of political community and Mayor Juba's decade-long crusade for amalgamation may eventually have convinced a majority of the voters.

The Participants

As stated above the active participants in the battle over Bill 36 were relatively few. On the one hand there was the N.D.P. Government supported by the city of Winnipeg, Metro, and some professional groups and on the other there were the area municipalities; the Conservative and Liberal parties in the legislature and the local citizens' group. The initiating factors were a result of the decade-long conflict between Mayor Juba and Metro. The inability of the two most important local governments to cooperate forced various Provincial governments to intervene, throughout the Sixties. The motivations of Stephen Juba -- whose single-minded obsession with Metro and his political longevity fueled the dispute -- are somewhat obscure but they are probably a combination of ego, ideological committment, and a desire to have a convenient whipping boy. His political resources of successful vote-getting, skill at using the media, and ethnic appeal far outstripped Metro's.

The decision-making power was the N.D.P. cabinet and in particular Premier Schreyer, Mr. Cherniack and Mr. Green. The motivations of the government were in part ideological (Cherniack and Green had both been members of the first Metro

council and were personally convinced of the benefits of unification) and in part political. The government received much of its political strength from the central city and unification would lower taxes and increase the ability of central Winnipeg to pay for services. Amalgamation had long been part of the program of the N.D.P. and it was committed to reforming Winnipeg's local government structures; one of the constraints upon the government was the desire of suburban ministers like Al Mackling or Saul Miller to retain some form of local identity. This compromise resulted in the concept of community committees. The ultimate resource of the government was coercive, that is the right to pass laws but the Government also had utilitarian or economic resources. The mill rates, for example, were lowered for 80% of the citizens and those suburbs whose rates would go up would receive a transitional grant form the government.

The motivations of the area municipalities were quite simple -- their very existence was at stake and Hell hath no fury like a politician about to lose his job. The motivations of the Liberals and Conservatives were political: the backbones of these two parties were suburban representatives and rural strength. Neither of these groups were much in favour of Unicity. Each hoped to make gains in the suburbs by opposing Bill 36 and in the case of the Liberals this meant reversing previous party policy which had favoured amalgamation.

Strategies / Results

The battle over Bill 36 was fought in three main arenas: the press and the initial public meetings, the legislature, and finally the law amendments committee. In each of the locales the opposing groups were attempting to do different things. In the first _arena_, the government was sampling public opinion and the area municipalities were attempting to demonstrate a large public

groundswell against the White Paper. In the legislature the parties were merely

making political points to use against each other in the fall election municipally

or later provincially **(that is put it on the record)** In the law amendments stage,

professional groups like the Institute of Urban Studies, attempted to use their

expertise to change the specifics of the bill and Mayor Juba and others attempted

to demonstrate personally the fervor with which they held their views.

One could discern various stages of the campaign. For the first month

or so the government and potential opponents made their preliminary moves. Rather

than present a bill on the subject of urban reform, the government published a

White Paper which enabled them to present their ideas while not becoming too

firmly attacked if the political temperature became heated. The mayors of the

area municipalities met informally, compared notes, and then announced their

opposition at the formal meeting of January 21. The White Paper stage of the

conflict continued until the end of April when the government brought down the

bill which contained the White Paper proposals. This was the key period in the

history of Bill 36, when Unicity could have been defeated. The Bill-36 stage of

the conflict included the debate in the legislature and the attempts various groups

to change specifics of the act.

The strategy of the Government was to keep Unicity from becoming a "live"

political issue. There were elements in the White Paper which could trigger off

an emotional battle and at all costs the Government wanted to avoid a repetition

of the auto insurance debate. The government adopted the tactic of "sweet

reasonableness" where it was willing to change non-essentials as long as the main

outlines remained firm. To avoid the charge of being dictatorial, it set up a

series of public meetings where cabinet ministers appeared receptive to change.

The Taraska Commission was appointed to review the ward boundaries, and the French

language was made an official language to appease the citizens of St. Boniface. The government bought off a potential source of opposition when they guaranteed that all municipal employees would retain their existing salaries under Unicity. At the last moment when Bill 36 was safe, they also felt compelled to bow to the mayor of Winnipeg. As in the case of the municipal employees, the future opposition of the mayor was neutralized by giving him what he wanted most. The strategy of the area municipalities was opposite to the government's: they needed to transform Unicity into an intensive issue with wide scope which would attract major currents of opposition. Because of the fight in Cabinet over the Community committees, it was felt that the Government, as a whole, was not as strongly committed to Unicity as it had been to other issues. If enough public opposition could be generated, the government might retreat. Opponents to Unicity made strong attacks in the papers, the local councils put out propaganda and aided citizen groups to form, but the issue never jelled. Unlike Stephen Juba, the suburban mayors did not have enough political resources to constitute a real obstacle to the government.

Conclusion

Bill 36, then, is an example of an urban policy innovation. It was born in response to difficult problems in the environment, it contained a novel approach to the solution of these problems, and its adoption was the result of a major political confrontation.

As a postscript to the story of Bill 36, in the municipal elections of October 6th, only seven N.D.P. candidates were successful. The independent election committee won in the suburbs which was no surprise but it even won in downtown areas which voted N.D.P. provincially. At the same time as Winnipeg voters were casting their ballots for a group made up of men who had opposed

Unicity, they returned Mayor Juba, the strongest proponent of amalgamation, by the large plurality of 139,174 to his old rival Metro Chairman Jack Willis, 49,014. The turnout was a record 60.7%. The main reason for the success of the independent election committee probably lies in the old phobia of party politics at the local level, one of the strongest traditions of Winnipeg's urban setting.

This paper, then, just skims the surface of the research which needs to be done. But like the woman of easy virtue who wanted to go to another city to start over again as a virgin, we could not return to first experiences but hoped only to clarify some guiding principles.