

Northern Housing: Needs, Policies and Programs

Winter Communities No. 3

edited by Tom Carter
1987

The Institute of Urban Studies





THE UNIVERSITY OF
WINNIPEG

FOR INFORMATION:

The Institute of Urban Studies

The University of Winnipeg
599 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg
phone: 204.982.1140
fax: 204.943.4695
general email: ius@uwinnipeg.ca

Mailing Address:

The Institute of Urban Studies

The University of Winnipeg
515 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B 2E9

NORTHERN HOUSING: NEEDS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Winter Communities No. 3

Published 1987 by the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg

© THE INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES

Note: The cover page and this information page are new replacements, 2015.

The Institute of Urban Studies is an independent research arm of the University of Winnipeg. Since 1969, the IUS has been both an academic and an applied research centre, committed to examining urban development issues in a broad, non-partisan manner. The Institute examines inner city, environmental, Aboriginal and community development issues. In addition to its ongoing involvement in research, IUS brings in visiting scholars, hosts workshops, seminars and conferences, and acts in partnership with other organizations in the community to effect positive change.

**NORTHERN HOUSING:
NEEDS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS**

Winter Communities No. 3

edited by

Tom Carter

Institute of Urban Studies
1987

PUBLICATION DATA

Carter, Thomas, editor
Northern housing, needs, policies and programs

(Winter communities series; 3)

ISBN: 0-920213-52-9

I. University of Winnipeg. Institute of Urban Studies. II. Title.
III. Series: Winter communities series (University of Winnipeg.
Institute of Urban Studies); 3.

This publication was partially funded by the Canada Mortgage and
Housing Corporation, but the views expressed are the personal views of
the authors and the Corporation accepts no responsibility for them.

Published by:

INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES
University of Winnipeg
515 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba
R3B 2E9 CANADA

Copyright 1987
Institute of Urban Studies

ISBN: 0-920213-52-9

PREFACE

This volume is one of two publications appearing in the Institute of Urban Studies' Winter Communities Series that features selected papers from the **Northern Housing Conference**. Recognizing the unique quality of the "northern" community, the Institute of Urban Studies in May 1987 hosted the conference in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, to address the issues of housing and related topics. Drawing together a wide cross section of participants, the conference helped to further underscore the distinct nature of northern settlement. Through the course of the two day event, it became apparent that there is a need for a continuing discussion of issues related to the problems of northern settlement. As a result, selected papers presented at the conference were chosen for publication as a two volume set of conference proceedings. This volume addresses the topics of needs, policies and programs for northern housing.

Robert Robson
Research Fellow
Institute of Urban Studies

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	iii
Table of Contents	v
<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
Introduction Tom Carter	1
Social Housing in Non-Market Communities Hal Logsdon	8
The Rural and Native Housing Program in Northern and Remote Communities Peter D. Anderson	20
Factors Contributing to Housing Need in the Yukon David Hedmann	30
Modern Housing in the Canadian North: Social Necessity and Economic Mismatch? Robert M. Bone	41
Housing Policy Concerns in Non-Urban and Single Industry Communities in Northern Manitoba Ken Cassin	49
Housing Delivery in the North Lynn Hannley	59

INTRODUCTION

Tom Carter

Individuals and agencies involved in policy development and the design and delivery of housing programs for the north have always had difficulty responding in a successful manner to northern circumstances. Policies and programs have floundered time and time again, and the primary reason for failure has often been attributed to attempts to force a southern policy or program option to work in a northern environment. That "these were not designed for the north" is a frequently repeated phrase.

What are the factors that make housing problems or circumstances in the north different? What are the crucial issues that housing policy and housing programs must address to be successful? Several sessions throughout the Northern Housing Conference in Saskatoon, May 1987, addressed these particular issues. However, by way of introduction, a brief overview of the north and what makes it different - and there seems no justifiable reason to suggest it is not different - may help place the problems in a better perspective.


The area of the north that was the focus of discussion at the conference is portrayed on Map 1. It encompasses the northern part of the three Prairie Provinces, Yukon and the Northwest Territories (NWT) although many of the comments throughout this paper are germane to northern British Columbia, northern Ontario, Quebec and Labrador. To characterize this area as the "north" is not to imply homogeneity.¹ Variations within, and between, regions in the area are as significant for housing policy as they are in southern Canada. However, there are some characteristics other than those associated with the more northerly climate of the area that set it apart from the rest of the country.

Although the area is sparsely populated, growth has been substantial, and is related to migration to the area associated with resource development as well as the higher birth rates of the indigenous population. Between 1951 and

1981, the population of the area illustrated on Map 1 increased 97% from 198,023 to 393,275 (Statistics Canada).²

MAP 1

Map Showing the Approximate Location of the Northern Census Division Demarcation Line and the Focus of the IUS Northern Housing Study



During the same period, the population of Canada increased only 74%. All regions within this area experienced significant growth. On the prairies, the northern Manitoba population grew by 48%, northern Saskatchewan by 73% and northern Alberta by 113%. Only in Alberta did growth in the south exceed growth in the north. In the two territories, growth was even greater with Yukon's population increasing 155% and NWT's by 185%. This rapid population growth and the housing demand it generated set the stage for a difficult

scenario under any circumstances but given the other difficulties that have to be overcome in the north, the scenario is even more problematic.

Combined with this population growth there has also been a significant geographical shift of a large component of the population. Many Native and Inuit people have moved from small scattered hunting villages to larger centres associated with resource industries, administrative, service and transportation functions. Not all those who have moved from centres associated with a more subsistence type of economy are participating in the economy of the newer centres, but they have taken up permanent residence in these centres to access health, education and other services. This shift has added substantially to the demand for housing in these centres.

There are other demographic characteristics that also contribute to the uniqueness of the north. Although the north (as illustrated on Map 1) contained less than 2% of the national population in 1981, this area contained over 25% of Canada's indigenous (Native and Inuit) population. In all jurisdictions within this area, the proportion of the total population that is Native or Inuit is very high - 38% in Manitoba, 63% in Saskatchewan and much lower, but still 12%, in Alberta. These proportions are far higher than those found in the southern part of the prairies. In the Yukon and NWT the percentage of the total population that is Native or Inuit is 15% and 55% respectively. Indigenous people in the north, like Canada's indigenous people in general, are experiencing difficulties adjusting to a society in which the economy and the living environment are different from their traditional way of life. This transition which affects such a large proportion of the population brings with it many difficulties that impact upon housing policies and programs.

The north is also characterized by a very young demographic profile. Over 40% of the population is under 19 years of age. The equivalent figure for Canada is just over 30%. Some areas of the north, particularly those areas where the population is mainly of native origin have an even younger profile. It is not uncommon for these areas to have over 50% of their population under 19 years of age. In these areas the population is increasing rapidly as birth

rates for Natives are far higher than for the White population. These areas of the north, because of their young profile have yet to experience their baby boom. The Native population of much of the north is just entering a period of very pronounced growth that will result in even more pronounced housing demand in the immediate future.

Moving from demographic to economic characteristics there are also a number of variables that emphasize the uniqueness of the north. Compared to most southern parts of the nation, the economy is more fragile, more susceptible to pronounced cyclical performance, and far less diversified. The single resource community is also a much more dominant factor in the north, bringing with it the instability that is so characteristic of such communities that depend so heavily on the fluctuating world market for resource products. Without discussing in detail the structure of the economy, it is worthwhile noting that such an economy results in fewer long term jobs and much higher seasonal employment as well as higher unemployment. This reduces overall income as well as income stability from month to month. This, in turn, reduces the ability of households to pay for shelter costs, which are higher on average in the north for a variety of reasons associated with climate, transportation costs, and construction costs. If the Native population, with less education and a much lower level of marketable skills, is considered within the context of this economy, their ability to earn an income that will satisfy their shelter requirements is in even greater difficulty and this further exacerbates the housing problem. The economy can often be characterized as welfare based and with many households depending almost entirely on welfare or on a limited income from seasonal employment, the operating costs of adequate housing are more than many families can afford. Debt retirement of a mortgage is out of the question.

The nature of the economy does not encourage long term investment in quality housing by either individuals or private entrepreneurs. Without any certainty that there will be long term demand in a centre, particularly single resource communities, there is no guarantee that consumers or developers can recapture their outstanding mortgage amounts if they had to sell. This not only discourages investment, but it also discourages the development of a

construction industry - an industry which is crucial to the delivery of adequate housing. A market similar to that in operation in most southern communities just does not function in most northern centres. Even when consumers are prepared to invest, lenders generally cannot be persuaded to provide the necessary mortgage funds. The non-market nature of these centres necessitates a radically different approach to many housing initiatives. This climate, combined with lower incomes and higher housing costs, prevent many program initiatives which build in debt retirement, equity accumulation and cost recovery (common terms in the south) from being an option in the north.

The nature of the housing stock itself adds to the difficulties. The housing stock is in much worse condition and a much higher percentage of dwellings lack basic services (including sewer, water and electricity) than is the case in the south. Information from the 1981 Census indicates that approximately 15% of all dwellings in northern Manitoba, northern Saskatchewan and NWT require major repair. In northern Alberta, the figure is 10%, and it is 6% in the Yukon. In the southern area of the prairies, the proportion of dwellings requiring major repairs is about half the northern level and the Canadian figure is 6%. The proportion of dwellings requiring minor repair is also much higher in the north.

Demographic characteristics, the nature of the economy and its implication for household income plus the condition of the stock itself combine to create a set of circumstances in which many households have serious housing problems. Affordability problems are common but adequacy and suitability problems are more prevalent than in most southern areas because of the condition of the stock and the fact that average household size is much larger in the north. Although few recent studies are available that specifically identify the proportion of households with housing problems (core need households), it is safe to conclude that the proportion is much higher in the north. A recent study undertaken by the Institute of Urban Studies for the Yukon Housing Corporation indicated that 29% of the households in the Yukon have housing problems that could not be addressed without some form of public assistance.³ The equivalent figure for Canada is 13% and in most provincial jurisdictions the proportion varies from 10.5% to 19.5%.⁴ No similar studies are available

for other parts of the north, but given the circumstances, they could also be expected to contain high proportions of households with housing problems.

In summary, housing circumstances of northerners, particularly the Native and Inuit people are on average much less attractive than for more southerly residents. This is neither a new nor a poorly documented conclusion. The circumstances described in the previous discussion have also been highlighted on other occasions. However, this does highlight the fact that, to date, housing policies have been less than successful in addressing the problems. Many suggest that success, measured in terms of improved housing circumstances, has been marginal at best and that policy initiatives have been basically ineffectual. A review of Canadian and northern housing policy indicates that little effort was placed on "made for the north" initiatives until the late 1950s and even subsequent to this date northern policy has often been a poorly adapted southern approach. The papers that follow in this publication focus on a variety of issues and problems and several offer constructive suggestions or possible solutions. What this overview and the subsequent papers all highlight, however, is the need for a more concentrated and focused effort in developing a uniquely northern housing policy - a policy that addresses northern problems with appropriate programs designed with northern circumstances in mind.

NOTES

1. In conjunction with an on-going northern research initiative, the Institute of Urban Studies had attempted to establish a boundary of nordicity for the three prairie provinces. The north-south distinction, roughly corresponding to the northern census divisions as defined by Statistics Canada, forms the basis for the analysis of uniquely northern problems and issues.
2. The comparative statistics used in this overview are all based on data taken from the 1981 Census.
3. Institute of Urban Studies, "Yukon Housing Needs Study," unpublished report prepared for the Yukon Housing Corporation, July 1986.
4. Canada, Neilson Task Force Report (Ottawa, 1986); and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, "Consultation Paper on Housing," (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1985).

SOCIAL HOUSING IN NON-MARKET COMMUNITIES

Hal Logsdon

Introduction

When considering housing policy and programs for northern Canada, several unique features of the northern environment must be considered. Too often we consider our northern areas to be mere extensions of mainstream Canada, or worse, no different at all. We continue to seek national housing programs which we expect to make equal sense in our northern areas. Sometimes we consider the differences between north and south to be simply ones of magnitude and try to use various factors to transpose national standards to northern Canada. What we usually fail to realize is that many areas in northern Canada are **structurally** different in terms of the economy and often **culturally** different due to the largely aboriginal population. This leads to the introduction of inappropriate programs and the consistent inefficiency or failure of these well-intentioned programs.

Some of the important differences between northern and southern Canada have little to do with latitude. Of course, the physical environment changes significantly as one moves north, but some of the most important differences are due not to weather and low temperature, but to remoteness and the costs and incomes which are typical of remote areas. In this regard, some communities in north-central Manitoba which are far off the transportation system and without any stable economic base may be more "northern" than some towns in the Yukon which are on the highway and are built around the mining industry.

One important feature in remote communities is the high cost of housing which is usually due to the high cost of transportation, building materials and the need to import skilled labour. As well, most households have low incomes which are very often seasonal because there is no permanent economic base in the community. This creates an affordability problem that is proportionally very much larger than anywhere in Canada. Related to this is

the total absence of a market mechanism in housing. Housing, especially the value and supply of housing, is significantly affected by the lack of a market and effective demand. Yet the need for adequate shelter in this harsh environment is obvious. The supply of adequate housing in this environment requires a different policy and program approach which does not assume that most people will be able to depend on the marketplace for shelter. In this environment, the government must assume the role of housing supplier for almost all of the population and must concentrate on the most efficient method of providing housing.

The Problem in Non-Market Communities


The Northwest Territories (NWT) is certainly northern Canada. Most of the communities in the NWT are remote, having no regular road, or railway access. Most are reached only by air transportation and served by an annual resupply by water. The distances from major centres of population are great. The population of most communities is predominantly Native, either Dené or Inuit. In most NWT communities, the government is the major player in the provision of housing and has been since permanent housing was introduced. Although the standard of housing provided by the government is far from extravagant, the costs have escalated enormously and the increasing need for housing continues to outstrip the fiscal ability of the government to supply the needed units. More efficient housing strategies which produce more services without spiralling costs are badly needed. By looking at a sample of these communities, it is possible to demonstrate their unique economic properties and draw some general conclusions about how to formulate more effective housing policy to meet the needs of households in these areas.

The Kitikmeot region is one of six planning and administrative regions for the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation. It consists of six arctic coast communities from Holman Island eastward to Pelly Bay (Map 1). Cambridge Bay, in the approximate centre of the region, serves as the regional administrative centre for the government of the Northwest Territories. All six communities are small with predominantly Inuit populations. Pelly Bay and

Holman Island are the smallest with populations just under 300 and Coppermine and Cambridge Bay the largest at about 900 and 1,000 respectively. The total population of the region is 3,584, of which 3,254 are Native.

MAP 1

Northwest Territories Housing Corporation District Offices



All six communities are quite isolated without any road or rail access. Year-round transportation is exclusively by scheduled and charter airline service. A barge service for cargo is provided once a year for all communities except Pelly Bay which is blocked by ice and served only by air. Cargo is expedited through Hay River, a road and rail terminus, up the Mackenzie River to Tuktoyaktuk and then on to the Kitikmeot communities. Consumer prices for the area were reported by Statistics Canada in 1983 as 70-139% higher than Edmonton.

In the Kitikmeot, most of the population lives in social housing. Residents of Kitikmeot communities who do not live in social housing are usually government or company (Hudson Bay Company, Northern Canada Power Commission, Northwestel), employees who live in staff housing, the clergy, and a very few households who maintain their own housing. The staff housing residents are usually transient, living in the community for several years before moving to another location. The social housing population of Kitikmeot makes up over 80% of the total population of the region and probably represents about 90% of the permanent or non-transient population. Therefore, by analyzing the household population of social housing and the waiting list for social housing, practically all of the housing need is included. The remainder of the population is housed by the government or employers through staff housing programs and their residency in the region is, by and large, dependent upon their employment. Looking at the income distribution of the Kitikmeot social housing population, including households on the waiting list, it is evident that the incomes are very low. Sixty-eight per cent of this population have monthly incomes below \$1,600/month (Fig. 1).

FIGURE 1
Social Housing Income Distribution
Kitikmeot District, NWT




FIGURE 2

**Ownership Cost Calculation for Small 3 Bedroom Unit
in Kitikmeot Region of the Northwest Territories
10% Down, 11% Interest over 25 Years**

Kitikmeot:	Principal on HAP Unit	Less 10% down	Payment/Mo 11% 25 yr	Land Lease	Lease /Mo	Taxes	Taxes /Mo	Principal + Int + Tax/Mo	Power	Heating Fuel	Water & Sewer	Insurance Premium	Maintenance Avg/Mo	Operating Cost/Mo	Shelter Cost/Mo	Monthly Threshold Operating	Monthly Threshold Total	Annual Threshold Operating	Annual Threshold Total
Cambridge Bay	\$109,600	\$88,640	\$949	\$500	\$42	\$268	\$22	\$1,013	\$69	\$162	\$12	\$36	\$100	\$379	\$1,393	\$1,284	\$4,643	\$15,171	\$55,710
Coppermine	107,600	98,840	932	500	42	269	22	996	55	138	12	57	100	359	1,355	1,197	4,518	14,269	54,218
Gjoa Haven	111,800	100,440	987	500	42	284	22	1,030	68	178	9	59	100	413	1,444	1,378	4,813	18,538	57,758
Holman Island	108,600	98,840	949	500	42	145	12	1,003	58	158	10	57	100	381	1,384	1,270	4,814	15,235	55,382
Pelly Bay	188,600	189,740	1,634	500	42	258	22	1,697	62	210	12	100	100	484	2,181	1,812	7,269	19,343	87,222
Spence Bay	112,600	101,340	975	500	42	285	22	1,039	82	322	11	59	100	575	1,814	1,915	5,379	22,983	64,549
Average	\$123,267	\$110,940	\$1,068	\$500	\$42	\$245	\$20	\$1,130	\$65	\$194	\$11	\$61	\$100	\$432	\$1,582	\$1,439	\$5,208	\$17,273	\$62,489

Notes:

1. Principal is for Homeownership Assistance Program (HAP) 'A' unit including contracted labour to erect.
2. Power costs are average charges to existing homeowners inclusive of the Federal Power Support Program.
3. Water and sewer charges are based on average charges inclusive of GNWT subsidies to homeowners.
4. Operating costs per month include monthly expenses of power, heat, water and sewer, insurance and maintenance.
5. Shelter costs per month include all operating costs including monthly payments of principal, interest, taxes and land lease costs based on the principal amortized over 25 years at 11%.
6. Monthly thresholds represent the minimum gross income required to permit the housing costs to fall within 30% of gross income. The operating threshold represents the operating costs only while the total threshold includes operating costs plus debt service.
7. Annual thresholds represent annual salary required to assume the costs as noted in 6.

On the other hand, housing expenses are very high in this area. The operating costs of an energy efficient unit, not including any debt service average \$432/month. If a 30% of gross income guideline for housing costs is utilized to measure affordability, almost two-thirds of the population cannot afford to pay for the basic operating costs of fuel, power, water and sewer, insurance and maintenance, which would require an income of \$1,439/month (Figs. 1-2). When the costs of debt servicing are added to the basic operating costs of maintaining a residence, the costs increase to \$1,562 per month. Again, using the 30% of income guideline, the monthly gross income required to both service the debt and maintain the operating expenses of a home would require a monthly income of \$5,206, far beyond the income of almost all households in the region (Figs 1-2).

Approximately two-thirds of the households cannot afford the basic operating costs of a home. One-third of the households can afford the basic costs of operation but cannot afford the added debt service associated with the capital costs. Only 1 household out of 593 can afford the operating and debt servicing costs of an adequate house. Obviously, the spread between incomes and expenses in the area do not allow households to pay either a level of market rent for accommodation or maintain their own housing independently. This situation does not provide much hope for either rental housing investment or homeownership.

What does this type of income distribution mean in an environment of high housing costs? First of all, it means that there will not be any investment in market rental housing by the private sector. There simply is not any opportunity for return on investment. The market rents would exceed the ability of everyone to pay. The complete absence of any market rental accommodation in the region accurately reflects this total lack of effective demand. As well, there will be little or no investment in private homes because, again, there is not the financial ability to service the debt while maintaining the high operating costs of the unit. Since all the effective demand for housing is well below the cost to produce the product, there is no housing produced for the market. The effective demand in this environment is zero and consequently, there is no market and no market-determined price.

Only the cost and the social value of the house as shelter serve as benchmarks. In this environment many of our traditional housing programs lose their effectiveness. Here, the concepts of equity, investment, return, and price take on very different meanings or lose their meaning altogether and many of the current programs fail because they are built on market assumptions.

The Rent-Geared-to-Income (RGI) Programs are designed to foster an economic choice in favour of market housing when the rental rate paid by the household draws close to the market rental rate. Unfortunately, the incomes of most non-market households are well below this level. The RGI client is, therefore, obliged to pay an ever increasing rent until he can afford to build his own accommodation, something almost no household can ever hope to afford.

RGI housing is necessary for those families who cannot afford to pay the cost of utilities and maintenance. Without a program which includes these charges in a rent geared-to-income, most of these families would not have access to adequate housing within their means. Within the Kitikmeot region, two-thirds of the households fall into this category and require RGI housing. In a non-market environment, the RGI programs serve lower income families well, but tend to load costs which would only be incurred by government on the higher income households without offering the choice of electing comparative or less expensive housing in the marketplace.

Although the upper third income households in Kitikmeot are producing higher rental revenues they are not covering the costs of their housing excluding debt servicing. Unfortunately, the government will usually pay more for utilities than the individual household because there are no checks on consumption. The maintenance costs also tend to be higher and the cost to administer the units must also be considered. Therefore, the RGI client who is paying a rent which would cover the costs of utilities and maintenance in a house of his own is probably not covering those costs in RGI housing. These 200 Kitikmeot households should actually produce \$118,000/month in rental revenue although the costs to the government for basic operating costs, excluding debt service amount to \$235,000/month. As noted previously, the

basic operating costs, if borne by the individual households would amount to an average of only \$86,400 (\$432/month/household).

The Rural and Native Ownership Program (RNH) is also based on market assumptions which serve to make it inefficient in the non-market environment. The mortgage loan is treated in the traditional manner but subsidized monthly to income; subsidized investment, so to speak. The client must pay the costs of utilities and maintenance and a 25% of income mortgage payment. Therefore, the total monthly cost is much higher than RGI. What does the client receive in return for this additional cost? The answer, unfortunately, is a property which has no more value to the family than a rental unit, since there is no reasonable resale potential. In a non-market environment, there is not any reasonable resale value because there is no effective demand for the unit. Therefore, the monthly payments become rent rather than investment because there is no realizable return. Recognizing this great difference between costs, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation has introduced utility subsidies which only serve to make RNH virtually the same as RGI housing. The sense of independence from the government usually gained from ownership is also lost since income verification and mortgage payment adjustment is necessary for the 25 year lifetime of the mortgage. To most families in non-market areas, the program is simply a more expensive rental option.

Although the government invests heavily in social housing in the north, the price that could be realized on sale is negligible since there is effectively no demand. The entire inventory of government-owned RGI housing in the NWT would, if sold, produce only a fraction of the book value of the assets if it could be sold at all. Similarly, the investment in housing that an individual household might make is not an investment with an expected financial return, only an investment in shelter for the family. The investment is purely social.

When the costs of supplying housing far outstrip the affordability in a geographic area, a non-market situation occurs, marked by a structural change in the supply and demand of housing. Housing is no longer demanded in the economic sense, since no one has the income to afford it. It is not a

sluggish market, it is a non-market. As well as the economic basis of the non-market phenomenon, there is a cultural dimension. Most Native families do not view housing as a financial investment and tend to view the location of the family home as permanent. In the Kitikmeot region most of the population is Inuit. There is little in-migration or out-migration in the region. Most families view their housing as lifetime shelter, not as an investment which can be sold with a return, when they decide to leave the area. Therefore, the value is simply that of shelter. This cultural dimension coupled with the non-market situation makes the concept of investment in housing almost meaningless. Even in RGI housing there is a tendency to view the rental unit as the family home. It is sometimes quite difficult to move families from one RGI unit to another when family size changes because of this notion of family home or location.

Subsidized Owner Builder Programs In Non-Market Communities

Without any economic base the policy and program challenge for housing in non-market communities lies in the ability to provide adequate and affordable housing at the least cost to the taxpayer. Because of the underlying market assumptions in current programs, they are often not effective or efficient in a non-market environment. To minimize costs, it is important to concentrate both on the initial capital costs of housing and the ongoing operations and maintenance.

Returning to the Kitikmeot region, two-thirds of the households cannot afford the full costs of utilities and, therefore, it would seem that an RGI program is necessary and beneficial for this sector of the population. One-third of the households can afford part of the costs of operation, yet are currently housed in RGI housing paying 25% of income and complaining bitterly about the high cost of rent, although few are paying rents which cover the government's basic costs of operation. By taking a closer look at this one-third of higher income families, we can discover some policy and program directions which will provide housing at less cost to both the client and

government and at the same time create an important independence from government housing assistance.

In cases where households can afford the basic operating costs of a unit, it would be more efficient for government to design programs that placed the financial responsibility of basic operating costs on the client while removing the burden of monthly rent or mortgage payments. As demonstrated earlier, the government usually pays more for these items than the household would. By transferring these costs and eliminating rent or mortgage payments, the government would realize a net savings and most households would not experience increases in total shelter costs.

The value of the house as shelter may be protected by making it an asset of the household, and requiring them to make a personal investment in the property. Although the household may not have adequate income to make a cash investment, they may in some way contribute to the construction of the house. This household investment in their own shelter not only ensures that the investment will be protected, but also reduces the capital investment the government is required to make. By investing in some way, either through "sweat equity" or cash equity, the household reduces the government expenditure necessary to provide the shelter.

Subsidized, owner-builder programs are a very efficient alternative to the current RNH and RGI programs for households in non-market communities who are able to afford the basic operating costs of a house. This type of program provides financial assistance to a household, geared to need, to build a house for themselves. It requires the client to contribute a significant investment through the contribution of his own labour and forgives the assistance. After the completion of the unit, the client is a homeowner; independent of the government, responsible for his own affordable expenses, with a significant personal investment in the home. These programs protect the government's social investment in housing better than RGI or RNH because the client household, with a personal investment, is more likely to protect the unit. The capital cost to the government is reduced because of the contribution of

the client toward construction. The operating costs are entirely transferred to the client and do not include any ongoing administrative costs.

The immediate reaction to such programs is often to dismiss them as "give-aways," but what is given away is equity, which in a non-market environment has no value as potential cash return. What is being given away is, therefore, only required assistance with shelter and is significantly less than assistance offered through other programs. In a market environment, this approach can be disastrous because the equity is easily converted to real return and the assistance may play havoc with the existing market mechanism. But in a non-market community, it is an efficient form of social assistance that promotes independence from the government without producing any undesirable market effects.

In the Northwest Territories, the Homeownership Assistance Program provides this type of assistance and it has proven to be very efficient. It is moving households out of more expensive RGI housing into their own homes which cost less to construct because of the equity contribution of the family and does not result in any longer term cost to the government. Of course the program has limited income penetration in many areas due to high operational costs and low household incomes, but even in high cost areas like Kitikmeot, the cost savings are significant. More importantly, the program provides households with an independence from government assistance and promotes self-sufficiency.

Conclusion

In environments where the market cannot be relied upon to produce shelter because of limited opportunities for return on investment, subsidized, owner-builder programs produce the needed units at a low cost while fostering independence. Such programs only work well where the spread between housing costs and incomes are wide enough to produce non-market conditions. If offered in market environments, they tend to produce negative effects on the market mechanism by offering ownership assistance to families who would normally rely on the market for rental housing. But in northern communities,

where no market is present, they work quite well. The subsidized, owner-builder programs like the Homeownership Assistance Program increase the stock of ownership housing in a community, allowing the stock of RGI housing to be used more effectively to serve families who require the deeper subsidies offered by that program.

Most households in these northern communities do not intend on moving to other locations and have, in the past, tended to be relatively immobile. Because of this, the house that is supplied through these programs is used by the family throughout its lifetime. It is unlikely that a market will ever develop in these environments unless incomes are significantly increased through economic development. For the foreseeable future, the government will play the major role in the provision of housing in these northern, non-market communities. By realizing the economic structure of these communities and dropping the market assumptions implicit in most of our thinking about how to provide assistance, we can produce programs which cost less and provide a better quality assistance to social housing clients.

THE RURAL AND NATIVE HOUSING PROGRAM
IN NORTHERN AND REMOTE COMMUNITIES

Peter D. Anderson

Introduction

Discussion in this paper is limited to the Rural and Native Housing Program which has, since 1974, been the main vehicle for housing people in the northern and remote communities of this country. The Rural and Native Housing Program assists families and individuals in obtaining affordable, adequate, and suitable housing for either ownership or rental. Before discussing the current program, it is necessary to provide a brief history of the program and how it has evolved, as this evolution is critical to understanding many of the housing problems and difficulties in northern and remote communities.

The Evolution of the Rural and Native Program

The Rural and Native Housing Program was announced March 7, 1974. However, before looking at the program some reference should be made to the Remote Housing Program which to some extent was the forerunner to the Rural and Native Housing Program. The Remote Housing Program operated under federal/provincial agreements in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba during the period from 1965 to 1973. There were a total of 16 units provided in Alberta, 925 in Saskatchewan and 452 in Manitoba. In each instance, the province was the responsible partner.

In general, the intent of this housing program was to construct, utilizing Native labour, low cost and modest housing units for sale to Indian and Métis in remote areas. The original construction cost amortized over 15 years averaged \$10,000 per unit. The purchaser's equity was generally \$200 either in cash or sweat equity, and monthly payments were based on a payment to income scale. Unfortunately, the level of sales of the units was not as anticipated and the program today remains primarily rental.

The housing units deteriorated very rapidly due to a number of factors which included lack of piped services, type of construction, and the lifestyle of the occupants. Following a major review in Manitoba of all remote units, a plan is presently in place to correct the deterioration and where piped services exist in the community, to service the unit.

The Rural and Native Housing Program: Successes and Failures

The Rural and Native Housing Program was an attempt to improve both the administration and delivery of housing programs to the rural and remote areas of the country and was the result of pressure on the federal government in the early 1970s from various Métis and non-status Indian groups from across Canada to respond to the deplorable housing condition of Native people living in rural and remote areas of the country. As noted earlier, the Remote Housing Program did little to satisfy the demonstrated needs. The main elements of the program announced in March, 1974 were:

- the extension, with provincial concurrence, of the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program, or RRAP as it is commonly called, to rural settlement and Native communities of 2,500 population or less.
- a target of upwards of 50,000 housing units for rural and Native families to be delivered between 1974 and 1979.
- provinces were invited to enter into partnership under Section 40 of the National Housing Act in order to make housing units available for private ownership on a purchase-to-income basis as well as rent-to-income.
- emergency repair program (previously called Winter Warmth) would be continued for a few years for those Native households currently living in substandard dwellings and not able to benefit from new units immediately.
- direct involvement of the people themselves in planning, implementation and administration of the program was considered critical to its success.
- involvement of other federal departments and their appropriate programs which could have an effect on the health, welfare, and social and economic well being of the people concerned.
- program support funds would be available to provincial associations of Native people and steps taken by CMHC to recruit and train Native people at Corporation offices and to second CMHC personnel to provincial Native housing groups.

What has been our experience given the goals of the program? In the years since the rural and Native housing program was announced, one can identify the successes and the problems in using the program instruments to reach the program objectives. It should first be noted that the efforts to involve other federal government programs to provide assistance to Native people, particularly in the areas of economic development and job training, were not successful. Whatever successes or problems identified with the program became those of Provincial Housing Corporations and CMHC alone.

After an extension to 1981 from the original date (the end of 1979) the target of 50,000 houses and rehabilitated units was reached in April of 1980. As of December, 1986 the total of houses constructed, purchased, and rehabilitated in rural and remote areas is 162,637. Included are 14,248 units under Section 40 and 148,389 under RRAP.

Looking briefly at the housing programs, and beginning with RRAP, monitoring indicates that the program is serving its intended purpose of upgrading houses to required standards. However, because of the nature of housing in the northern remote areas, there is much less opportunity to deliver the program. Housing is either government assisted in some way and therefore not eligible, or it is of such a condition that RRAP will serve no useful purpose to improve the unit to an acceptable standard in a cost beneficial way or to increase the useful life of the property by 15 years, which is a program requirement. RRAP is delivered primarily through delivery agents. The current loan maximum for loan clients is \$25,000 with the maximum loan forgiveness ranging from \$5,000 in the southerly, more accessible communities to \$8,250 in the most remote geographical areas, depending on income.

The Emergency Repair Program is delivered exclusively by the provincial Native organizations with the exception of NWT. The program provides a non-repayable contribution to needy owners or occupiers in rural areas to undertake emergency repairs required for the continued safe occupancy of their houses. The maximum contributions range from \$1,500 in more accessible areas to \$3,800 in the most remote. This program is seen as successful in meeting

the emergency needs of owners of less than adequate housing. Because many owners of these units will not move to new accommodations, it is no longer seen as a stop-gap program.

The Section 40 NHA Ownership/Rental Program historically was introduced in an era of participation and at a time when social objectives often outweighed housing delivery objectives, particularly as they concern Native people. What was not fully appreciated was that the introduction of a housing program which was difficult to administer when combined with the changing social and economic aspirations of Native people was doomed to run into administrative financial and attitudinal problems. The most notable aspects of the program are that it has provided ownership and to a much lesser extent rental accommodation for some 14,248 families who had an average income of about \$11,500 per year, meeting the program's intent of serving low income families. The program has been constrained by a full range of issues affecting its delivery which include:

- a) The concept of client involvement in the process of planning, implementation and management of the program has been difficult and costly to implement. The sharing of responsibility and decision making with groups who often do not have the training and sophistication in the involved and expensive process of producing housing has slowed the process and made it even more expensive, particularly when a housing program has been used as a vehicle for economic development and employment.
- b) The necessity for a federal/provincial cost sharing arrangement for ownership delivery of the program has led to as many different programs as there are provinces involved. Provinces have had different priorities, different commitments to the program, and a different administrative arrangement. As an example, in three adjoining provinces, New Brunswick has 80% of its owners in receipt of social assistance, Quebec never signed the Section 40 Agreement, and in Ontario no social assistance recipient is eligible to become a Section 40 owner.

- c) The program is by nature expensive. The cost of construction and building materials in rural and remote communities is high; the efficiency of the building industry, if there is one, is minimal; the choice of sites for building and servicing is not ideal; distances are great, and transportation choices may be limited; and the search for thermal efficiency in adverse climatic conditions all increase the cost in providing adequate housing.
- d) Perhaps the most difficult issue to comprehend is that of moving the low income tenant or owner of an unimproved shelter (which could more commonly be referred to as a "shack") into an ownership position having to pay on a mortgage based on 25% of his/her income. While many purchasers have adapted to this concept there are also many who do not appreciate that they are owners, and maintain a renters mentality. Before becoming owners, little or none of their income was paid in housing costs and the concept of homeownership and its responsibilities are not well understood. This has led to a serious arrears problem, particularly in remote areas where other living costs such as food and fuel are extremely high, and where owners are seasonally employed and do not have sufficient income to pay both mortgage payments and maintenance on their unit. Often their conception is that 25% of income is rent and the landlord, that is CMHC or the province, should pay for maintaining the unit to an acceptable standard. One result of this is the deterioration of the physical condition of some units and the need for post-occupancy repairs.
- e) In the early days of the program, modest housing was considered by some to be minimum housing. Existing housing which was purchased for resale to rural and Native housing purchasers received minimum upgrading. The quality of units constructed in rural and remote areas suffered for many reasons; inexperienced contractors, poor sites with swamps or rock being the norm, poor house siting by setting it too low and the absence of pipe services were contributors. A final contributor to housing problems was a search for thermal efficiency.

Air-tight houses tend to produce condensation problems and this situation is aggravated by large families, severe winters and absence of pipe services. The physical deterioration of the unit can be rapid and it may not last even the amortization period of 25 years without substantial maintenance.

- f) With the main thrust of the Rural and Native Housing Program directed towards homeownership, and given the circumstances already described of a lack of affordability and building deterioration, extraordinary financial assistance is sometimes warranted. Such help cannot be extended under Section 40 to homeowners unless there is a legal necessity to do so such as under warranty type post-occupancy repair.
- g) The involvement of the client group as represented by the Provincial Native Association has been maintained from sustaining grants to establish and maintain housing groups to assist in rural and Native housing delivery. Such groups primarily work with CMHC where CMHC is the active partner. While there has been reasonable continuity in the housing groups, these groups are headed by elected representatives. Changes for political reasons, create at times, uncertainty in direction, staff turnover and disruption to the orderly delivery of the program.

The work done by the groups varies from province to province but usually consists of services such as determining need and demand, assisting applicants with the paper work and counselling. CMHC or the province retains responsibility to approve applicants, buy land, let contracts, supervise the work, make advances and administer mortgages. Instances of the client group becoming involved in construction have generally been of questionable success. There are many examples where cost overruns were the norm and projects were left to be completed by the active partner.

Over the years there has been pressure on the federal government from Native representatives to include training and development along with an economic development focus to any changes in the Rural and Native Housing

Program. However, it is recognized that without separate funding, economic development costs increase housing costs and ultimately lead to higher mortgages. The costs of subsidies reduces the housing impact of a given budget. To this date, the program does not make any provisions for economic development as such to be a program component.

Arrears continue to be a major cause of concern. A great deal of administrative time is required in addition to the actual cost of arrears, foreclosures, and the repair of acquired properties. Of no less concern are the problems faced by the owners. A review of the arrears problem concluded that low incomes, irregular incomes, high cost of utilities, ignorance of program requirements on entry, client family type, and administrative shortcomings all contribute to the high level of arrears. Where substantial improvement in arrears has been noted a number of factors have contributed including: improvement in the administrative practices including the finalization of sales and title transfers in place of occupancy agreements; the setting of arrears goals; the increased administrative attention given to the Rural and Native Housing portfolio; the clarification of collections policies; improved counselling; and, firm, reasonable and timely follow-up. Arrears nationally average 26.76% for the ownership and rental programs with the highest arrears being associated with the remote northern areas.

Program Changes And Improvements: 1974-1987

The delivery, operations, and administration of the program have been under constant review and changes since the beginning in 1974. Through consultative processes with Native people and the provinces, issues and problems have been identified which have resulted in improvements. A discussion of these changes and their implications is outlined below:

- a) RRAP is now available on a universal basis with a separate budget allocation for Rural Homeowner RRAP. In order to achieve the Native targets a significantly higher number of Rural Homeowner RRAP loans are targeted to Native clients. The levels of forgiveness and the

relationship of forgiveness to geographic location have already been outlined.

- b) 1985 was the first year that the Rural and Native Housing Homeownership/Rental Program was available nationally to all rural Canadians. In addition, there was provision for an increased utilization of the rental option nationally which was previously not available in all provinces. With affordability being identified as a major source of problems, three approaches are now in place:
 - i) homeownership tenure is reserved for those households in need who are able to contribute equity and who are most able to successfully manage homeownership responsibilities. This encompasses primarily the working poor.
 - ii) clients without equity are directed towards rental. Welfare clients are generally directed to the rental option.
 - iii) a lease-purchase option is in place to enable the more low income clients to upgrade themselves over time from rental to homeownership.

- c) The introduction in 1986 of a heating allowance for the homeownership component will enable participants under the program to direct additional household financial resources to home maintenance. Equitable treatment of pre-1986 clients will be secured through negotiations with the provincial partners to extend the heating allowance to the existing portfolio. Most provinces have already agreed. With the addition of a heating allowance, energy efficiency in the units and the associated cost of a highly efficient, low maintenance newly constructed unit, becomes less of a concern. The program can now utilize suitable existing housing where available. The addition of a heating allowance should, particularly in the areas of a high cost of living, such as the north, reduce the arrears as more money will be available in the household.

- d) The program is targeted to persons in core housing need which is defined as those households who cannot afford or cannot obtain adequate and suitable accommodation. This includes those households; who occupy a crowded or inadequate dwelling and currently pay less

than 30% of their income for shelter but for whom basic shelter costs for an adequate and suitable dwelling available in their market area would consume 30% or more of their income; or who pay 30% or more of their income for shelter but for whom an adequate and suitable dwelling in their market area would consume 30% or more of their income.

- e) the Provincial Native's Association now receive a fee-for-service which has replaced the old sustaining grants. Fees are made available for services provided under an agreement which identifies the agents role and responsibilities in assisting the active party in the delivery of the homeownership/rental program. This has created a more business like arrangement with the Native associations and provides a clear understanding of the levels of assistance which are expected from the provincial association. In addition, tripartite management committees have been established comprised of representatives from CMHC, the province, and the Provincial Native Association. The responsibilities of each tripartite committee include ensuring that Native housing goals are met, preparing annual and three year housing plans for Native people, and setting priorities for rural and Native housing homeownership and rental activities. In effect, the Tripartite Committees will oversee all Native Housing Assistance activities, including delivery in each province. This will ensure client Native people continue to have a strong voice in their housing requirements.

Finally, as part of the on-going search to more effectively and efficiently deliver housing in rural and remote areas of this country, the Rural and Native Housing Demonstration Program was introduced in 1986. The objective of this program is to assess the feasibility of offering a housing assistance program in rural and remote areas whereby the occupant is funded for the cost of land and materials and, under expert supervision, builds his own home. This new Rural and Native Housing Program will involve a total of 500 units over a 5 year period and will be applied in all rural areas of the country. The units are expected to cost on average less than \$40,000 and this has been

born out from first year's experience with the program. The Demonstration Program will be watched closely and all innovations will be monitored with a view to the possibility of their being expanded for inclusion under the general program guidelines.

**FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO HOUSING NEED
IN THE YUKON
David Hedmann**

Introduction

In 1986, the Yukon Housing Corporation completed a housing needs study. The study was commissioned in response to requests that the Corporation rationalize government intervention in the housing market and justify expenditures. The results of this study indicate that when compared to the other territorial and provincial jurisdictions, the Yukon has the highest percentage of population in core housing need.

This paper presents existing and new information about housing needs and a description of the context in which these housing needs exist. The paper outlines geographic, economic, political, administrative and social factors that have contributed to housing needs and impaired policy and program planning. A selection of policies and programs to mitigate these needs is presented.

Factors Contributing to Housing Need

The Yukon, as much as any northern jurisdiction, has serious housing needs and a wide range of conditions which contribute to these needs. The 1986 "Yukon Housing Needs Study" indicates that the Yukon has a higher percentage of population in core housing need (as defined by CMHC) than any other territorial or provincial jurisdiction (Figure 1). To fully understand the housing problems in the Yukon, it is necessary to begin by describing some of the geographic, economic, political, administrative and social factors that have contributed to current housing needs. The paper will also highlight some of the findings of the 1986 "Yukon Housing Needs Study" and subsequent housing needs research, and review the Yukon Housing Corporation's recent and planned activity to meet these needs.

Geographic Factors

Geography in the Yukon has a particularly strong impact on housing needs. The Yukon is the smallest of the twelve provincial and territorial jurisdictions, with a population of just over 26,000 in 1986. Approximately 18,000 people - almost 70% of the Yukon's population - live in the capital, Whitehorse. The remaining population lives primarily in sixteen other centres, where the median population is 314 (Map 1). All communities are accessible by road, with the exception of Old Crow inside the Arctic Circle, which is accessible only by air.


Fifty-five per cent of people in need of housing assistance live in Whitehorse, in locations such as trailer courts and squatter sites along the Yukon river. Forty-five per cent of the people in need of housing assistance are spread throughout the territory. This causes logistical problems for policy development and for program delivery. In 1987 for example, the corporation is delivering a 28 - unit program in 10 different communities.

Economic Factors

The Yukon economy, even more than the geography, has contributed to current housing needs. First, the economy in the Yukon has a tradition of boom and bust. In 1982, for example, the Cypril Anvil/Dome Petroleum mine in Faro closed indefinitely. The mine closure shut down the town of Faro, with a population of about 2,000 people, and affected most households in the Yukon. As tax revenues declined, the territorial government cut expenditures, put in place a hiring freeze, and cut salaries and hours for all employees by 10%. This recession lasted three years. During such periods of recession, people have increased difficulty affording housing.

Second, the boom and bust economy discourages investment in housing by individuals, entrepreneurs and businesses. In turn, the lack of investment in housing causes landlords to defer maintenance during periods of low occupancy. In addition, if the landlords can maintain solvency, they tend to raise rents

MAP 1



dramatically during times of high occupancy. Many lower and moderate income households must spend more than thirty per cent of their income for shelter, regardless of adequacy or suitability.

Third, the economy is characterized by a high percentage of part-time and seasonal employment. Part-time and seasonal employees usually cannot manage unassisted ownership of an adequate dwelling. Seasonal and/or intermittent earnings are not sufficient to meet equal, regular mortgage payments. Part-time and seasonal workers find it virtually impossible to secure a CMHC insured mortgage or to qualify for an assisted homeownership program. Moreover, experience has shown that conventional homeownership programs do not work for most part-time or seasonal workers. For some clients, even rental programs do not work. Incidentally, of the twelve jurisdictions, the Yukon has the smallest percentage of social assistance clients in social housing, perhaps because of the high percentage of part-time and seasonal employment.

On the other hand, some people choose to live in inadequate dwellings to protect themselves against periods of little or no income. This practice fosters the commonly accepted perception that people choose, and are content to live in inadequate dwellings, undermining support for housing programs.

Political Factors

The political system and process have also contributed significantly to housing needs. The system fostered the frontier mentality of "every man and woman for themselves." Generally, the government and the public held the perception that everyone in the Yukon was responsible for their own housing needs and that private sector resources were sufficient to meet these needs. The government adopted a hands off approach to social programs (such as housing) and to any laws perceived to limit so-called individual freedoms. Until 1985, it was legal to drink and drive in the Yukon, although driving while intoxicated was illegal. The assumption was that individuals should have freedom and responsibility for driving sober or drunk. Likewise, the

government assumed that individuals should have freedom and responsibility for their own housing.

While it is difficult to document, it seems that the politicians and bureaucrats did not support significant public sector intervention in the housing market except to establish subdivisions. The Yukon government provided more than eight million dollars on an eventual cost recovery basis in the late 1970s and early 1980s for one of several new subdivisions in Whitehorse. The government funded that subdivision in order to accommodate an anticipated influx of people working on the construction of the Alaska pipeline and with related industrial development. The subdivision was not intended to provide housing assistance to those in core housing need.

Meanwhile, the territorial government apparently decided that the private sector could meet all housing needs in the Yukon. They began to sell social housing units on the open market. Indeed, the social housing inventory declined between 1982 and 1984. In 1983, the territorial government dismantled the Yukon Housing Corporation and made Housing a branch of the Department of Community and Transportation Services. Staff strength fell from fifteen to two.

In 1985, a new government provided new political direction to Yukon Housing. At the request of the Minister responsible for the Department of Community and Transportation Services, Yukon Housing prepared a 14-point action plan to structure a new Yukon Housing Corporation. This plan included three crucial steps:

1. A Yukon housing needs study;
2. Development of a white paper on social housing policy;
and
3. Preparation of a new Housing Corporation Act.

Administrative Factors

Unfortunately, the administrative system designed to address housing needs failed to resolve the problems created by geography, economy, politics and, in some instances, compounded them. The Yukon Housing Corporation was established in 1972 with the mandate:

to create, co-ordinate and give direction to housing programs so as to provide standard housing to all residents of the Yukon Territory, whether this be done through homeownership or subsidized rental.

Based on a housing needs study completed in 1972 the new Corporation announced a 7.5 million dollar budget, (in 1972 dollars) and a five-year housing plan for 1974-78. This involved construction of 4,500 units, for sale and for rent. Program costs were shared with the federal government. For reasons which have not been researched, over the 1974-78 period, only 145 units were added to the inventory. This represents roughly three per cent of the planned units. At fiscal year end 1986, there were only 351 units in the Corporation's social housing inventory. The equivalent of this would be if the NWT Housing Corporation had only seven hundred social housing units instead of the approximately 3,900 currently in their inventory.

To add to the difficulties of delivering social housing in the Yukon, there has been a history of high staff-turnover in the Yukon Housing Corporation and the Yukon Territorial Government. In the eighteen months since I have been with the Corporation, there has been a 50 per cent turnover in head office staff. Historically, it seems that no sooner were new initiatives made, than key personnel left the organization. Standard operating procedures, field manuals, by-laws and contracts are still not in place, fifteen years after the Corporation was created.

Social Factors

Less tangible than geographic, economic, political and administrative factors, are the social factors which have contributed to core housing need. It is very difficult to define housing needs for some people in core housing

need - those in need of special purpose housing, or those who live in rural or remote communities such as Old Crow and Dawson City. It is also very expensive for the government to provide such housing assistance. Moreover, many people have difficulty recognizing that housing needs exist.

Full-time government and other workers are concentrated in Whitehorse and, for the most part, they are well housed. Judging from my own experience, many of these people are unaware that housing needs exist to the extent that they do. Some lower income people in need of housing assistance have difficulty in articulating their housing needs and accessing housing programs. Given the extent of housing needs in the Yukon, it would seem that many households in need also have difficulty convincing decision makers to provide more resources for housing programs.

In any effort to mitigate housing needs, the Yukon Housing Corporation must take into account all of the factors that contribute to housing needs in the Yukon. The Yukon Housing Corporation established an interagency committee as part of its activities for the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless. Research undertaken by this committee identified housing needs for several client groups which cannot be picked up in any usual needs study, including victims of family violence, the psychiatrically and mentally disabled, and people in transition from different situations. We are advancing the position in our discussions with other jurisdictions, and here today, that these needs are not, in fact, special needs. Rather, these housing needs should be perceived as normal and mainstream in our society.

A Review of Housing Need

Ever since the collapse of the ambitious 1974-78 plan, housing need in the Yukon has been growing. During the global and operating agreement negotiations in 1984-85, the Yukon Housing Corporation concluded that they would have to document Yukon housing needs in order to participate in the national needs-based allocation process.

Though several groups in the Yukon had completed sectorial needs studies, no territorial study had been completed since 1972. Discussions between Yukon Housing Corporation and CMHC resulted in a \$40,000 study in the Yukon Territory. After a review of several methodologies, the Corporation decided to undertake a door-to-door survey to determine housing needs in the Yukon. Because of the limited data and sample base, current housing models have little application in the Yukon. Yukon Housing Corporation selected the Institute of Urban Studies to do a Yukon Housing Needs Study.

In 1985, the Institute of Urban Studies (IUS) completed a survey of 998 Yukon households. This sample represented 10% of households in Whitehorse and 20% of households in other communities. Each household was interviewed combined with a lengthy questionnaire administered by an interviewer. As indicated earlier, the survey indicates that the Yukon has the highest percentage of housing need of all the jurisdictions in Canada (Figure 1). This bar graph highlights the findings: 29.4 per cent of households in the Yukon are in core housing need, almost 33% greater than Manitoba, the jurisdiction with the second highest percentage of core housing need, and more than double the national average.

At the same time IUS was working on the needs study, CMHC unilaterally introduced core need income thresholds. The definition of core housing need was, and remains, problematic. CMHC and Yukon Housing Corporation have been working to develop thresholds which both agencies believe are realistic for the Yukon. The main stumbling block has been the absence of data and a methodology for non-market areas. New thresholds will cause the percentage of the Yukon population in core housing need to increase from 29% to approximately 34%. So, when we talk about the core housing need population in the Yukon, we are talking about more than one third of all households.

The composition of the core housing need population is illustrated in Figure 2. Families with children account for more than half the need. These are figures for the whole Yukon; the actual composition of the core housing need population varies from community to community.

FIGURE 1





FIGURE 2



Many households in core need have housing adequacy problems:

1. Twenty-four per cent of households in the Yukon do not have basic facilities;
2. Twenty-three per cent live in accommodation with poor interior conditions; and
3. Sixteen per cent live in accommodation with poor exterior condition.

When overlap is eliminated, almost 50% of the housing stock in the Yukon is inadequate. Not all households in inadequate housing have income levels below the thresholds which would place them in core housing need. This fuels the argument that a significant number of people in the Yukon live in inadequate dwellings by choice. At this time, there is no clear data base to prove or disprove this argument.

Policy And Program Approaches To Address Needs

So what is it that the Yukon Housing Corporation is going to do to address these needs? Given the constraints already outlined, our current plans include the development of the following:

1. a social housing policy White paper in 1987. This will provide the policy framework for new program development and delivery
2. a five year housing program in 1987 for 1987-91
3. a RRAP enrichment program in 1987
4. a municipal services program in 1987
5. a disabled renovation program in 1987
6. a new cost shared renovation program replacing RRAP in 1988
7. increased assistance to private non profit groups in 1988.

Equally important, what can we do to ensure that the failure of the 1974-78 plan is not repeated in 1987-91?

1. to mitigate geographic problems, we are planning to decentralize activities and develop local expertise;
2. to mitigate economic problems, we will deliver smaller scale projects and develop the housing construction sector;

3. to mitigate political problems, we will undertake extensive consultation in the development and delivery of housing policies and programs at the community level;
4. to mitigate our administrative problems, we are systematically developing a corporation through our fourteen point action plan; and,
5. to mitigate our social problems, we will develop a continuing Housing Commission and Community Planning and Client Services Program.

Conclusion

Nothing is easy when it comes to defining housing needs and delivering programs to meet those needs in the north. We are faced with great challenges. What keeps our work interesting are the opportunities created by these challenges. I have touched only briefly on Yukon Housing Corporation plans to address housing needs in the Yukon. I hope you will all feel free to respond to those proposals and discuss your own experience with factors that contribute to housing needs in the north.

**MODERN HOUSING IN THE CANADIAN NORTH:
SOCIAL NECESSITY AND ECONOMIC MISMATCH?**

Robert M. Bone

Theoretical Framework

The diffusion of ideas, institutions, methods and values from a technically more advanced society to a less advanced one is part of the process of modernization.¹ This diffusion of development has wide spread social consequences for people of technically less advanced societies because, depending on the level of modernization, it can require massive changes in their way of life. These social changes can be very trying and they represent one drawback to the development strategy of imposing outside technically advanced solutions upon another less advanced society.

One example of development diffusion is the introduction of public housing programs for Native peoples in northern Canada. In this paper, the concept of privately owned housing units built under a public housing program is presented as an example of imposed development diffusion. The goal of this program was to solve the northern housing problem by employing the concept of private ownership.

Historical Background

Housing should fit the needs and financial capacity of people. Until the 1940s the vast majority of northern Native peoples lived on the land and this fact necessitated the use of local resources to construct shelters at different locations, according to the season of the year. Typical types of shelter were the igloo, log cabin, and skin or canvas tents. These types of shelter had four chief design elements: (1) basic protection from the elements, (2) ease of construction, (3) use of local labour and materials and (4) no or little need for cash investment.

The decade of the 1950s was marked by the commencement of settling of Métis families in small isolated communities. For the Métis, this shift represented an important step in their inclusion in Canadian society and in doing so it altered their lifestyle. Shelter was among the changes in their lifestyle. Their traditional shelter, the log cabin, soon proved to have serious drawbacks in a settlement environment. Three main problems with log cabins were their small size, quality of construction and lack of modern amenities necessary in an urban surrounding.

Two new factors, namely increased family size and living in close quarters, added to their inadequacy. Log cabins, often under 100 square feet, were satisfactory for a family of 3 or 4 living on the land but since the Métis family size more than doubled in the first decade of settlement living, overcrowding became a serious problem. An example of extreme overcrowding was recorded at the community of La Loche in the 1976 Housing Needs Survey when three families totalling 20 people were living in a small house built under the 1960 public housing program. Its size was 540 square feet and the living space per person was calculated at 27 square feet. But the worst case of overcrowding was in La Loche where a family of eight lived in a log shack of 120 square feet, giving only 15 square feet of living space per person (Report on the Housing Needs Survey, Northern Saskatchewan, Table 2).

Settlement living also resulted in contamination of water supplies, generating the need for a village sewage/water system. As the population of the Métis communities grew, the magnitude of health problems arose due to the pollution of the water supply by human wastes. The solution required large capital investments by individuals and their communities. In the case of the Métis and their communities, such capital was simply not available through local taxation.

By the early 1960s, housing for Métis in northern settlements was in a desperate situation. Compared to staff housing for public servants living in isolated centres, such as the RCMP, conservation officers, teachers and nurses, Métis dwellings were clearly substandard. In the larger settlements, water and sewage systems were developed for staff housing and public buildings

such as schools and nursing stations. In this way, a dual housing system emerged, giving more evidence of the disparity between Native and non-native living conditions in northern communities.

Armed with facts and figures, Native political leaders went to the media, comparing Métis dwellings to those occupied by urban slum dwellers in the Third World. These statements caught the public's attention and forced the federal and provincial governments to address the Métis housing problem created by the move to settlements. All agreed that a new type of shelter was required and that government housing programs were needed to fill that social gap.

Public Housing Programs

Public housing programs in northern Saskatchewan began in 1960 when the Saskatchewan Department of Natural Resources built two small houses at Pinehouse. At that time, few people lived full-time at this site and the need for housing was small. However, the demand for public housing accelerated as the migration of Métis people to settlements increased. For example, Pinehouse had less than 50 inhabitants in 1961 while in 1986 its population was nearly 700. This rapid growth of settlement population is typical of all northern Métis communities and it accounts for the continuing need for urban-style housing by the Métis. Therefore, the driving force behind public housing programs for Native peoples including the Métis is the social necessity of providing suitable housing for a people in transition from a bush life to a settlement life.

In the 1960s, the public housing programs produced small and simply constructed framed units. In northern Saskatchewan, the first program was funded solely by the provincial government. However, as the magnitude of the problem became more visible, the province realized that it did not have the resources necessary to deal with demand for northern housing. Negotiations began with the federal and provincial governments. These housing programs

were normally for a five year period and over time the type of housing changed from "basic" shelter approach to a "fully modern" unit.

This change in the type of housing was most evident in the size and style of public housing. The size of the housing stock increased with the basic units increasing from less than 200 square feet of living space to over 1,000 square feet. The style of the public housing followed the design of housing found in southern Canada and the most efficient delivery system was to produce several models. The presence of modern amenities such as central heating, flush toilets and running hot and cold water were common to most DNS built houses in medium to large settlements. The quality of these houses, at least by southern standards, was a substantial improvement over the original Native housing and the first types of public housing for the Métis.

The most ambitious housing program took place in the 1970s under the Department of Northern Saskatchewan. This program was designed to provide a southern level of housing to the people of the north and thereby reduce the north-south disparities. It was also expected to give a sense of pride and responsibility to the Métis through the concept of home ownership. From 1972 to 1981, this housing program delivered over a thousand housing units to 30 settlements in northern Saskatchewan at an estimated cost of over \$50 million.

This program, jointly funded by the federal and provincial governments, was based on home ownership for low income Métis families, i.e., those families earning less than \$10,000 per year. In the early 1970s, CMHC would not approve a housing loan for a family living in southern Saskatchewan unless their earnings exceeded \$12,000. Governments recognized that these low income families could not pay the full mortgage payments and, for this reason, mortgage payments were scaled to family income.

Building costs are higher in the north than in the south. There are two primary reasons for these differences: (1) the cost of transporting building materials to remote settlements and (2) the need to import skilled southern labour to help build these units. Currently, the cost of building a 3-bedroom unit with a total of 1,200 square feet of living space at remote communities

in northern Saskatchewan, such as Stony Rapids, would exceed \$100,000. For similar reasons, the cost of maintenance and repair of northern houses is higher than in the south. This fact plus the low income of Métis families represents a serious flaw in the concept of privately owned modern houses.

The Modern Privately Owned Housing Solution

The home ownership type of solution to the housing program has considerable merit if the economic base of the northern Métis communities was improving. Unfortunately, such development has not occurred and the Métis continue to live in communities with little opportunity to gain employment. For this reason alone, the home ownership solution has been plagued with problems. These problems relate to the fact that most Métis families do not have members with permanent jobs or with equivalent sources of other income. Such low income families find it difficult to meet their basic needs and, therefore, housing payments along with maintenance and repairs to these units fall behind.

What the government has inadvertently done is to create a modern type of privately owned housing for a low income group and this income group has insufficient funds to afford such housing. In the case of the DNS housing, there is a mortgage adjustment feature. But other costs were not addressed. These include:

1. the cost of fuel oil
2. the cost of sewer and water system
3. the cost of electricity (use of electric stoves rather than wood ones)
4. the cost of telephone service
5. the cost of garbage collection
6. the cost of property taxes
7. the cost of maintenance and repair.

In addition to these costs, the chief economic motive for private ownership of housing is the equity of the dwelling. In northern Saskatchewan, few settlements have a market for housing and therefore almost all Métis housing has little or no equity.

Housing Mismatch

There is no doubt that a public response to the Métis housing crisis was necessary. The problem is that the public response created a mismatch between housing costs and Métis income. Evidence for this position is found in the rapid deterioration of newly built public housing units and the failure of many home owners to keep up with their subsidized mortgage payments. This new housing problem of "high costs" of ownership is typified by the remarks of the Mayor of Buffalo Narrows, Leonard Larson quoted in the La Ronge based newspaper, The Northerner (May 6th, 1987):

All is not well in the northern municipal system. We are more dependent on government today than we ever were and sometimes it seems our infrastructure can be a detriment rather than as asset. We have no economic base and a high percentage of our population is on welfare.

If we develop lots at \$15,000 each, who are we going to sell them to-welfare recipients? I am not sure we should be developing land or sewer and water systems.

While the ultimate solution to the housing program lies in a stronger northern economy and the emergence of a sound economic base for Métis families, the short term solution is either to build less sophisticated houses or to increase subsidies for their operation and maintenance. One example of the increased dependency on southern products and the associated rise in house operating costs is the use of fuel oil driven furnaces rather than wood furnaces. The cost of heating a 1600 square foot housing unit produced under DNS, the Toronto Split, is substantially higher using fuel oil than wood. In 1976, it was estimated that the heating bill for fuel oil would be \$720 while the cost of using a local resource, wood, and the labour of the home owner would be less than \$100 (Housing Needs Survey, p. 112). Since 1976, the price of fuel oil has risen much more rapidly than the cost of procuring local wood which is essentially a ubiquitous resource. While there were "good" technical reasons for using forced air furnaces, the decision to use fuel oil rather than wood is another example of the shortcomings of the diffusion of southern methods into the north.

Rethinking The Public Housing Solution

For the most part, Métis income is too low to afford modern housing delivered by public housing programs. According to Bone and Green (p. 483), the average cost of operating a modern dwelling in northern Saskatchewan in 1976 compared to a traditional one was considerable, i.e., \$150 per year compared to \$1,800. With an average 1976 family income of \$7,600, these higher operating costs were difficult to pay and left little funds for other basic needs, including maintenance of the modern dwelling. All evidence indicates that this situation has not changed over the last ten years.

There appears to be three choices facing society:

1. to expand public support to areas of maintenance and repair of dwellings,
2. to curtail public investment in the northern housing, or
3. to change the housing strategy by allowing northern authorities to determine the design, construction and maintenance of public houses by using more local labour and resources.

The proposed housing strategy was articulated in the 1976 Housing Needs Survey of the Northern Municipal Council. In this approach, public housing funds would be assigned to local Métis settlement councils. They would be responsible for using these funds wisely in order to satisfy local housing needs, including the design, maintenance and repair of these units. Certain constraints would be placed upon these local agencies by governments to ensure the funds are "wisely" spent. The advantage of this "bottom down" approach is that local control and participation is increased. Such control should result in the increased use of local resources and labour. Since transportation costs make up about 30% of the total cost of building public housing in the north, this approach may offset any additional costs of local labour. Significantly, it should also reduce the level of northern unemployment and thus foster community development.

In conclusion, local authorities deserve a chance to participate more fully in the public housing programs. This community development approach, while not a new strategy, has not been tried before in northern Saskatchewan. While

it may not be the perfect solution, it does transfer housing funds and responsibilities to northern peoples. Such an approach satisfies the social necessities of addressing the Métis housing shortage. Whether it reduces the current economic mismatch between Métis family income and housing costs depends on the local Métis decision-makers. The hope is that by being close to the problem, solutions will match the needs and capabilities of Métis people.

REFERENCES

1. Bone, Robert M. and Milford B. Green. "Housing Assistance and Maintenance for the Métis in Northern Saskatchewan." Canadian Public Policy IX,4 (1983): 476-486.
2. Chislett, Katherine L.; Milford B. Green; and Robert M. Bone. "Housing Métis in Northern Saskatchewan: The Case of Housing Mismatch." Forthcoming issue of Canadian Geographer.
3. Larson, Leonard. "Maybe We Need A New System." The Northerner 33, 18 (6 May 1987), 1.
4. Northern Municipal Council, Report On The Housing Needs Survey, Northern Saskatchewan. Saskatoon: Institute for Northern Studies, University of Saskatchewan, 1977.

HOUSING POLICY CONCERNS IN NON-URBAN
AND SINGLE INDUSTRY COMMUNITIES
IN NORTHERN MANITOBA

Ken Cassin

INTRODUCTION

The discussion in this paper focuses on the "non-urban" north; those communities with a population of less than 2,500 - to use a Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) definition - whose housing conditions historically have been very poor, and to which planes and/or truckloads of "experts" descend from time to time to examine, define, plan and evaluate. The paper also discusses, however, a number of issues that have arisen with respect to housing in the larger urban/limited industry communities of the north.

Although the comments, herein, are relevant in other jurisdictions, they do reflect a Manitoba experience. While provinces and territories have varying types of unilateral public sector support programming, federal government policy has historically, and still is, the major influence in northern housing programming. However, this paper does not deal with the issue of "on-reserve" funding - a federal responsibility.

The "duality" of the north should be noted at the outset. The first group of non-urban communities, generally with a smaller population, has a particular set of problems reflecting an underdeveloped economy - and economy which could be defined in Third World terms. These communities are often characterized by lower levels (or lack) of basic facilities, and weak and unstable economies. Fishing and trapping are still predominant with concomitant high unemployment and social assistance dependencies. As a result, these communities are almost entirely dependent upon direct, deep subsidy government programming. The second group of communities is often defined as "resource" or "single industry" communities. However, these terms may not be wholly appropriate in that some of these communities are somewhat less homogeneous, with a greater level of industrialization and self-

sufficiency, or a limited degree of economic diversification. The physical character of the "resource" communities differs from the "non-urban" communities in the level of basic services; the "resource" group enjoying measurably superior service. As well, the quality of the housing environment in the "resource" communities is more comparable to southern communities. Unlike the "non-urban" group, the "resource" communities are generally eligible for a range of government housing programs under the National Housing Act. However, it is not uncommon for these "resource" centres to experience housing shortages, despite the higher average incomes of their residents. Often, there is not local building industry and the availability of adequate mortgage financing in the 1980s is somewhat suspect - mortgage insurance under the National Housing Act mortgage insurance is virtually unavailable.

NON-URBAN/REMOTE NORTH

In the area of housing, important strides have been made in non-urban/remote north communities in the last fifteen years. Approximately 1,000 government subsidized housing units have been delivered to non-urban northern communities in Manitoba over that period. Historically, all households in these communities have been eligible for subsidized housing units - most units being granted to large, low income families. Despite numerous problems and errors, substantial client identified dwelling condition improvement has taken place.

Housing Need

The nature of housing need in non-urban northern communities has often been lumped with rural areas. While there are clear similarities in housing, adequacy problems are more prevalent in both rural and remote areas than in urban areas; both basic facility and affordability problems are recognized as significantly more severe in the non-urban north. However, of equal importance, and an often overlooked connection in determining housing "need," is the non-market nature of communities. Traditional housing "requirement"

measures, based on population/headship projections, are of little application in these communities. Traditional measures of housing need and demand implicitly assume market response mechanisms are in place. Such is not the case in these communities. Neither the building or financing industries are oriented to deal with these communities. Therefore, housing need transcends the historic measures of adequacy, affordability and suitability. The issue of accessibility in the absence of local "markets" becomes critical.

The composition of housing need in non-urban communities is also of interest. Projections generally, if not exclusively, focus on family housing requirements. Relatively recent developments suggest a need for elderly person's accommodation; developments which introduce a whole range of questions with respect to care facilities in remote communities.

Policies and Programs

The primary federal vehicle for dealing with housing problems in the non-urban north has been the Rural and Northern Housing (RNH) Program under Section 40 of the National Housing Act. It was introduced in 1974 in response to representations from the Native Council of Canada. In Manitoba, the RNH Program represented an extension of the Remote Housing Program, facilitated under the same section of the NHA in the early 1970s.

The RNH Program provided for construction or acquisition/rehabilitation of housing units for low income households in communities with a population of less than 2,500. The units were to be rented or sold to clients on a payment-gearred-to-income basis. This arrangement recognized a deep subsidy requirement to meet the needs of very low income households. A variant of the public housing rent-to-income formula was created to meet this need. Federal/provincial cost-sharing of capital costs and subsidy costs was established on a 75/25 basis.

The second federal programming thrust was in rehabilitation. This was provided through two programs: the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance

Program (RRAP); and, the Emergency Repair Program (ERP). The ERP provided direct grants for "band-aid" repairs at the minimum health and safety level standard. They were provided on the understanding that the units were beyond long-term rehabilitation, and would require replacement. The RRAP provided loans, originally up to \$10,000, with up to \$3,750 to be forgiven on a needs basis. The program was originally part of Urban Neighbourhood Improvement Program, and had specific income level targeting objectives ("worst first") in addition to a major stock rehabilitation focus (life expectancy extension of 15 years). In 1974, the RRAP was extended to rural and remote areas.

RNH Issues

The RNH Program has had varying degrees of success. Specific physical problems with respect to unit type, design and construction are being discussed in other sessions of this conference. In reviewing the success from a policy perspective, the leading issues have been homeownership and affordability. From a client perspective, this is expressed in terms of the cost of homeownership, most specifically, heating and maintenance costs.

While resolution of affordability and arrears problems are being facilitated through the provision of a heating subsidy, it is clear that the issues have posed significant problems within the program in terms of other costs of homeownership. Fundamental to the resolution of these problems may be the recognition that the emphasis on homeownership, as opposed to utilization of the rental provisions permitted under Section 40 of the NHA, has been highly overstated. The reasons for adopting the ownership alternative at the outset of the program as the principal mode of delivery stemmed from a number of considerations ranging from greater security of tenure, encouragement of maintenance and improvements, to the administrative advantages of less on-going agency involvement, presumed lower subsidies, lower operating losses in the longer term, etc. In retrospect, these considerations have proven to be somewhat less than valid. In fact, it may be argued that the homeownership emphasis has served to detract from the effectiveness of the program in that it is ultimately much less affordable

than the rental alternative, when the cost of utilities, on-going maintenance and improvement, and general remote area living costs are considered. Also, it became more administratively complicated and costly, ironically, because of the mortgage over leasehold arrangement.

While the arrears and affordability questions may be considered historic problems with the program, the same cannot be said for the new Core Need Income Threshold entrance criteria for the RNH and RRAP Programs. Core Need Income Thresholds (CNIT) define the income level over which a household is assumed to be able to obtain suitable, adequate, affordable accommodation in their market area. These thresholds reflect the federal government's desire to "target" its subsidy assistance to those who are in the greatest need. This policy direction came in substantial part from an evaluation of the NHA, Section 56.1, Private Non-Profit Housing Program. It found that federal expenditures were not being well directed with respect to income groups.

While one would be hard pressed to argue against the principal of directing subsidy assistance to those who are in the greatest need, the unique character of these non-urban communities suggests that this approach is too narrow. There is no private housing market and no ready alternative for any income group. There are clear institutional barriers with respect to mortgage lending and insurance in these centres. The use of CNIT as, in effect, the only recognized element of housing "need" fails to adequately take into account this accessibility issue. The CNIT is currently based on the cost of land, a building kit delivered on site, and a limited sub-trade labour component. The underlying assumption is that if your income is above the CNIT, you may find accommodation in your market area or build your own house. The lack of market alternatives in these non-urban communities mitigates against the former, but some program flexibility is permitted in the latter assumption.

While the application of CNIT's to the RNH Program may be inappropriate, the application of CNIT's to the RRAP is bizarre. This stems from the fundamental design of RRAP. It was conceived as a repair program in the context of urban neighbourhood redevelopment, with a degree of sensitivity to

need based on income. It has been redefined as a social housing program without rethinking its intent or standards. Therefore, a "cliff effect" in the benefits scale has developed, whereby a client with \$1 of income above the threshold would be ineligible for benefits, while an income at or below the threshold would provide the client with thousands of dollars in non-repayable benefits. Secondly, the program standards remain at such a high level that a proper rehabilitation of the dwelling unit would require a loan repayment beyond the means of the eligible client. This problem is most acute where incomes are low and rehabilitation costs are high, i.e., northern communities. A rationalization of incompatible objectives is in order, and the federal government is currently reviewing the RRAP.

Policy Directions

There is little question that increasing fiscal pressures at all levels of government is and will continue to be a major concern. The federal government has clearly stated that the size of the social housing "pie" will not increase. Fiscal restraint will be of particular concern in the north, where costs and subsidy levels are high.

Future short term considerations will probably centre around programming options which address the affordability, accessibility and tenure issues. Uppermost will be the issue of the application of CNITs in both RNH and RRAP Programs, as social housing is the "only game in town." Undoubtedly, delivery constraints and product problems, as discussed in other sessions in this conference, will require continued resolution. Also, short term program pressures are likely to come from the need for elderly accommodations in remote communities, and this will raise a number of associated policy questions.

In future, longer term considerations may relate to the need for economic and social policy progress to be more closely linked. Given the probable fiscal constraints, collective efforts - from a variety of government agencies, industries, and communities - will be needed to deal with housing,

employment and economic development linkages. With specific reference to housing, it will be necessary to rethink the manner in which "need" is identified and addressed.

NORTHERN URBAN CENTRES

As previously discussed, the physical character of these northern urban centres differs from the non-urban communities in that a basic level of facilities exists in the former. However, these centres experience some similar problems in terms of the nature of need/demand; often accessibility is the manner in which need is manifested. Again, traditional measurements of housing "requirements" assume the existence of a private sector response mechanism. Such a mechanism translates housing "need" into "demand," assuming affordability is not an issue. While the existence of adequate income levels is a necessary condition for the translation of need into effective demand, it is clearly not the only condition. This is exemplified by the fact that in the mid-1970s, Thompson, Manitoba had the highest per capita income in the province, yet experienced a serious housing shortage which was not effectively addressed. The fundamental problem was that there was no local, mature building industry or housing market in a traditional sense.

The fact that accessibility is a housing problem in both northern urban and non-urban communities does not necessarily suggest that other housing need measures (i.e., affordability, adequacy, or suitability) are absent from northern urban centres. Previous studies - specifically the "Rural and Native Housing Review," 1980 - suggest that the incidence of affordability problems increases with community size. As well, if the northern communities are set out on a continuum of economic diversification, it is likely that the greatest diversification and lower reliance on single industry correlates with a more mature housing industry in terms of builders, available financing, the resale market, and the incidence of affordability problems. In terms of the composition of housing need, there are increasing pressures from elderly persons and "empty-nester" households for accommodation in northern urban centres, regardless of the level of diversification.

Policies and Programs

The overall "programmatic" response in northern urban communities has been to ensure that they are eligible for the same range of programming as other centres of their size, under the National Housing Act. This includes any social (e.g. non-profit housing) and market initiatives (e.g. mortgage insurance) which may be available.

Issues

Market housing development has generally been poor, even in larger northern centres. There is a current but varying need for small rental projects of approximately 15 to 25 units. This need is arising in market segments that do not require traditional social housing intervention. The pressure is often from elderly and empty-nester households as well as young professionals with "middle incomes." But the rental sector in particular, outside of periods of rapid expansion in single industry centres, has been particularly slow. It is characterized by wider gaps between economic and market rents than in southern cities. Locational and design considerations are impacted by the fact that development costs can not be translated into affordable rent levels, and more stringent financing requirements (e.g., shorter amortization periods, larger down payments) put pressure on developers to achieve earlier positive cash flows. Therefore, why would a developer build in Flin Flon when he could build at a lower risk in Winnipeg? The issue of mortgage insurance - in response to a housing need not usually recognized as a social housing need - becomes extremely important.

A public presence in the mortgage market has been a feature of federal housing policy for some time. The provision of joint mortgage loans (pre-1954) and the provision of mortgage insurance (post-1954) both attempted to provide protection for lending institutions, while increasing access to homeownership and lowering risks associated with rental market investment. The growth of private sector mortgage insurance in the 1970s, the concomitant suggestions of the maturing of the industry, and the concern over the

financial health of the Mortgage Insurance Fund per se, have been the bases for the re-examination of the federal presence in the mortgage industry over the last year.

From time to time, a variety of functions have been ascribed to the federal involvement in mortgage insurance. These include, but may not be restricted to: the provision of protection to lending institutions (and, therefore, investors) from borrower defaults; the minimization of direct government investment (i.e., joint mortgage loans); the provision, through actual administration of the insurance program, of a degree of consumer protection in terms of product standards/integrity; and lastly, the provision of equal access to mortgage funding for all Canadians.

In the recently announced changes with respect to Federal Loan Insurance, the issue of single industry resource communities has not been resolved, and further consultation will be required. While it is encouraging that a difference between northern and southern markets is recognized, it is unclear if the fundamental problems of northern centres will be addressed. The problem is that as a traditional "market" does not work in the northern centres, the validity of traditional programmatic responses/approaches is suspect. Certainly mortgage insurance will be available again at a program level. It remains to be seen whether or not sufficient insurable values will be provided to ensure housing investment. This concern has been expressed as whether "equal access" to mortgage insurance is just that, or whether access in some areas is less equal in others.

Policy Directions

Serious consideration must be given to redefining state mortgage insurance activity in terms of its broad social purpose. A redefinition of its purpose and objectives is required should this type of vehicle be used for housing support. This will have to be done within the context of a "rethinking" of the manner in which housing need is recognized and addressed. Conceivably, a different approach to equity protection is required.

The second major issue which must be addressed, by government, industry and single industry communities, is one which I have not touch on in this paper; what happens to single industry communities when the industry is gone? The housing component of this issue must be addressed in a much broader context of responsibility.

HOUSING DELIVERY IN THE NORTH

Lynn Hamley

Introduction

The north is not homogeneous and a discussion of housing delivery that does not take this into account would ignore significant aspects of housing delivery. The problems of delivery in a northern Alberta community are different than those in a community like Yellowknife, and those in Yellowknife are different than those of a community like Pangnirtung. In addressing housing delivery, problems related to the short building season, transportation logistics and lack of an available labour force will not be addressed in this paper, as it is more appropriately discussed under housing design and construction which deal with these issues more directly. In addition, this paper does not address the issues related to delivery in resource based communities. This issue is covered in another paper from the conference. This paper addresses housing delivery in the Northwest Territories (NWT) from the perspective of who delivers or should deliver; the relationship of the user to the product delivered, and the delivery agent.

Who Delivers Or Should Deliver?

Traditionally in Canada we have relied on two sectors for the development of housing: the private sector and the public sector. Within the last twenty years, a new community based sector has emerged, often referred to as the "third sector." This community based sector is represented by the efforts of community based non-profit and co-operative organizations. The majority of housing in this country has been developed by the private sector, with the public sector only directly providing housing when the private sector was unable to do so. The third sector provides residents with housing options; co-op housing provides a tenure option - co-operative ownership - while non-profit rental housing provides an alternative to private or public rental.

In the Northwest Territories, however, the major delivery agent has been the public sector. As Souchotte (1986) points out there are "small private housing enclaves in centres such as Frobisher Bay, Inuvik, Fort Smith and Hay River, the only major private market is in the capital city of Yellowknife." There are two reasons why most of the housing in the north was developed by the public sector. The first is a result of the housing supply crisis that emerged in the 1950s with the relocation of people, particularly in the eastern arctic, off the land and into organized communities. Although the housing was built by government, the intention was to have the residents assume ownership of the housing. Unfortunately, the cost of heating and maintaining these units mitigated against this, and the units became public housing rental units. Public rental housing evolved as the main vehicle for providing housing for residents of local communities. The second reason was that with the exception of the larger communities, there was no housing market in most of the communities. High costs of production, both as a result of

TABLE 1
Northwest Territory Housing Corporation Inventory
February 1982

Region	Number of Units	Population
Baffin	1,305	8,300
Fort Smith	742	22,384
Inuvik	761	7,485
Keewatin	625	7,485
Kitikmeot	625	3,245
TOTAL	4,058	45,741

Source: 1) Number of Units - NWT Data Book, 1982-83
 2) Population - Statistics Canada, Selected Social and Economic Characteristics: Northwest Territories, 1983

location and settlement distribution, made it impossible for a private entrepreneur to develop and rent housing units. With a limited private market, government delivery was the only realistic option. In addition to public rental housing, the government provided special rental housing for its staff. As illustrated in Table 1, by February 1982, the NWT Housing Corporation owned and managed over 4,000 public housing units.

In addition, by 1982 the Government of the NWT owned a total of 1,080 staff housing units and leased another 907, which were distributed among the regions as follows (Table 2):

TABLE 2

Government Owned And Leased Staff Housing
February 1982

Region	No. of Owned Staff Housing Units	No. of Leased Staff Housing Units
Baffin	224	256 ^a
Fort Smith	406	571
Inuvik	179	75 ^b
Keewatin	153	5 ^c
Kitikmeot	118	0
TOTAL	1,080	907

Source: NWT Data Book, 1982-83

Notes: ^aFrobisher Bay only

^b72 of which are in Inuvik

^cRankin Inlet only

While public housing is still a mainstay in the NWT, by 1986 there was a visible shift in production of home ownership units. In 1986, residential construction activity included the building of 145 public housing units, 40 government staff houses and the rehabilitation of 107 units. In addition, 180 house material packages were supplied by the Housing Corporation under the Home Ownership Assistance Program(HAP), (Souchotte, 1986). Under the HAP Program, materials are provided for housing assuming the potential owners provide the labour to erect the housing.

The third sector has been very slow to develop in the north. Although there were building co-operatives developed in the early 1960s in both Frobisher Bay and Inuvik, these two early projects were not replicated in other parts of the Territories. In 1975, the residents of Fort Good Hope decided it was time that they began to deliver their own housing rather than relying on government rental housing. While their initial attempts to develop their own housing were not without difficulty, they managed to pursue the idea to a successful conclusion. In 1985/86, the Fort Good Hope Housing Society received adequate funding to develop eight (8) new houses in the community. Once developed, these units were owned and managed by the individual household. The main impetus for the development of their own housing stemmed from a concern over the dependency relationship that government housing created. Such a relationship was aptly described by Antoine Mountain, a resident of Fort Good Hope, "The houses [government housing] were pretty well cluttered up. There was no room for a wood stove. People didn't have to chop wood or haul water. All they had to do was rely on government handouts. They stopped caring about their houses and lost their initiative for a hunting and trapping way of life" (Souchotte, 1986).

It was not until 1982, that continuing housing co-operatives were explored as an option in the NWT. Yellowknife was the first community to review such an option. The core group which eventually formed the Borealis Co-operative Limited, comprised primarily employees of Arctic Federated. The core group held its first public meeting in March 1982 and by June of that year it had sixty-four member households. The impetus behind the co-operative was the member's desire to develop a housing project which they owned and controlled.

A second group developed in the eastern arctic later that summer. Hillside Housing Co-operative Limited, located in Iqaluit (Frobisher Bay) was organized by a government employees. Not only were the members of the group concerned about living in housing over which they would have control, they were also concerned with acquiring quality housing. A number of members lived in housing that had been previously declared substandard. For the members and the community, the co-operative was seen as an ownership alternative to rental housing which would have a positive impact on the community. As James Britton, Regional Director for the Government of the NWT noted in 1982:

As you may know virtually all housing is provided here by government agencies or by private sector employers. This has had some unfortunate consequences for the community - a high level of transience, a somewhat indifferent attitude to the problems of the Town and its appearance, etc. Lately there have been a few promising developments in the area of home ownership and there have been a few private housing starts. There has been an improvement in the conditions in the Town as well. The Hillside Housing Co-op would represent a major step forward in the process of encouraging homeownership. I am sure the project, as well as providing accommodation to the Co-op's membership, will inspire more Frobisher Bay residents to obtain their own quarters.

Another co-operative developed in Fort Smith in 1985, and a second group is currently working towards the development of a co-operative in Yellowknife. The delivery of these co-operative projects was not an easy task. Even under the best circumstances, the delivery of a co-operative housing project requires the co-operation and co-ordination of a number of a number of parties; the owner, their consultants, the builder, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation the financiers and local planning authorities, to name but a few. Such co-ordination and co-operation is much more difficult to achieve when a project is located in a northern community. For example, with the project in Frobisher Bay, the consultants were located in Edmonton and Yellowknife, the Contractor was from Ottawa with a branch office in Frobisher Bay, CMHC's office was in Yellowknife, and the mortgage company was in Edmonton. In addition, the materials and supplies had to be shipped from Montreal. Needless to say, the co-ordination of this project was fraught with difficulty.

It is clear from the presentations to the Special Committee on Housing of the Government of the NWT that many residents would welcome an option to public housing. Homeownership was often cited as an objective, particularly in the western Arctic. With the exception of the major communities in the western Arctic, Yellowknife and Fort Smith, where private builders can build houses on speculation for sale to individual owners, homeownership units can probably only be delivered through government programs such as HAP (whether constructed by an individual owner or a community based non-profit organization similar to the Fort Good Hope Housing Society) or through continuing housing co-operatives. In addition, in many communities, private rental units can probably only be delivered through community based non-profit organizations.

Relationship of the User to the Housing and the Delivery Agent

Both homeownership and community operated private rental projects require the availability of local skills and resources to develop and maintain the housing once it is built. Within the last couple of years there has been the development of a number of local contractors in the various regions. The special program established by the Construction Association and the NWT Department of Economic Development and the Housing Corporation to train northern contractors should assist the provision of both the skills to develop the housing units and to maintain them once they are built. Additional resources are required to affect a shift away from public housing to ownership/community based rental units which will necessitate a community development/social development program. Such an approach is necessary because the reliance on public housing has fostered a dependent rather than an interdependent relationship between the user and the housing delivery agent.

Communitas Inc. of Edmonton has found, for example, that even individuals and groups developing housing projects in an urban environment require extensive training in the areas of financial, physical and community management. It is important for homeowners to have a planned maintenance program. In the Territories, such a planned maintenance program can even be

more critical. In an urban environment when something breaks down, it is possible to access supplies and materials from local suppliers; in the north, however, an owner might have to wait for the next shipment of goods and materials.

As was illustrated in the various presentations to the Special Committee on Housing, as well as presentations at the Conference On Northern Housing in Saskatoon, residents in the north have a great desire to have more control over their own housing units. A shift towards some forms of ownership and community based rentals would certainly facilitate this control. In addition, providing the local housing associations who manage the public housing with more autonomy and resources would also shift the control away from a central agency to the local community. There is, however, a major problem, aside from the need for local skills and resources that must be addressed if the shift away from public housing is to be realized. This problem exists in the larger communities but is more pronounced in the smaller, more isolated communities. The problem is one of affordability. The early experiments in the eastern Arctic did not work because residents could not afford to maintain and operate their units. In communities where residents do not have a steady income or predetermined shelter allowance, they would not be able to afford to operate and maintain the units without some form of government subsidy. The situation would be exacerbated if one added the cost of debt retirement. The cost of developing a housing unit in the NWT is much greater than in southern communities. For example, the co-operative project in Yellowknife was approximately 40% more expensive than units developed at the same time in Edmonton, while the Frobisher Bay units cost almost twice that of the Yellowknife units. Transportation and labour costs, as well as specific design requirements necessitated both by climatic and environmental factors, are the main reasons for the cost differentials. Without government assistance, the housing charges for a fully serviced three bedroom co-op unit in year one in Yellowknife would have been \$1,798.00, rather than \$835.00, and \$2,350.00 rather than \$1,165.00 in Frobisher Bay. Assuming 25% of income, a household still required an income of \$40,089.00 for Yellowknife and \$55,920.00 in Frobisher Bay to pay these subsidized charges. Without

additional subsidies and housing allowance, most co-op residents could not afford the co-op housing charges.

As illustrated in Table 3, the Housing Corporation's cost of operating and maintaining housing in the randomly selected communities is expensive. Assuming 25% of income towards the costs, households would require the following incomes to pay the operating and maintenance of the housing in the various communities (assuming a cost of \$94.00 per m²). It should be noted that while 25% of income is used, many NWT residents consider this too large a proportion of income towards housing, since other costs of living are higher in the north than in the south. A more appropriate percentage of income might be derived through a residual income approach.

TABLE 3

Income Required To Pay Housing Corporation Operating/Maintenance Costs

Community	Unit Size	Operating and Maintenance Costs	Income Required
Aklavik	50.01/m ²	\$4,700.94	\$18,804.00
Arctic Bay	73.30/m ²	6,890.20	27,560.00
Baker Lake	66.76/m ²	6,275.44	25,102.00
Cambridge Bay	63.57/m ²	5,975.58	23,902.00
Fort Providence	37.46/m ²	3,521.24	14,085.00

Source: NWT Data Book, 1982-83

Note: assumes a cost of \$94.00 per m²

The cost of Housing Corporation operations used in the previous table include a component for administration that would not be paid by a private homeowner, and probably would be less expensive in a co-operative form of ownership. The elimination of these costs could effectively reduce the cost to the individual owner. Table 4 illustrates the income that would be required to cover the cost of utilities and maintenance. The utilities are

based upon the average 1981 Housing Corporation costs for the region, and the maintenance costs are based upon an annual average per unit cost of \$400.00/month (Edmonton base - the average maintenance cost per year budgeted in co-op projects) and adjusted first to deal with the differential between Edmonton and Yellowknife (1981) shelter costs, and then adjusted to deal with the difference in maintenance costs on a square meter basis, indicated between Yellowknife and the various selected communities (NWT Housing Corporation figures). No adjustments were made for homeowner utility subsidies provided by the government. As a result, these figures represent the potential costs and income requirements exclusive of any subsidy assistance.

TABLE 4

Operating Cost And Required Income For Various NWT Communities

Community	Annual Utilities	Annual Maintenance	Income Required (at 25% G.D.S.)
Aklavik	\$3,406.00	\$590.00	\$15,984.00
Arctic Bay	4,163.00	661.00	19,296.00
Baker Lake	5,271.00	652.00	23,692.00
Cambridge Bay	4,532.00	602.00	20,536.00
Fort Providence	2,896.00	494.00	13,560.00

Even assuming these reduced costs, based upon the 1981 median incomes (Table 5) within these communities, unless households had more than one person working, many of them would have difficulty meeting the costs of utilities and maintenance on a unit. In addition, in most of these communities, at least half of the census families had incomes of less than \$5,000.00 per year.

TABLE 5

Median Incomes In Selected Northern Communities

Community	Median Income Males over 15	Median Income Females Over 15	Census Family Income <\$5,000.00 Annum % Total Households
Aklavik	\$6,090.00	\$3,699.00	50%
Arctic Bay	6,599.00	1,916.00	51%
Baker Lake	7,457.00	4,303.00	52%
Cambridge Bay	12,312.00	4,044.00	51%
Fort Providence	5,606.00	4,412.00	50%

Source: Statistics Canada,
Selected Social and Economic Characteristics - Northwest
Territories 1983

The issue of affordability is not as severe in the larger communities such as Yellowknife, Fort Smith and Inuvik (Table 6). As the following table illustrates, the 1981 median incomes for males over 15 are generally higher than the amount required to cover the cost of utilities and maintenance.

TABLE 6

Median Incomes In Larger Northern Communities

Community	Annual Utilities ^a	Annual Maintenance ^b	Income Required	Median Income Male	Median Income Female
Yellowknife	\$4,896.00	\$494.00	\$21,560.00	\$21,296.00	\$11,629.00
Fort Smith	2,896.00	494.00	13,560.00	14,787.00	5,879.00
Inuvik	3,406.00	554.00	15,840.00	18,942.00	9,382.00

Notes: ^abased upon average for region

^bEdmonton base - adjusted as previous table

Conclusion

In summary, affordability is a problem that affects the delivery of housing in the Territories. Many households could not afford to pay the utility and maintenance costs of a unit and certainly could not cover the cost of the debt service. Table 7 illustrates the income required to cover the cost of repayment of the debt service and utilities of a 94 m² house in the various selected communities. The table is based upon a \$70,000.00 house in Edmonton, which was adjusted upwards by 40% to establish a Yellowknife cost and then adjusted for each community. A mortgage rate of 11% and a 35 year amortization were used to determine repayment.

TABLE 7

Housing Affordability In The North

Community	House Cost	Annual Utilities Maintenance	Annual Debt Service	Income Required (at 25% G.D.S.)
Yellowknife	\$ 98,000.00	\$3,390.00	\$10,795.00	\$56,740.00
Aklavik	136,220.00	3,996.00	15,006.00	76,008.00
Arctic Bay	163,660.00	4,824.00	18,029.00	91,412.00
Baker Lake	155,820.00	5,923.00	17,165.00	92,352.00
Cambridge Bay	142,100.00	5,134.00	15,653.00	83,148.00
Fort Providence	98,980.00	3,390.00	10,903.00	57,172.00

Historically, the subsidies have taken the form of provision of public housing. Northerners have indicated that they want options. The HAP Program provides an ownership option, however, because of its requirement that a household's income (taking into account ownership utility subsidies) be such that they can operate and maintain the units after they are built, it is really not an option for low income households, which in most regions represents a large proportion of the population. For example, in the five

regions, nearly half of the census families had household incomes of less than \$5,000 per year. There definitely is a gap between incomes and the cost of housing. One suggestion is to increase the economic base and thereby the income levels. While this may be possible in some communities, it certainly will not be possible in all communities.

High costs and limited incomes necessitate housing subsidies for a large proportion of the population in the north. Once the need for subsidies is recognized and accepted, the issue that must be addressed is what form should these subsidies take. While public housing may be the answer for some households, options should be available to a broad spectrum of households. In developing these options, the financial limitations of the household must be recognized. Is it, in fact, appropriate to burden households with no secure income potential with a mortgage debt service that they can only carry with extensive subsidies, or is it better to provide mortgage free housing and only subsidize a portion of the operating costs?

Given the high costs of production in the NWT, and the limited resale market outside a few major communities, a delivery system that made use of capital subsidies to deal with the production of units and housing allowances to deal with operating costs might be more appropriate than a model which relies heavily on public housing. The housing allowance could be predetermined based upon typical utility consumption and maintenance costs on owner occupancy. Given the differences in employment and income opportunities among the various communities, a variety of programs might be necessary to ensure equitable treatment of all residents in the NWT.

Such an approach could provide various tenure options to households whose incomes do not currently enable them to take advantage of existing ownership programs, and to community groups who want to develop non-profit rental projects.

In developing such programs, it is important that there be community input and involvement. A strategic approach which takes into account the community development/social development requirements of the various communities is

necessary. In closing the comments made by Mr. Barnaby (1984) to the Committee on Housing illustrate how not to approach the problem.

As was mentioned before, there has always been a problem with housing, especially since the territorial government got involved in it. If you look back to before the government moved north, I mean everybody owned and built their own houses and had responsibility for everything they decided. They did it for themselves, about 1968 or 1969, there was a big push by the government to change everything around....I guess it involved everything, but it also involved housing. There was a lot of time and money spent introducing a new rental program of housing. At that time, people were promised that they would pay a couple of bucks a month and they would have a lower rental unit, that is what they were called. So that was a pretty good deal, you got all you electricity and fuel oil, plus the house for two dollars a month.

Along with that, a lot of the old houses were destroyed. At that time, there was no council, nothing to advise the territorial government; they did not recognize band councils, they did not talk to them. So a lot of the houses were destroyed, some of them pushed over with cats, some of these people still do not have houses. Their houses were never replaced. Also, they would have no choice but a rental house, that means their houses were taken away from them and then they would have to rent from the people who took them away.

CONTRIBUTORS**Peter Anderson**

Peter Anderson is the General Manager of the Prairie and Northwest Territories Region, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Mr. Anderson, a graduate of the University of Manitoba, has been with CMHC for the past 15 years in various capacities including: Director, Saskatchewan; Manager, Calgary; and Assistant Manager, Winnipeg. He has a keen interest in the housing field, especially in the areas of native and seniors' housing.

Robert Bone

Robert Bone is Professor of Geography, University of Saskatchewan. While Director of the Institute for Northern Studies, Professor Bone was involved in a major study of Métis housing in northern Saskatchewan, the Northern Saskatchewan Housing Needs Survey which was undertaken by the Northern Municipal Council. He was instrumental in the preparation of the Northern Saskatchewan Housing Needs Survey Report, 1978. This study focused on Métis housing in northern Saskatchewan, an inventory of Métis housing and measuring the need for more housing. The question of housing assistance and maintenance for the Métis in northern Saskatchewan was the basis of an article published in Canadian Public Policy in December 1983. Copies of this article can be obtained from the author. From 1982 to 1987, he has been Director of the Norman Wells Socio-Impact Monitoring Program for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

Tom Carter

Tom Carter is the Assistant Director of the Institute of Urban Studies and Associate Professor of Geography, University of Winnipeg. Prior to joining the Institute in 1985, Dr. Carter was Executive Director of the Research and Policy Department Division with the Saskatchewan Housing Corporation. Dr. Carter held various positions in research and program delivery with the Housing Corporation in the period 1974 to 1985. He has lectured in geography

and urban studies at the Universities of Brandon and Regina and currently lectures in Urban Studies at the University of Winnipeg. Dr. Carter is a graduate of the Universities of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Ken Cassin

Ken Cassin is the Director of Research and Planning, Manitoba Department of Housing.

Lynn Hannley

Lynn Hannley is the Director of Communitas Inc.

David Hedmann

David Hedmann has lived in the Yukon for five years and has worked for the Yukon Housing Corporation since 1985. His activities have included day to day administration of several housing programs and involvement in many special projects. Some of these include: the direction of consultants involved in the development of a Yukon social housing policy white paper; program development; the preparation of Corporate policy position papers; and territorial/federal negotiations. Mr. Hedmann is a graduate of Concordia University in Montreal and attended the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia where he was a founding member of the Indian and Northern Affairs studies group. He has worked previously for a private sector consulting firm in Vancouver, the Department of Indian Affairs and Indian organizations in British Columbia and the Yukon.

Hal Logsdon

Hal Logsdon is currently the Vice-President, Program and Community Services, for the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation. Mr. Logsdon began his housing career in 1976 when he accepted a job with the Housing Corporation as District Manager in Cambridge Bay, Northwest Territories. He also worked as District Manager in Inuvik before assuming his current position in

Yellowknife. Mr. Logsdon immigrated to Canada in 1967 from the United States, and is a graduate of the Universities of Guelph and Carleton. He is currently responsible for housing program development and planning. He has been active in the development of Senior Citizen's Housing and Homeownership programs in the Northwest Territories, and is a member of the Federal/Provincial Committee that organized the new housing agreements. He was also active in the bilateral negotiations between Canada and the Northwest Territories which lead to the cost sharing of the Northwest Territories Homeownership Assistance Programs.

Robert Robson

Robert Robson joined the Institute of Urban Studies in November 1986 as a Research Fellow. Dr. Robson is a graduate of the Universities of Guelph and Manitoba. He has focused his research on northern development and resource towns, and has published several articles on this subject in the Laurentian University Review; Environnements; Urban History Review/Revue d'histoire urbaine; and Labour/Le Travailleur. During his appointment at the Institute, Robson will be researching issues related to northern and remote area housing.